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in Africa Ranked by Outreach 164All across Africa, access to finance is rightly seen as the key to unlocking
growth for poor farm families as much as for expanding export firms. This
book explains that Africa needs not only funds, but also a more effective
and inclusive means of channeling funds and other financial services to
where they can be most effective. 
Making financial systems work better is already a widely shared goal
among policy makers in Africa. Strong financial systems have helped
deliver rapid overall growth, as well as direct and indirect benefits, across
the income distribution. Reflecting this understanding, policy reforms that
have halted and reversed earlier deterioration have been adopted over the
past decade. Governments have been building needed legal, information,
and regulatory infrastructures. They have facilitated entry of—and compe-
tition among—solid financial intermediaries, national, regional, and
international.
Important foundations have been laid, but it is clear that the perform-
ance of national financial sectors still falls short of its potential. Policy mak-
ers in many African countries are confronting similar issues and choices:
how to get credit flowing more readily to where it can boost growth, how
to get more finance for long-term and riskier projects, whether small
national equity markets should collaborate across national borders, how
best to design the regulation of banks and microfinance institutions in the
African context, and where governments should concentrate their efforts.
Foreword
xixii MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
The fact that such a wide range of fundamental questions is being asked in
so many parts of Africa motivates the present regional study. Drawing on
recent experience across the region and in international comparisons, Making
Finance Work for Africa seeks to present a coherent and consistent policy
approach that addresses African priorities and can work in African conditions.
This is a wide-ranging study that defies brief summary. But I am struck
by three ideas, which recur in different forms throughout the book. 
First, there is a clear institution-building agenda whose building blocks
will yield clear benefits over time. At the same time, scope also exists for
energy and imagination in adapting and applying universally sound prin-
ciples to local conditions. 
Second, despite the sometimes problematic political overtones, there is
much to be said for being open to regional or international solutions. The
reentry of foreign banks and the renewed interest in multicountry regula-
tory agencies show that this thought already has its adherents. Interna-
tional partnerships and outsourcing are also key to making the most of
new technologies that are providing innovative solutions to the challenges
of access to finance.
Third, countries have benefited from adopting an inclusive approach. By
an inclusive approach I mean ensuring not only that reforms are targeted at
embracing all income groups and sectors, but also that regulators facilitate
the emergence and growth of a range of different types of intermediaries
and ownership structures, and of different types of financial products.
The low level of private sector investment is both a cause of Africa’s growth
shortfall and a consequence of low confidence engendered by the repeated
setbacks in most countries in the region. Escape from these conditions can
hardly be imagined without a central role for finance. Policies that strengthen
finance will also address these core development gaps. By providing an alter-
native to government patronage as the basis for entry into business activities,
a strong, independent financial system can transform the business environ-
ment. Financial development can also generate a lock-in effect that raises the
commitment of national elites to growth-oriented policies.
Making finance work for Africa is thus one of the most central and far-
reaching of development goals for the continent.
Gobind T. Nankani
Regional Vice President for Africa
The World Bankxiii
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A decade of reforms— 
There are stirrings of change in African finance, some of them vigorous.
Strengthened by an extended wave of reforms over the past decade,
financial systems in many African countries have begun to diversify their
activities, deepen their lending, and increase their reach with new prod-
ucts and new technologies. Financial repression and the practice of
directed credit are both much diminished, and there has been extensive
privatization of state-owned banks—often to foreign-owned banks, the
reentry of which represents only one aspect of a growing potential in
internationalization and regionalization. A microfinance movement with
deep roots on the continent has strengthened with organic growth and
new entrants. Growing links between microfinance institutions (MFIs)
and mainstream banks illustrate the adaptation of organizational struc-
tures to local conditions.
The persistent failure—until a decade ago—of formal and semiformal
finance to advance, thereby leaving a fragmented and dualistic financial
system stubbornly in place, thus seems to have been overcome. A new
wave of intermediaries, many of them market based, has begun to adopt
new approaches that promise to address the special challenges that con-
front financial development in the region. Cell-phone technology is being
CHAPTER 1
Setting the Scene
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used for retail payments and for price transparency. Modern technology
also underlies the surge of retail lending in several African countries. 
—But there is still much left to do 
Of course, these countries still have a long way to go. The continued shal-
lowness of finance and the limited access by small firms and households to
any formal financial services, especially in rural areas, mean that this
financial awakening is just a turning of the corner. The environment for
financial firms remains difficult, and progress has not been as fast as had
been hoped. The combination of improvements and unfulfilled potential
warrants a new look at African finance. 
To some extent, the condition of national financial systems reflects gen-
eral economic conditions in each economy. But a two-way process is at
work: a strong financial system is a powerful engine of growth—and
equality.
Finance can expand opportunities and reduce risks—
The economies of East Asia have shown how putting national savings to
work in productivity-increasing investment can sustain rapid growth over a
generation. Microfinance innovations in Asia and Latin America have
helped low-income households manage risks through savings. Such innova-
tions have empowered energetic microentrepreneurs, giving them the first
step up the ladder of prosperity and lifting living standards in the areas where
they operate. Innovations in the technology for remittances and novel tech-
niques in insurance have also played an important role in improving welfare.
By bridging the gap between savers and entrepreneurs, financial systems
not only reduce the risks on both sides but also open up opportunities to
both sides. They can reduce the barriers to entry for entrepreneurs, thereby
allowing the economy at large to benefit in terms of increasing employ-
ment, improving the price and quality of services, and reducing the stifling
influence of established monopolies. Given access to the necessary finance,
farmers can move to a higher level of productivity and output. Savers, too,
can share in the returns on an expanded flow of investment. Housing,
insurance, and pension arrangements can be lifted onto a new plane.
—But governments must provide a supporting policy environment
Increasingly, scholars acknowledge that supportive policy for financial sec-
tor development is a key component of national development policy.SETTING THE SCENE 3
Indeed, careful comparative analysis of the growth rates of different coun-
tries over a 30-year period has produced convincing evidence that having
a deeper financial system contributes to growth—and is not merely a
reflection of prosperity (figure 1.1).1 Countries with deep financial systems
also seem to have a lower incidence of poverty than others at the same
level of national income. At the firm level, growth also responds to access
to credit and to the conditions that favor such access. 
Finance and social change
Strong financial systems are built on good governance, certainly both of
the intermediaries and their regulators. In addition, because all sizable
enterprises and all government agencies do business with the financial sec-
tor, improvements in this dimension of the financial sector have a perva-
sive leavening effect on the quality of governance in the business and
government sectors as a whole.
FIGURE 1.1 
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Source: Based on data in Beck 2006. 
Note: Country abbreviations are included in the abbreviations list at the front of the book. This figure plots for 99 countries the re-
lationship between private credit from the banking system, expressed as a percentage of GDP, and average annual growth in GDP
per capita, controlling for the effect of initial (1980) GDP per capita, inflation, trade openness, government consumption, average
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Without a well-functioning financial sector to allocate and reallocate
resources available for investment, African societies in which a closed
group of incumbents (public or private) makes most of the investment and
strategic decisions, because only they have the resources to implement
large-scale plans, risk stagnating (see Eifert, Gelb, and Ramachandran
2006; Rajan and Zingales 2003). By allocating and reallocating resources
on a more objective basis of creditworthiness and prospective returns, a
finance-rich economy is more conducive to a wider distribution of eco-
nomic power and influence, which in turn should feed back into improved
national economic performance on many dimensions. 
Financial development can help broaden the elite class because wealthy
and middle-class people can acquire a share in the success of local economic
ventures and begin to define their own prosperity in terms of national pros-
perity without reference to ethnic or local advantage. One concrete exam-
ple is the way in which national elites have become interested in the
fortunes of recently privatized firms, which though often majority owned
by foreigners have a fraction of their ownership listed on local exchanges. If
elites are invested in national economic prosperity (rather than defensively
attempting to secure—for a time—their share of a static or declining pie that
may at any time be swept away by social or economic crisis), they may
work harder to introduce policies that underpin economic growth.2
Key Policy Issues
What policy responses are now needed to foster the new energy; to help
ensure that modern technology, organizational innovation, and interna-
tionalization are exploited to the maximum; and to help ensure that
investable funds are well allocated to underpin growth and to protect
against any future risks?
The agenda for financial sector policy reform and strengthening is a long
one. A practical strategy needs to take into account implementation con-
straints. Furthermore, some reforms require preconditions in the wider
economic and political environment, without which they will be ineffec-
tive or even counterproductive. 
What should guide African decision makers in prioritizing policies to
strengthening financial sectors? This report suggests a two-pronged
approach:SETTING THE SCENE 5
• Economic growth is the surest way to a substantial and sustained reduc-
tion in poverty in Africa; policy for long-term growth requires focusing
on the larger and more formal parts of the financial system. 
• But even while growth-enhancing policies are beginning to have their
effect, improving the access of low-income households and microentre-
preneurs to financial services should become an additional central focus
of financial sector policy. 
Thus, consistent with the two policy prongs of growth and access, the
most pressing needs in African finance are (a) to increase the availability
and lower the cost of credit to productive enterprises and (b) to extend the
reach of basic savings, payments, credit, and insurance services for low-
income people and for the smallholder farms and microenterprises that
provide their livelihood. Africa also needs a wider range of longer-term
facilities (including mortgage finance); greater possibilities for risk man-
agement and diversification, including more transparent price discovery;
and improved marketability of tradable securities, such as debt and corpo-
rate equity. Each of these areas makes demands on scarce technical and
managerial skills, including prudent management, regulation, and
supervision.
The two prongs will have overlaps; indeed, in time these overlaps will
tend to grow as the larger intermediaries find ways of applying technology
to reach a wider clientele. The challenges of agricultural finance will
remain central for both prongs. Scaling up high-productivity agriculture
and agribusiness will remain an important part of the growth process in
most African countries; large-scale agricultural enterprises will remain
important customers of the main banks. For most farmers and rural work-
ers, their main point of contact with the financial sector will be at the
micro level.
For the most part, the growth and access prongs do not interfere: con-
flicts or tradeoffs between the two goals are encountered only rarely. It is
possible to move forward on both fronts.
African financial systems are not all the same;3 they are spread across a
spectrum of financial sector performance. Nevertheless, sufficient similari-
ties exist between the underlying economic conditions that face financial
firms in most of the countries to allow several generalizations. In addition
to low savings rates, finance in most African countries works within an
environment that is extreme in four key dimensions: scale, informality,6 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
governance, and shocks. Although similar difficulties are found elsewhere,
the frequency with which this quartet of environmental obstacles meets
up together in Africa means that policy analysis in the region has a distinc-
tive flavor. 
• Scale refers to the small size of the economies and even more of the
national financial systems and firms and their customers. Sparse popu-
lation, resulting in isolation and great distances (at least in terms of
travel time) to points of services, is another aspect of what is included
under the heading of scale. Because most financial services involve fixed
costs and increasing returns of scale (at least up to a certain point), the
problem of scale translates into a problem of high unit costs and even
unaffordability of certain services. Possible solutions include rigorous
attention to cost control, reliance on internationalization to benefit from
a sharing of some of the fixed costs, and reliance on information and
communications technology that can result in lower unit costs. 
• Informality refers to the status not just of client enterprises of financial
intermediaries but also of the markets within which they work; infor-
mality reduces the degree to which reliance can be placed on systematic
documentation, adherence to a predictable schedule, or even a fixed
place of business. 
• Governance problems arise at the level of private and public institutions
but are probably relatively more severe in the public sector. This prob-
lem reduces the credibility and stability of government policy and
increases the danger that policy goals will be subverted in
implementation.
• Not all types of shocks are more severe or more frequent in Africa than
elsewhere, but the continent’s history over the past half-century has
been marked by a high incidence of occasional economic or political
meltdowns (associated with conflict, famine, and politico-societal col-
lapse as well as with external factors) at a frequency of up to one per
decade per country (Arnold 2005; Meredith 2005). At the micro or
“idiosyncratic” level, risk is also very high for individual households
near or below the poverty line and for small farms and firms.
So that financial services can be delivered safely and at reasonable cost
despite these difficult conditions, stakeholders need to find solutions draw-SETTING THE SCENE 7
ing on innovations in financial, information, and communications tech-
nology; internationalization; and well-adapted organizational structures. 
Bearing in mind this quartet of environmental challenges, we now turn
to the two major approaches that are conventionally adopted to pursue
financial sector reform in Africa. 
Modernism and Activism: Two Perspectives for Reform
Building and preserving an enabling environment for domestic finance to
flourish is a goal on which all will agree. African policy reforms to date
have gone some distance toward stabilizing the macroeconomy and
removing incoherent administrative controls on wholesale interest rates.
Regulatory authorities have rightly intervened in insolvent banks; many of
them have been recapitalized and placed under better management and
ownership. Among many other reforms, a lot has been done to improve
the regulatory framework for banking (Aryeetey and Senbet 2004). 
Clearly more is needed, but what? There can be no dispute about the
importance of macroeconomic stability, contractual certainty, and policy
and commercial transparency as the foundations of an effective financial
system (see box 1.1). That is not to say that these foundations are securely
in place throughout the continent—far from it. Macroeconomic instability,
though much less evident than a decade ago, is still a threat in certain
parts; crowding out by government borrowing has been evident in several
countries; and the risk of major policy reversals is routinely factored into
investor decisions. Reforming the legal and judicial system and improving
financial information and transparency are tasks that are far from
complete.
Certain building blocks, including rationalization and clarification of
laws, streamlining of court procedures, establishment of credit registries,
and training of financial professionals, are well accepted as key compo-
nents in moving toward more effective financial systems. This book does
not dwell on these widely agreed goals and building blocks—which are not
Africa-specific.4 Instead, the focus is on matters that are not so clear but
speak more specifically to Africa’s distinctive needs.
Two distinct but complementary perspectives to the strengthening of
African financial systems prevail in current policy discussion. They can be
summarized as the modernist and the activist perspectives. Both accept the8 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
importance of the overall enabling environment but seek to look beyond
those basics. Both perspectives have validity and an appropriate range of
application. Misunderstandings and policy debates can often be interpreted
in terms of a clash over which perspective is more relevant and more likely
to be effective in meeting different dimensions of African needs.
Putting in place the infrastructures necessary for effective functioning of
the financial sector will require a protracted period of modernization.
There is no doubt that modernization represents the bedrock of any credi-
ble vision for national financial sectors, whether in Africa or elsewhere. 
The modernist perspective sees finance as an anonymous, atomistic,
market-oriented mechanism that disregards the pedigree or power of its
users except to the extent that such power influences the remuneration of
BOX 1.1
Stability, Certainty, and Transparency:
Foundations of Financial Sector Efficiency
Three of the most important background aspects of the economic and in-
stitutional environmental contributing to efficient financial sector function-
ing are macroeconomic stability, certainty of contract enforcement, and
availability of information.
Macroeconomic stability is particularly helpful for encouraging banking de-
velopment. Low and stable inflation encourages monetary savings by mak-
ing the real value of savings more predictable. Fiscal discipline allows mo-
bilized savings to be channeled to the private sector and prevents the
crowding out of private investment by government borrowing demands. 
Lenders and investors are more willing to enter into financial contracts
where more certainty exists about the relative legal rights of borrowers,
creditors, and outside (minority) investors and if fair, speedy, and impartial
enforcement can be confidently expected. Legal systems giving greater
relative weight to the rights of creditors compared with borrowers and to
the rights of minority shareholders compared with majority shareholders
and management, for example, promote deeper debt and equity markets,
respectively. Ideally, creditors should have effective ways of enforcing con-
tracts outside bankruptcy as well as maintaining creditor rights within theSETTING THE SCENE 9
each financial contract. This perspective casts a suspicious eye on the inte-
gration of industrial and financial power, because the emergence of con-
centrated industrial-financial groups can have the effect of blocking
entrepreneurship by those outside the main power groups. Integration of
finance and government is also questioned for similar reasons (hence the
low standing, from the modernist perspective, of state-owned banks).
The modernist perspective concerns itself mainly with large-scale
finance—deepening the resource mobilization of the banking system,
ensuring that banks want to and can safely lend on these resources, and
enabling productive formal sector firms to find the mix of equity and debt
finance they need to grow, as well as sophisticated tools for risk
management.
bankruptcy procedure. Effective functioning of property registries and
courts is critical to the creation, perfection, and enforcement of security in-
terests. Shareholders need not only sufficient information but also the pos-
sibility to influence company decisions directly through votes on critical cor-
porate decisions and indirectly by their voice in the selection of directors.
More important than the laws on the books, however, is the actual enforce-
ment in practice. In this context, fighting corruption and fortifying corporate
governance are both key. 
Finally, effective financial intermediation depends on tools to reduce the in-
formation asymmetries between provider and borrower that can restrict in-
termediation because of the associated adverse selection and moral hazard.
Transparent financial statements are crucial for reducing screening and mon-
itoring costs for lenders and thereby increasing the efficiency of resource al-
location. Credit registries that give easy and reliable access to clients’ credit
history and both negative and positive information make borrower quality
much more transparent, making it safe for lenders to lend to a wider range
of customers with a satisfactory credit history (see Beck 2006).
At the same time, it is worth remembering that the link between risks and
the importance of the financial sector is a two-way one. When risks are
high, financial contracts can help market participants hedge or pool these
risks. In this way, the financial system can be a valuable buffer for the rest
of the economy, though in practice it is more effective in insulating short-
term risks than long-term risks.10 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
Governments have a central role here, not least in creating the
enabling environment. The policy agenda associated with the modernist
perspective focuses on the macroeconomic, contractual, and information
frameworks, with the objective of reducing information asymmetries,
improving legal certainty, and lengthening investors’ planning horizon.
This agenda includes updating laws governing financial contracts and
ensuring their proper and reliable enforcement through judicial reforms
to make certain that property rights are clearly defined and enforceable,
both in general terms and as they apply to specific modern financial
instruments. It also focuses on defining and updating accounting rules
and procedures to ensure that enterprise accounts are a reliable basis for
investment and other financial relationships, as well as on improving sys-
tems of credit information sharing to allow borrowers to use their reputa-
tion as collateral. Increasing the predictability and stability of government
policies as they affect the overall macroeconomic environment is also an
important desideratum for the modernist, as systemic risk impedes the
functioning of finance—even if integration with global finance can miti-
gate this problem.
The touchstone for the modernist is “best practice” of the advanced
market economies. Transplanting best practice is acknowledged as likely to
take time, but the modernist is inclined to see any move in that direction
as progress. As we will argue, this view is where the modernist may over-
reach in Africa. Modernists sometimes neglect real-world constraints. Dis-
appointing results can be expected from a mindless transplantation of
overambitious structures from the advanced economies. Indeed, although
modernization may seem low risk, it can cause problems if introduced in
an unfavorable environment. For example, the design of African stock
markets—influenced by what was seen as best practice in advanced
economies—may (as discussed in chapter 3), through costs and prerequi-
sites, have created barriers to listed equity finance for many African firms
that could have obtained it if a more context-sensitive regulatory design
had been chosen.
Applied with a realistic attention to national context, however, the
modernist agenda does help to build the foundations of an effective finan-
cial system for the long run. As implied by the term we have used for it,
what the modernist perspective offers directly is modernization more than
economic growth, but growth comes with and as a result of successful
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need to be actively engaged in encouraging the numerous initiatives that
financial market participants are already taking to reach a wider market. 
The activist perspective to finance is concerned with achieving results in
areas where the anonymous private financial sector is not conspicuously
successful: finance for agriculture and the rural economy, for micro- and
small enterprises, and for low-income households, as well as long-term
finance in general. Inherent difficulties, risks, and costs impede the effec-
tiveness of finance in each of these areas. The occasional collapse of finan-
cial intermediaries and the economic dislocation that often accompanies
such crises are also the target of the activist perspective.
The activist sees the need for special interventions to help correct the
market failures here. These interventions include enacting restrictive leg-
islation and establishing competent and politically independent prudential
regulators to guard against weak, reckless, or corrupt management of
financial intermediaries that could cause their collapse. Protecting the con-
sumer from predatory practices is also high on the activist agenda.
The activist sometimes advocates a variety of special public, charitable, or
otherwise privileged intermediaries. Because of the disappointing perform-
ance of many publicly owned financial firms (all too often subverted through
a politicized management or through corruption), the risk of overreaching in
this regard is well known. Even though the deficiencies that gave rise to state
ownership persist today, few close observers of financial systems around the
world now recommend the establishment of government-owned develop-
ment banks in African countries. Effective governments will have learned
the lessons of the past and, to avoid counterproductive interventions result-
ing from weak governance, will support—but will not themselves take the
lead in—implementing the activist agenda by increasing their direct engage-
ment in providing financial services. The potential for regional entities and
for partnerships with local and international nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and with the private sector to fill this gap needs to be explored;
donors, too, can have a potentially valuable role as disinterested activists in
bolstering specific initiatives.
Imposing impracticably low interest rate ceilings in a misconceived
attempt to protect borrowers is another familiar activist error, which
chiefly results in reduced flow of formal sector credit to those who could
most benefit from it.
But it would be a major mistake to think that these instances can be
extrapolated to discredit the activist perspective on a broad front. In partic-12 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
ular, the rapid growth and many success stories have encouraged individ-
ual social entrepreneurs as well as international donors and others to pro-
mote the creation and expansion of microfinance firms in Africa as in
other developing countries. This result can be seen as consistent with the
activist perspective. 
Activism is most effective when it achieves its effects by realigning the
incentives of the relevant market participants. It should be attempted only
by entities that have adequate governance. This requirement poses a prob-
lem for many governments in Africa, as cross-country surveys confirm.
Sometimes it is not immediately clear whether certain policies should
best be considered modernist or activist. The widespread, but relatively
recent, adoption in almost all countries of a greatly intensified regime of
bank regulation is sometimes presented as a modernist agenda, even
though it responds to a series of market failure events. Restrictive legisla-
tion on bank behavior and the establishment of competent and politically
independent prudential regulators to guard against weak, reckless, or cor-
rupt management of financial intermediaries that could cause their col-
lapse is part of the standard policy package in both advanced and
developing economies these days, but it can easily be seen as part of the
activist agenda. Indeed, as markets become more integrated and sophisti-
cated, the modernist view among scholars has begun to emphasize market
discipline in preference to regulatory discretion in bank regulation. 
The conclusion of the present study is that only through a pragmatic
and context-sensitive combination of both modernism and activism can
good results be expected. Pursuing only one or the other would leave
Africa without many of the financial services it so badly needs. The rele-
vant aspects of the context that need to be taken into account in African
countries include the cost and complexity of each type of intervention, the
ease with which abuses and subversion of the policies can be limited (espe-
cially in the context of weak governance), and enforcement capacity.
Ultimate Goals: Financial Sector Development for Growth and
Poverty Reduction
As Sachs (2005) has pointed out, well-targeted direct assistance to improve
the productivity of subsistence farming productivity and to reduce disease
can have a sizable effect on extreme poverty. This assistance, however, justSETTING THE SCENE 13
gets the poor to the bottom rung of the ladder. Helping them to the next
rungs is the task of microfinance; building the ladder requires mainstream
finance.
Reducing absolute poverty in conditions of anemic growth is all but
impossible for a market economy.5 From a long-term growth perspective,
the major channel for a sustained reduction in African poverty is a trans-
formational increase in the share of the population that is working in the
modern sector and with advanced economy productive techniques.
A more effective formal financial system would not only intermediate
on a much larger scale, but in doing so it would help improve enterprise
productivity and growth, not least in sectors that have the potential to con-
tribute directly or indirectly to exports, especially exports of nontraditional
goods and services. Faster national economic growth is the only sure way
to a sizable and sustained reduction and eventual elimination of absolute
poverty (as we know it today). In addition, improved access to financial
services for poor people and people in rural areas would directly help
improve their circumstances and help reverse what has, at least until
recently, been a trend in the continent toward widening inequality and
increasing poverty rates.
In terms of agriculture—which accounts for such a high proportion of
output and especially of employment at present and will continue to form
the backbone of the African economy for the foreseeable future—the
required transition will be toward a situation in which, although farms
may be largely family controlled, they will be less labor intensive and on a
much larger scale than at present.
It follows that accomplishing this long-term growth agenda needs the
machinery of efficient mainstream finance. Only in this way will there be
a ladder for the poor to climb. Of course, in addition to having access to
effective financial services, the international and domestic private sector
will be able and prepared to invest in modern productive structures only to
the extent that complementary factors, including human capital and phys-
ical infrastructure, as well as other necessary conditions of the business
environment, are present.
Effective finance has a role to play in contributing to these complemen-
tary factors also. The right financial arrangements can speed and improve
the provision of physical infrastructure. And the legal and information
infrastructures needed for effective finance also help improve the overall
governance and business environment.14 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
At the small scale, finance is relevant to helping ensure that human cap-
ital gets created. Investment by households and individuals in health and
education requires insurance, savings, and sometimes borrowing services,
without which families are often unable to acquire the needed skills. So
finance at the small scale helps support the creation of the skilled and
healthy labor force, which is among the most important prerequisites for
the willingness of entrepreneurs to embark on the needed investments.
Returning to the analogy of climbing a ladder, these are the second and
third rungs up the ladder—the part of the climb that small-scale finance
can help, once the bottom rung has been reached. 
Although this vision provides the long-run goal toward which policy
should be aimed, much of Africa will not have completed this transition
for many years to come. The bulk of the population will still depend on a
more unstructured and unsystematic, low-productivity economic struc-
ture. Even if amelioration of their condition in such structures is not
directly conducive to achieving the growth-delivering economic transfor-
mation spoken of above, it should not be neglected. Financial services for
microenterprises, even of low productivity, and for low-income house-
holds directly speak to a reduction of poverty. 
Policy Perspectives for the Major Elements of the 
Formal Financial Sector 
Finance at the large scale is provided in general by large and influential
financial firms—banks, insurance companies, pension funds, securities
market specialists, and so forth. As a general observation, if the provision
of mainstream financial services in African countries is to improve as to
quantity and quality, more competition and a greater presence of strong,
profitable financial firms are needed. That requirement certainly means
policy should create a favorable environment for doing financial business,
but it does not mean that what is good for existing financial firms is neces-
sarily good for the economy as a whole. 
Clearly, the managers and owners of these firms are experts, and their
opinions must be taken seriously in policy design. Their recommendations
often seem to represent the modern solution. But this is not necessarily
always the case. After all, in a typical well-balanced economy, the financial
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observation is crucial for policy design, because the political and economic
power of major financial sector players may tend to tip the balance into
policies that make financiers wealthy (regardless of their effectiveness) as
distinct from policies that favor financial sector efficiency. A vivid recent
example of a major policy initiative designed to improve sector
performance—rather than please incumbent suppliers—is the consolida-
tion of the Nigerian banking system resulting from the increase in mini-
mum capital. This ownership shake-up may not have been welcomed by
many incumbents, and there is the risk that the high entry barrier repre-
sented by the new minimum capital could reduce competition. It is too
early to pass judgment, but if the end result is reduced rent seeking and
greater professionalism by the elimination of numerous small banks, it will
have been a good idea.
Banks are and will remain at the heart of African financial systems.
Their effectiveness could be greatly improved if stronger underlying infra-
structures existed, including in the information and, especially, legal
dimensions. Banks can function without, for example, a robust regime of
land-ownership rights6 and without a predictable judiciary, but they do so
in a manner that is greatly constrained. Absence of these infrastructures
reduces bank lending (as is reflected in the high liquidity prevailing in
many African banking systems) and increases the necessary spread for
those who do get to borrow (both for covering administrative costs—
because neither large depositors nor liquid asset markets will cover those—
and because of heightened loan loss risks). A full resolution of these legal
issues is not something for which a quick technical fix is readily available—
although some easy steps can help. The long-term solutions may be coun-
try specific and will certainly require political follow-through. 
Extensive ownership changes have occurred in African banking follow-
ing the bankruptcy of many banks, including state-owned banks. Interna-
tional banks have returned in force: new entrants from South Africa,
returning ex-colonial banks from Britain and France, as well as a handful
of intercontinental South-South links, especially from the Gulf and South
Asia. A new wave of regional banks within Africa is also flourishing. Yet
state presence lingers more than is immediately evident. For one thing,
numerous state-owned near-banks still exist, including development
finance institutions. Furthermore, several large, formerly state-owned
commercial banks remain state controlled, with direct government owner-
ship being supplemented by parastatal shareholdings. Lip service to the16 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
concept of privatization can leave a bank even more vulnerable to the
weaknesses that are often associated with state ownership. And political
pressures on lending decisions of banks—both state owned and private—
continue to be a problem in some countries.
The lack of long-term finance is partly a reflection of the long-term risks
already mentioned and partly an endogenous response to the need for
monitoring and recontracting. In some countries, it is caused by a
regulatory-induced bias restricting maturity transformation. Finally, across
Africa, there is a paucity of long-term resources available for investment.
Although pension funds, social security, and life insurance are natural
providers of such funds, more could be done to encourage those entities to
actively seek out long-term uses for their funds. However, good gover-
nance of these funds needs to be ensured, and that will be facilitated if
active securities exchanges exist on which their investments can be priced.7
For the present, most organized African securities markets are largely
primary markets with relatively little secondary activity. Perhaps an over-
elaborate model of regulation has been adopted for these markets (the
modernist model overreaching itself), effectively precluding small issuers,
yet failing to achieve substantial liquidity for larger issuers. 
With the failure of several state-owned insurance companies and the
entry of regional or international firms to provide the basic insurance prod-
ucts, general insurance is gradually making a comeback in Africa. But the
potential complexity of insurance business makes it essentially a business
in which the buyer must beware. Most national regulators are ill equipped
to assess and discipline fraudulent or reckless insurers. Insurance is a good
candidate for regional cooperation in supervision—potentially as an annex
to banking supervision.
Regional cooperation and integration have long seemed to offer possi-
ble solutions to problems of small scale. Regional integration could be fur-
ther pursued in numerous dimensions. Currency unions are firmly on the
political agenda. At present, just three working examples survive of a more
numerous set of colonial relationships. Despite political commitment to
single-currency programs (undoubtedly inspired by the European Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union, or EMU, project), most practitioners do not
expect further single currencies to become a reality in any short time-scale,
especially given the diversity of national macroeconomic policy conditions
and the inability of most African governments to provide a fully credible
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ther integration is supervision of banks and other intermediaries (with the
two international agencies of the CFA zones now well established and
offering one potential model) and securities markets (one already, others
in the planning or development stage). It might be more fruitful to redirect
political will in the short run to cooperation on bank and other intermedi-
ary supervision and to exploitation of regional gains from stock market
integration.
Aggregate national resource mobilization is primarily a matter of con-
vincing the wealthy that they can safely leave their deposits in the local
banks. That means macroeconomic and political stability, sound banks,
adequate competition, and a quasi–tax regime that allows reasonable rates
of interest to be paid. Absence of these conditions helps explain why
African savings rates have been low. A new technical challenge to achiev-
ing sustained macro balance without choking off growth is emerging from
increasing aid flows (as well as from the effects of the oil price boom in oil-
producing countries). The willingness of the private sector to hold money
onshore is likely to grow in line with the improved prospects created by
these inflows, thereby allowing greater financial deepening without trig-
gering unduly restrictive credit policies. 
Helping more people to access deposit services is also important and
commercially possible, but its social value lies in a different dimension
entirely from that of aggregate resource mobilization—namely from
affording the depositors an important liquidity, precautionary saving, and
accumulation function. Offering deposit services can also be a key to the
healthy growth of the MFIs that serve low-income clients.
Reaching Difficult Markets
At most, 20 percent of African households have any access to formal
finance.8 Even medium-scale enterprises have difficulty accessing credit
and the other financial services they need to grow. 
The major problems are twofold. First, intermediaries have difficulty
delivering their products to poor or remote customers—let alone adapting
product design to these customers’ needs—at an affordable cost. Cost
penalties particularly relevant in Africa (though also observed in other
parts of the world) include the small size of the market at both national
and local levels, which is partly attributable to low geographic density of18 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
population and pronounced economic isolation (especially in rural areas).
This factor is compounded by the deficiencies of transport and communi-
cations, as well as extremely low transaction sizes and the inappropriate-
ness of some standard products to the needs of small clients. Lack of
competition adds to the cost penalties experienced by clients.
Second is the difficulty of assessing creditworthiness and enforcing con-
tracts. Low levels of perceived creditworthiness in Africa relate to the poor
quality and scarcity of information about individual risks as well as to high
incidence of shocks (weather, health, social disruption) exogenous to the
agents and often systemic or at least covariant. Weak legal and judicial and
other information and contract enforcement infrastructures are also a per-
vasive underlying factor here.
Despite a newfound interest on the part of some of the big banks in
reaching parts of the market in which they have not been active before—
the small farmer, the rural or urban poor, the middle-class would-be
homeowner—it would be unwise to assume that their unaided efforts are
guaranteed to overcome the formidable challenges that face such an effort.
Although the banks may have the resources to meet the overhead costs of
setting up new systems that can help reach rural households and meet the
financial service needs of small farmers, they will have to work hard to
make sure that the unit costs of operating these systems are sufficiently low.
Governments can assist banks and other private financial intermediaries
in this regard through efforts to build and repair various hard and soft infra-
structures that are essential ingredients in rolling out financial services
widely. Improving the functioning of courts as enforcers of contracts and
property rights—whether through legislative changes to reduce the com-
plexity and cost of unnecessary court procedures, through training and selec-
tion of judges and an effective system of sanctions for judicial corruption, or
through efficient mechanisms for enforcing judgments—is one area in which
the need for reforms is clear and on which some of the initial steps in that
direction can be taken without too much difficulty, technical or political.
Likewise, it is not too difficult to clarify laws and tax rules in order to smooth
the way to a wider use of leasing and factoring—credit techniques that have
long proved effective in reaching borrowers with limited scale and weaker
creditworthiness. Building the credit information infrastructure—from reg-
istries of secured claims and credit bureaus to accounting rules and the per-
formance of the audit profession—is a longer process but also eminently
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usable as collateral may be a tougher challenge. It may require a political
campaign to refocus public awareness of the relative benefits of modern
market-based land-ownership structures in comparison with tribal or other
conventional land-tenure systems or with socialism; even more important,
the opposition of those who have a vested interest in the current arrange-
ments for the control of land will need to be overcome.
Even if these modernist “meso-level” initiatives are accomplished,
lending—and borrowing—in Africa will remain a challenge. The necessar-
ily unsystematic and unstructured nature of African business transactions,
especially in the informal sector, is one major reason simple solutions are
not available. In these conditions, lenders must reach deeper into classic
loan appraisal techniques. Micro-, small-, and medium-scale enterprises’
access to credit from the formal financial sector will depend in large part on
the degree to which banks and other formal intermediaries are motivated
by profit or social concern to make this more elaborate and necessarily
more costly effort. If the effort is to be worth making, it is crucial that nei-
ther governments nor donors spoil the market (as they have in the past)
with simplistic and heavily subsidized credit interventions that will be cap-
tured by those who would have received credit anyway, do not need the
subsidy, and could have provided profitable business to share the costs of
market-dependent intermediaries.
Experience shows that successful lenders in Africa go beyond the
mechanical rules and procedures that work well in more settled environ-
ments. Relationship lending is probably the best umbrella term9 to describe
the tailored investment in credit appraisal, the flexibility of response to
excusable delinquency, and the imaginative approaches to renegotiation
and recovery that are needed to be a successful lender to the middle mar-
ket in Africa. This strategy requires experience and skills and may at first
not always yield financial rewards commensurate with the skills employed.
That is why charitable NGOs and donor agencies are active in these areas.
Commercial concerns are also engaged, and provided that they have a long
time horizon and deep pockets, they should also be able to make a success
of this method if they are not undercut by subsidy or blocked by overelab-
orate or poorly designed prudential regulations. Facilitating their activities
and helping them reach scale while controlling costs must be a top priority
of financial policy authorities in African countries.
Credit and noncredit financial services—such as deposits, payments
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a tough time reaching rural areas, farmers, and low-income households.
Different main sources of difficulty can easily be seen for each of these
three categories. Rural areas are by definition more remote than urban
areas, and in most African countries the population is very dispersed
indeed. Farm enterprises are rarely able to benefit as immediately and
deeply from the most common techniques of sustainable microfinance as
are small urban traders. This difficulty arises not only because of the short-
term and progressive nature of the lending relationship but also because
the relatively high break-even interest rates (see box 1.2) that have to be
charged for sustainable microfinance are often out of line with the rates
of return that can be achieved in most of African farming today—even if
such returns are reliably in double digits. Finally, low-income households
are hard to reach because they can rarely afford to pay the unavoidable
fixed costs involved in any banking-type relationship, but it is not
impossible.
It seems natural to look to financial engineering and technological
advance to help overcome these difficulties. Already, innovators through-
out Africa have been piloting a range of initiatives that can help. Several of
these are described in chapter 4. Even if some have not yet reached com-
mercial scale, they all show the general outlines of the way forward.
Extending these experiments and conducting others is something in which
all concerned—specialized MFIs, whether or not cooperative in structure;
mainstream banks; governments; and donors—have their part to play.
Organization of the Report
Chapter 2 provides a quantitative stock-taking of Africa’s financial sys-
tems. Financial depth is found to be somewhat lower than the worldwide
average even after taking account of inflation and mean per capita income,
especially for credit. Africans also have disproportionately high offshore
deposits. Interest margins are high; international comparison pinpoints
small scale, property rights institutions, and lack of competition as among
the important causal factors. Apart from a few of the longest established,
organized securities markets are small and inactive; institutional investors
often concentrate on bank deposits and real estate instead. Microfinance
has improved its outreach, though access rates in African countries remain
behind those in other regions.SETTING THE SCENE 21
Chapter 3 examines finance at the large scale and its contribution to
national economic growth. The chapter considers the measures needed to
boost financial depth and, in particular, to encourage banks to lend a
higher fraction of the resources they mobilize. The role of different owner-
ship structures in African banking—in particular the return of the foreign
banks and the decline of development banking—is documented and inter-
preted. The best solution to long-term finance is not development bank-
BOX 1.2
Microfinance: Sustainability and Outreach
The goal of achieving a large outreach and sustainability drives certain mi-
crofinance principles that also mesh well with the modernist perspective to
mainstream finance. The financial systems approach to microfinance envis-
ages microfinance institutions converging to financial self-sustainability. Ac-
cording to this approach, subsidies that are provided focus on setup and
head-office issues, including product development, and are not directly
used to subsidize lending interest rates at the margin (even when the sub-
sidy is received in the form of a low-interest long-term loan that the MFI in-
vests in treasury bills, using the net revenue to cover operating costs). As
scale is achieved, such subsidies will tend to assume a relatively smaller
part of the microfinance business (in a way that, for example, systematical-
ly distorting marginal pricing of interest rates would not). Even though the
intention is usually to eliminate them, such foundation subsidies do tend to
persist for a very long time.
The high interest rates (spread over wholesale rates) seen in unsubsidized
microcredit—although much lower than those typically charged by
moneylenders—result from the costs associated with intermediation of
this sort and, in particular, costs that result from small scale. Microfinance
can be successful in rural areas but is more widespread in urban and peri-
urban settings, which points to the costs associated with remoteness and
low density. By the same token, such high interest rates (and a fortiori such
absences) mean that much potentially socially beneficial microlending sim-
ply does not take place. The same applies mutatis mutandis with respect to
the pricing of deposits and insurance type products (see Helms and Reille
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ing. Instead, the long-term resources of pension funds and other institu-
tional investors offer a more promising alternative source of term finance,
though governance improvements are needed to underpin this source.
The pricing transparency offered by active organized securities markets
could help. The lack of volume and activity on existing exchanges is seen
as partly attributable to an overambitious model of securities regulation:
less onerous requirements could increase the scale and activity of the
exchanges and their usefulness to smaller firms, without undue loss of
investor protection. 
Regional cooperation can help improve policy solutions in the areas
considered in chapter 3, but there is a need to select the most promising
among the numerous extant projects here, with intermediary supervision
more immediately promising than currency union. If the external envi-
ronment improves, careful policy design in other macro areas will be
needed to ensure that resource mobilization increases in response and to
guard against the danger that the growth dividend from incipient financial
deepening is not choked off by unduly restrictive measures.
Chapter 4 turns to finance at the bottom of the pyramid, considering in
turn the challenges faced in reaching a wider market for credit, insurance,
deposits, and payments. Evidence and practical experience about what can
work in an African environment are reviewed under each heading, with
an emphasis on financial engineering and technology as key elements of
the solution. Although activism is clearly needed here, different types of
agents have different roles to play. The direct provision of financial services
will remain largely in the hands of private financiers, albeit including coop-
eratives and donor-aided NGOs. Government needs to attach priority to
creating policy structures that actively help these intermediaries reach
cost-effective scale and that are not blocked by dysfunctional or excessive
regulation. Donors can help fill gaps by acting as independent “agents of
restraint” to prevent abuse where national governments so far lack the
market credibility or governance institutions to intervene effectively.
Financial sector reform is a long haul, but in tackling it policy makers
should be on the lookout for available shortcuts that can help without
compromising stability and efficiency: they should be especially open to
leveraging on what external agents can offer, and they need to ensure that
policy is geared toward inclusiveness. The report ends (chapter 5) by
addressing these issues of policy prioritization. It suggests two particular
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today—namely (a) boosting credit flows by strengthening registries and
streamlining court procedures and (b) working on enhancing the inde-
pendence of regulatory authorities. More generally, priorities will vary
depending on the contrasting conditions that face African countries, and
this point is illustrated for some specific extreme cases—postconflict coun-
tries, oil-rich countries, small countries, sparsely populated countries, and
finally the few large countries able to avail themselves of critical mass. 
Notes
1. The evidence pointing to a positive causal association between better-devel-
oped financial systems and faster economic development is based on analysis
of a wide range of country-level, industry-level, firm-level, and internal coun-
try data. If we consider worldwide experience as a whole, financial develop-
ment’s positive effect on gross domestic product per capita growth comes
through improving the efficiency of resource allocation and thereby produc-
tivity, rather than through financial development’s effect on investment vol-
umes (Levine 2005). The evidence for subgroups of countries is harder to
interpret. Thus, the investment-volume channel may be relatively stronger in
low-income countries, for which indeed the evidence for a causal effect of
finance on long-term growth is less clear (Rioja and Valev 2004a, 2004b).
However, Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) provide evidence sug-
gesting a complex causal pattern for variations in the effect of finance at differ-
ent levels of development. They find that once a country has achieved a certain
level of financial development, more finance does not contribute further to
growth, but growth in countries with low financial development does benefit
from further financial deepening. Studies confined to African data also find a
causal link between finance and growth (see Ghirmay 2004), but some sug-
gest that the effectiveness of finance might be lower in Africa (Kpodar 2005). 
2. A major Harvard-Oxford-African Economic Research Consortium (AERC)
project, building on earlier work that was surveyed in Collier and Gunning
(1999a, 1999b), has combined historical case studies and cross-country econo-
metrics to try to understand the causes of Africa’s low growth performance.
While noting the role of exogenous factors (“opportunities”) in holding back
many African countries, the study points to a set of antigrowth policy
(“choice”) syndromes-control regimes, adverse redistribution, unsustainable
spending booms, and state failure-that have accounted for the loss of between
1 and 2.5 percent per annum in median growth rates. According to the pro-
ject’s conclusions, avoiding these syndromes was virtually a necessary condi-
tion for rapid growth and virtually sufficient for avoiding the growth collapses
that so often undermined sustained progress in Africa (Fosu and O’Connell
2006; see also Azam, Bates, and Biais 2005; Azam, Fosu, and Ndung’u 2002). 24 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
3. For example, the AERC-Harvard-Oxford Africa growth project emphasizes
contrasting physical and political geographic preconditions for growth
between African countries (see Fosu and O’Connell 2006); contrasting mone-
tary regimes in Africa are highlighted by Honohan and O’Connell (1997). 
4. A useful background resource for anyone wishing to assess the quality of a
country’s financial sector in terms of these standard building blocks is Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (2005).
5. But note also that, up until recently, in contrast to most other developing
countries where both the numbers and percentage share of the population in
absolute poverty have been falling, African countries have been characterized
by a widening inequality gap, with more absolutely poor people alongside a
middle class whose prosperity is—on average—gradually increasing (see
Artadi and Sala-i-Martin 2003; Sala-i-Martin 2006). At the same time, how-
ever, certain nonincome social indicators have improved (Silva Lopes 2005).
6. Insecurity of individual land tenure in Africa has had implications well beyond
those for access to credit, notably in its chilling effect on rural investment, as
documented in microstudies such as Dercon, Ayalew, and Gautam (2005).
7. Another important and underrated benefit of equity markets is the way in
which they can help to give elite groups and the upper-middle class a stake in
economic systemic stability and growth through diversified and interlinked
claims on the system achieved by portfolio (arm’s-length) equity claims on
firms operating in and reliant on the local economy (including banks).
8. To be sure, many more have recourse to informal finance for both household
and enterprise needs. Indeed, the richness and persistent centrality of African
informal financial networks for most Africans is a phenomenon that has fasci-
nated observers. It is not to diminish the current importance of these networks
to confine the present discussion to the formal financial sector. The formal sec-
tor is the main target of policy, and it will undoubtedly become increasingly
important in serving the majority of African households and firms.
9. Relationship lending is to be distinguished from related party lending, where
the lender has family, social, or nonlending business relationships with the
borrower.Introduction: International Comparisons
An underdeveloped financial system—
Given the proposition underlying the discussion of the previous chapter—
namely that financial development is important for economic develop-
ment and poverty alleviation—how do Africa’s1 financial systems stand in
international comparison? Is a low degree of financial depth, efficiency,
and access simply a question of economic development, or can other fac-
tors explain Africa’s low score? This chapter assembles the key statistics
allowing such a comparison as an essential starting point for policy discus-
sion. The objective is not to belabor the shortcomings of Africa’s formal
financial systems. Although there are sizable differences between coun-
tries within the region, it is well known that, on average, African finance
performs well below that of other regions. Instead, the goal is to pinpoint
especially weak areas and to identify dimensions in which improvements
might realistically be hoped for. 
—in both absolute and relative terms
As measured by aggregate banking depth, African financial systems are
shallow. Most of this shallowness can be related to low income, given the
worldwide tendency for higher-income countries to have deeper financial
systems. However, a disproportionate number of African countries are
CHAPTER 2
African Financial Systems: 
Depth, Breadth, and Efficiency
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below this average relationship, especially in terms of credit. Offshore
deposit accounts explain some of the missing deposits, and an apparent
inability of banks to find enough safe lending opportunities shows up in
the low credit numbers. Banking spreads are high too, as are bank profits
and overhead costs. Lack of competition in banking is one aspect of this
problem, and it can also be traced to other structural factors that have been
shown to contribute to spreads in other countries. 
Only one in three African countries has an organized securities market,
and though South Africa has one of the largest emerging stock markets in
the world, only a handful of the rest of the stock markets have achieved
significant capitalization or liquidity. Insurance is also highly variable
across African countries, especially in the life sector, with considerable
potential both for development and, as with pension and social security
funds, for more effective portfolio allocation. 
Much of the financial sector is informal
Reflecting the prevalence of poverty in the region, new data suggest that
not more than 20 percent of African adults have an account at a formal or
semiformal financial institution. Across countries, however, the data vary
widely, and the roles of different classes of institutions—savings banks,
cooperatives, microfinance institutions (MFIs) sponsored by nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs)—also vary widely. Enterprises complain more
about lack of finance in Africa than in other regions, and they are less likely
to use formal external finance, which impedes investment and growth. 
Financial Depth and Efficiency: 
What Explains Africa’s Low Score?
As for the developing world as a whole, banking is at the heart of Africa’s
formal financial systems, so measures of banking depth and efficiency are
the natural place to begin. 
Banking Depth
Banking depth is generally measured by reference either to deposit
resources mobilized by the system or by credit extended. Although these
two measures of depth are closely correlated, there are differences, both inAFRICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: DEPTH, BREADTH, AND EFFICIENCY 27
terms of their influence and in terms of measurement. The deposit side is
central to analysis of monetary policy, inasmuch as it measures an impor-
tant component of liquid spending power in the economy, and fluctua-
tions in money and bank deposits may help predict inflation. But it is the
level of bank credit to the private sector that is most closely correlated with
medium-term growth and poverty reduction (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Levine 2004; Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Honohan 2004), essentially
because that measure captures the degree to which banks are channeling
society’s savings to productive uses.2
Deposit and credit measures differ for several reasons. In addition to
mobilizing domestic deposits, banks can source loanable funds from the
wholesale market—for example, from their affiliates or from other banks
abroad. Furthermore, capital liabilities—owners’ resources, for example—
are also important contributors to a bank’s capacity to lend. Conversely,
not all the resources mobilized may be onlent to the domestic private sec-
tor. For one thing, the government and other public authorities and pub-
lic enterprises will also be drawing on bank finance; furthermore, many
banks invest some of their resources abroad. 
We therefore focus on two standard indicators of financial depth and
development: the ratio of liquid liabilities to gross domestic product (GDP)
is a broad measure of monetary resources (currency plus demand and inter-
est-bearing liabilities) mobilized by banks and near-bank intermediaries rel-
ative to economic activity. The ratio of private credit to GDP gets us closer
to the growth potential of financial intermediation by measuring the claims
of financial institutions in the private sector relative to economic activity.3
In interpreting the data, one must bear in mind that the link between
financial depth and growth is a two-way one: although deeper financial
systems tend to boost subsequent growth, the level of per capita income is
also a major determinant of current financial depth, with lower monetary
holdings in poor countries. Consistent with this relationship, we find that
intermediary development in most African countries is lower than in other
regions of the world (figures 2.1 and 2.2). The ratio of liquid liabilities to
GDP averages 32 percent in Africa, compared with 49 percent in East Asia
and Pacific and 100 percent in high-income countries. Similarly, the ratio
of private credit to GDP averages 18 percent in Africa, compared with 30
percent in South Asia and 107 percent in high-income countries. The ratio
of private credit to GDP averages 11 percent in low-income countries in
Africa but 21 percent in low-income countries outside Africa. 28 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
Within Africa, the tendency for higher-income countries to have deeper
financial systems is also observed (figure 2.3). Consistent with its much
higher mean income (and special economic structure), South Africa is a
large outlier in all these indicators and need not be discussed further in this
context. Two other outliers in the deposit data, Mauritius and the Sey-
chelles, are offshore financial centers. An additional factor is inflation
expectations; countries with long experience of inflationary surges tend to
have lower monetary depth (Boyd, Levine, and Smith 2001). 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show that much of the low level—and of the cross-
country variation—in African monetary depth can be explained by
national per capita income, controlling for inflation. Still, more African
countries fall below the line than above it.4 Among the low-depth coun-
tries are all but one of the members of the CFA franc zone.5
Monetary depth is lowered by the tendency of wealth holders to hold
their liquid assets outside Africa: the ratio of offshore deposits to domestic
bank deposits is significantly higher in Africa than in other regions of the
FIGURE 2.1





























Sub-Saharan Africa rest of the world
Source: World Bank’s Financial Structure database.
Note: This figure shows the liquid liabilities of the monetary system (M3) relative to GDP for the 127 countries available. African
countries are shown in darker color. The highest African values are for the offshore financial centers of Seychelles, Mauritius, and
Cape Verde, followed by those of South Africa and Ethiopia. All data are for the latest available year, 2004–05. AFRICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: DEPTH, BREADTH, AND EFFICIENCY 29
world (figure 2.6). This tendency points to capital flight as one factor exac-
erbating the low rate of domestic savings (though additional factors are at
work, including the requirement imposed by some foreign financiers for
African importers to post cash collateral abroad).6 Aggregate data point to
Africa as the continent with the largest capital flight relative to private
wealth, for which a variety of risk factors are likely causes (Collier and Gun-
ning 1999a, 1999b; Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo 2004; Ndikumana and
Boyce 2002). Unlike in other regions, capital flight in Africa is not compen-
sated by private capital inflows; Africa is the only region where donor fund-
ing still exceeds private portfolio funding (Senbet and Otchere 2006).
Also, in terms of credit depth, more African countries fall below what
would be expected from the cross-country pattern—and in several cases
the gap is quite large (figure 2.5). This feature is consistent with another
striking characteristic of African financial systems: the low intermediation
ratio (that is, the low share of deposits intermediated into private sector
credit). Figure 2.7 shows what is happening: in Africa, the median bank-
FIGURE 2.2


























Sub-Saharan Africa rest of the world
Source: World Bank’s Financial Structure database.
Note: This figure shows private credit granted by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP for the 128
countries available. African countries are shown in darker color. The highest African values are for South Africa, Mauritius, Sey-
chelles, and Cape Verde. All data are for the latest available year, 2004–05.30 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
ing system allocates more of its resources to liquid assets and lending to
government than do systems in other regions, thus implying a lower share
of credit allocated to the private sector. Given the importance of private
sector credit for economic growth, finding effective ways of ensuring that
the banks channel more of their resources to the domestic private sector is
crucial for financial sector development. 
Though financial depth remains low, signs of recovery are unmistakable
and encouraging. As figure 2.8 shows, indicators of financial development
for the median African country have steadily increased over the past 10
years after hitting a low point in 1995–96. The earlier decline was partly a
legacy of bank closures and rationalizations following the waves of bank-
ing failures experienced in earlier years. A cleanup of the books left private
credit and deposits lower than they had been (and often saw a jump in the
share of government credit when failing banks were recapitalized with
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FIGURE 2.3
Private Credit and GDP per Capita
Sources: World Bank’s Financial Structure database; World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
Note:Country abbreviations are included in the abbreviations list at the front of the book. This figure plots the ratio of private cred-
it to GDP against GDP per capita (in log scale) for 122 countries. African countries are shown in darker color. All data are for the lat-
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Real private sector credit has, in particular, been growing at an acceler-
ating rate, and its median value has doubled in the past decade. Even as a
share of GDP, it has turned the corner, with the median share reaching
almost 14 percent in 2005, about a third higher than at its anemic trough
in 1996. (A regression estimate of the time trend is shown in figure 2.8.)
And although some countries have not shared in the general upward
movement, four of every five African countries for which data are avail-
able have seen financial depth increasing since 2000. 
The continued wide variation in financial depth among African coun-
tries (map 2.1) shows considerable further upside potential, especially in
countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique,
where private sector lending remains minuscule. A case in point is Tanza-
nia, where the loan-to-deposit ratio of the banking system as a whole
dipped to less than 18 percent after the financial restructuring of the largest
banks. After a cautious resumption of lending, the ratio of private credit to
FIGURE 2.4
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all other countries Sub-Saharan Africa
Sources: World Bank’s Financial Structure database; World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
Note: Country abbreviations are included in the abbreviations list at the front of the book. This figure plots the residual from a lin-
ear regression of the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP on inflation against the residual from a linear regression of GDP per capita on
inflation for 139 countries. Liquid liabilities and GDP per capita are in log scales. African countries are shown in darker color. All
data are for the latest available year, 2004–05.32 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
GDP has increased steadily since 1996, growing from 2.8 percent in that
year to about 10 percent by 2005. Tanzanian bank deposits have also been
growing rapidly and these resources are still underlent: there is consider-
able growth potential left, even before considering the possibility of mobi-
lizing more domestic resources. For Tanzania, as for other countries, the
question remains how to unlock this growth potential. 
Banking Competition and Efficiency: Interest Margins, Costs,
and Profitability
Africa’s banking systems are characterized not only by low levels of inter-
mediation but also by high interest rates, wide intermediation spreads, and
substantial bank profitability. High lending interest rates, whether caused
by inefficiency or lack of competition, do more than add to borrowers’
costs. By pricing the safer borrowers out of the market, high interest rates
FIGURE 2.5 
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Sources: World Bank’s Financial Structure database; World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
Note: Country abbreviations are included in the abbreviations list at the front of the book. This figure plots the residual from a lin-
ear regression of the ratio of private credit to GDP on inflation against the residual from a regression of GDP per capita on inflation
for 151 countries. The ratio of private credit to GDP and GDP per capita is in log scales. African countries are shown in darker col-
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can increase the risk of lending, making banks less willing to lend and—as
has been recognized since the pioneering work of Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981)—potentially resulting in credit rationing combined with high bank
liquidity. One source of high lending rates is high wholesale interest rates,
which reflect currency and other macroeconomic uncertainties as well as
the demand by governments for domestic loanable funds. The degree of
efficiency and competition in the banking system is another factor that
explains variation in lending rates. 
Wholesale real interest rates in Africa increased significantly in the
median African country in the early 1990s. This was a direct and intended
consequence of interest rate and macroeconomic liberalization; it was also
influenced by fiscal and macroeconomic expectation effects. Since 1993,
realized wholesale interest rates have fluctuated without any discernible
trend (figure 2.9). 
Interest rate margins
The intermediation spread (the gap between average deposit and average
lending rates) or the intermediation margin (net interest income as a per-
FIGURE 2.6
Offshore to Domestic Bank Deposits: Regional Distributions
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Latin America and the Caribbean
Europe and Central Asia
East Asia and the Pacific
High-income countries
Sources: World Bank’s Financial Structure database; Bank for International Settlements online database. 
Note: For each region, the figure plots the minimum, maximum, and median of the ratio of offshore to domestic bank deposits for 132
countries. The shaded boxes show the interquartile range. Outliers have been omitted. All data are for the latest available year, 2004–05.34 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
FIGURE 2.7
Asset Composition of Banks across Regions
Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics database. 
Note: For each region, the figure shows the composition of the asset portfolio of banks between liquid assets, foreign assets,
claims on state-owned enterprises, claims on government, and claims on the private sector. All data are for 2005.
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Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics database. 
Note: Figure shows estimated date coefficients from pooled time-series cross-section median regressions. AFRICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: DEPTH, BREADTH, AND EFFICIENCY 35
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Real Interest Rates in Africa, 1990–2005
Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics database. 
Note: The figure shows estimated date coefficients from pooled time-series cross-section median regressions. Real interest rates
are computed using the consumer price index as the deflator.36 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
centage of total earning assets) are often taken as measures of banking
(in)efficiency. In interpreting these numbers, one must recall that the dif-
ference between interest received and interest paid by the banks goes to
pay for staff and other noninterest costs and to make provisions for loan
losses, as well as to contribute to profits. Thus, a high spread could result
from an uncompetitive banking environment (implying higher profits) or
from factors such as a higher risk of default. Some elements of default risk
may in turn be considered systemwide and outside the control of the
banks, but some banks may deliberately choose a high-yield, high-risk
portfolio. Banks in some countries may also face different unit prices for
skilled staff members and other inputs—though within a particular market
variations in unit staff costs are likely to reflect skill differentials rather
than exogenous factors. Foreign banks, however, often draw on expatriate
staff members, which can increase intermediation costs considerably.
Given all these considerations, it is clear that the variation across countries
and across banks in intermediation spreads and margins needs to be inter-
preted with care.
Figure 2.10 shows that African banking systems tend to have higher net
interest margins than banks in many other parts of the world. On average,
the net interest margin in African banks between 2000 and 2004 was 800
basis points, compared with 480 basis points in the rest of the world. How-
ever, banks in many Latin American and Eastern European countries have
margins at least as high as African banks do, which raises the question of
what drives high interest margins across banks and countries.7
One factor is bank profitability. The overall profitability of African banks
in recent years has been high: in our sample, the average return on total
assets was 2.1 percent, more than three times the profitability of non-
African banks (0.6 percent). Similarly, the average return to equity for
African banks in our sample was 20.1 percent over the period 2000 to 2004,
compared with 8.5 percent for non-African banks (table 2.1). High prof-
itability might be due to high risk premiums demanded by bankers, lack of
competition, or—most likely—a combination and interaction of both.
Bank operating costs are another component of the interest margin.8
Mean operating costs—that is, administrative (overhead) costs—in African
banks averaged 650 basis points during 2000 to 2004, compared with 480
basis points on average in the rest of the world.
Breaking down the interest margins into profit and cost components is
informative but also raises a deeper question: what underlying structuralAFRICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: DEPTH, BREADTH, AND EFFICIENCY 37
FIGURE 2.10
Net Interest Margins across Regions
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Europe and Central Asia
East Asia and the Pacific
High-income countries
Sources: World Bank’s Financial Structure database; World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
Note: The figure shows the minimum, maximum, and median of the national mean net interest margins for banks in 146 countries,
as reported in the BankScope database for the latest available year, 2004 or 2005. The shaded boxes show the interquartile range.
TABLE 2.1
Bank Profit Comparisons, 2000–04
Return on assets (%) Return on equity (%)
Africa 2.1 20.1
Foreign banks in Africa 2.8 26.7
Subsample of foreign banks in Africa 4.7 43.2
Rest of world 0.6 8.5
Foreign banks in rest of world 0.9 8.6
Subsample of foreign banks in rest of world 0.7 9.7
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from BankScope.
Note: The table shows mean return on assets and return on equity for the classes of banks shown in Africa and in the rest of the
world. The subsample of foreign banks consists of those banks for which data were available and that have operations both in
Africa and in the rest of the world.
factors in the different economies are driving these differences? A recent
study (Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine 2004), using bank-level data
for 76 countries (including 7 from Africa) for the period 1995 to 1999 sug-
gested that the most important drivers include the quality of property
rights protection (weaker property rights lead banks to charge higher lend-38 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
ing rates and also to spend more administrative resources on credit
appraisal and monitoring); inflation; and bank size (smaller banks incur
more overhead costs, which may also add to their interest margins). 
Reestimating the same regression equation as in the 2004 study just
mentioned with a larger and more recent data set allows us to obtain both
confirmation and updated estimates of the importance of these underlying
factors in contributing to higher operating costs and the other components
of high interest margins. Table 2.2 shows the breakdown. Of the 320 basis
points difference in average interest margin between Africa and the rest of
the world, only 60 basis points are left unexplained by the model; of the
180 basis points difference in overhead costs, only 10 basis points remain
unaccounted for. After we account for these different country and bank-
level characteristics, a dummy variable for Sub-Saharan Africa does not
enter either regression significantly. There seems to be no significant differ-
ence between margins and overhead costs across banks with different
ownership structures, after controlling for other bank- and country-level
characteristics.
By this analysis, much of the gap, especially for the interest margin, is
fundamentally explained by the weaker protection in Africa of property
rights, as measured by the composite governance indicator for which
recent values are plotted in figure 2.11. On a scale that has been normal-
ized to give a worldwide average of zero and a standard deviation of one,
the African countries in the sample have an average governance score of
–0.5. This lower governance score for Africa translates into a predicted dif-
TABLE 2.2
Net Interest Margins and Overhead Costs in International Comparison
Interest margin  Administrative costs 
(basis points) (basis points)
African banks 800 650
Rest of world banks 480 480
Difference 320 180
Of which:
Property rights protection 130 40
Bank size 70 50
Other bank characteristics 40 70
Inflation 100 30
Africa residual 60 10
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from BankScope.AFRICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: DEPTH, BREADTH, AND EFFICIENCY 39
ference of 130 basis points in the net interest margin differential and 40
basis points in the higher overhead costs. Although this indicator of gover-
nance is a very general one, the low score for Africa captures many aspects
of an unsatisfactory contractual framework: weak creditor rights, seldom
enforced by compromised courts; a deficient and rarely applied insolvency
framework; and a general disrespect for contracts. 
The small size of banks and financial systems in Africa can explain a
large part of the large margins and overhead costs. The average African
bank in our sample has total assets of US$81 million, compared with
US$334 million for the average bank outside Africa. This difference can
explain 70 basis points of the higher net interest margins and 50 basis
points of the higher overhead costs in African banks, or about a quarter of
the difference from the worldwide average. Small size is also reflected in
the data on aggregate banking system size: African banking systems are
among the smallest in the world (figure 2.12).
A number of bank-level characteristics are also important. Banks with
higher fee income (as opposed to interest income) earn lower interest mar-
FIGURE 2.11





































Sub-Saharan Africa rest of the world
Sources: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2004; World Bank’s Governance Matters IV database.
Note: The figure shows the composite governance indicator for 209 countries. African countries are shown in color. All data are for
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gins but incur higher costs. Less liquid, better capitalized banks with more
volatile earnings earn higher margins and incur high costs. On average,
African banks’ individual characteristics, other than size, tend to reduce
interest margins but increase administrative costs. 
Finally, monetary instability can explain a sizable part of the higher
average net interest margins and overhead costs in Africa. Here differ-
ences between countries are especially substantial. Only 16 African coun-
tries have had annual average inflation in the double digits over the past
decade, but the outliers—Angola and the Democratic Republic of
Congo—have seen annual inflation running into the hundreds of per-
cent, with Zimbabwe soaring above 1,000 percent per annum in
2005–06.10 As a result, cumulative inflation over the five years from 2000
to 2004 averaged 36 percent for African countries and 20 percent for the
rest of the world. The high inflation boosted interest margins in the
affected countries, explaining almost 100 of the 320 basis point average
FIGURE 2.12






















































Sub-Saharan Africa rest of the world
Sources: World Bank’s Financial Structure database; World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
Note:The figure plots the overall size of the monetary system in 121 countries, as measured by liquid liabilities (M3) in U.S. dollars
for all available countries, on a logarithmic scale. African countries are shown in color. The African country with the largest bank-
ing system is South Africa with US$98 billion, followed by Nigeria with US$11 billion, Mauritius with US$6 billion, and Ethiopia
with US$5 billion. All data are for the latest available year, 2004–05.AFRICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: DEPTH, BREADTH, AND EFFICIENCY 41
difference in net interest margins and about 30 basis points of the admin-
istrative cost differences.
Some of the causal factors included in the regression estimates may
have contributed to a lack of competition in African banking. Further-
more, the 60 basis points (on average) that remain unexplained may also
be attributable in part to lack of competition. The same contractual and
informational deficiencies that explain high overhead costs and high risk
premiums in lending also reduce competitiveness by binding borrowers to
specific lenders and by deterring new entrants.11 These deficiencies also
reduce the contestability of African banking by increasing entry costs for
new institutions. 
Most of Africa’s banking systems are highly concentrated. This is not
surprising, given the small size of the national markets. The market share
of the top three banks (concentration ratio) in each country averages 73
percent across 22 African countries, based on total assets in the latest year
for which data are available; for the median country, the figure is 74 per-
cent. This figure compares with 60 percent for the world as a whole. No
other region has a mean higher than 66 percent. The lowest ratios in Africa
are for the largest economies—South Africa (41 percent) and Nigeria (48
percent).12 All other African countries have ratios of at least 59 percent.
The general picture is one of market dominance by a small number of
banks. In Mozambique, the largest bank (a foreign-owned one) holds a 48
percent share in the lending market. In Mauritius, the largest two banks
account for 77 percent of the lending market. 
Concentrated banking systems are not necessarily uncompetitive—for
example, in open systems, the threat of entry can restrain incumbents
from overcharging (Claessens and Laeven 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven,
and Levine 2004). But concentration does often go hand in hand with
market power, especially when contestability is weak.
This attempt at quantification of the obstacles to banking efficiency thus
points to at least three major background dimensions: the contractual and
informational environment, the broader issues of systemic risk, and the
lack of scale. Together these dimensions can explain the high risk premi-
ums demanded by bankers, the high profitability, and the lack of competi-
tion. The specific indicators used in the regression analysis only scratch the
surface of these issues.
As can be seen in figure 2.9, the median quoted intermediation spreads
(the gap between representative lending and deposit rates reported in the42 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
International Monetary Fund [IMF] International Financial Statistics
database) widened in the early 1990s—a trend that is likely attributable in
part to liberalization. Since the late 1990s, the upward trend has been sta-
bilized and even reversed, with the median for 2005 at about 1,000 basis
points—compared with more than 1,500 basis points in 2001. The data
are too noisy to point unambiguously to the explanation for this improve-
ment, but one plausible explanation is that, as in other parts of the world,
postliberalization competitive pressures have begun to kick in. Improve-
ments in the underlying environmental factors discussed above will also
have played their part, in countries such as Nigeria and Tanzania, for
example.
Ownership issues
Following a wave of privatization and restructuring of banks—includ-
ing state-owned ones—in numerous African countries, the balance of
ownership has shifted dramatically in recent years. Now the foreign banks
are back in force. Although somewhat similar trends have occurred in
other parts of the world, the process has gone further in Africa than in
other regions. Table 2.3 classifies countries according to whether their
banking systems are mainly foreign owned (more than 60 percent of bank-
ing assets in foreign-controlled banks), mainly government owned (or
owned by government agencies), mainly owned by the local private sector
(with the same 60 percent dividing line), or foreign plus government
owned (the two types accounting for at least 70 percent) or whether they
fall in a residual category called “equally shared.” Two of every five African
banking systems are mainly foreign owned, and only three countries (7
percent) are still dominated by state-owned banks. Map 2.2 shows the
variation in ownership structure across African countries. 
Interestingly, although a worldwide sample of banks shows no signif-
icant difference in profitability across banks with different ownership
structures, foreign-owned banks in Africa are more profitable than for-
eign-owned banks elsewhere (even controlling for the higher profitabil-
ity of banking in Africa). They are also more profitable than locally
owned banks (see table 2.1). Table 2.1 also shows data for a subsample of
banks with operations both in Africa and elsewhere. For this subsample,
the difference between profit performance in Africa and elsewhere is
even more pronounced: a mean of 9.6 percent in Africa as against 6.2
percent elsewhere.AFRICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: DEPTH, BREADTH, AND EFFICIENCY 43
Volatility
Monetary volatility is only one dimension of a generally volatile political
and economic environment that has hampered monetary deepening and
efficiency improvements. Africa is a continent of civil strife and political
violence; only nine countries have suffered no internal or external conflict
during the past 50 years (Strand and others 2004). On average, an African
country survives little more than a decade without a major economic,
social, or political disturbance (Arnold 2005; Meredith 2005). This dura-
tion is similar to 19th-century business cycles in what are now advanced
economies—though the African crises tend to be deeper and more pro-
tracted and extend to all parts of the economy and society. Such volatility
does not affect only financial depth and interest rate spreads. Just as the
TABLE 2.3
Distribution of African Countries by Predominant Form of Bank Ownership
Mainly  Mainly  Mainly local  Foreign plus 
government  foreign private sector government Equally shared
Eritrea Botswana Benin Burkina Faso Angola
Ethiopia Cape Verde Mali Congo, Dem. Rep. of Burundi
Togo Central African Republic Mauritania Sierra Leone Cameroon
Chad Mauritius Congo, Rep. of 
Côte d’Ivoire Nigeria Gabon
Equatorial Guinea Rwanda Ghana
Gambia Somalia Kenya
Guinea-Bissau South Africa Rwanda













Source: World Bank staff estimates.
Note: Mainly government, mainly foreign, and mainly local private sector mean more than 60 percent of total assets are held by
banks majority owned by government, majority owned by foreign shareholders, or majority owned by the local private sector, re-
spectively; foreign plus government means these two categories together hold more than 70 percent. Equally shared is a residual
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business cycle impeded investment and growth in economies in the 19th
century, so the likelihood that an investment in recent decades would be
destroyed or made valueless by a major downturn must have impeded
investment in Africa—chaining African business leaders to a short-term
perspective.
The causes of these recurrent crises have been many. Part of the prob-
lem has been Africa’s economic dependence on exports of primary prod-
ucts. The high share of natural resources and agricultural commodities in
Africa’s exports, combined with the high price volatility for these com-
modities, exposes African economies to high terms-of-trade volatility.
Drought, floods, and other supply shocks add to the problems: natural dis-
asters causing death occur frequently in Africa, as they do in much of
mainland Asia. HIV/AIDS has often been mentioned as a cause in recent
years. But it is the relatively high frequency of political disruption and civil
strife that has most marked Africa for a seemingly endemic pattern of sys-
temic economic instability. 
Market perceptions of instability dampen financial sector development.
Lack of financial development could also be contributing to the sources of
instability in a variety of ways. For example, African countries lack diver-
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sified financial instruments that could broaden claims on the prosperity
that could be generated by a growing and profitable business sector. This in
turn represents a missed opportunity to give a wider group of influential
Africans a stake in sustained economic growth. Such participation in sus-
tained economic growth, in turn, would help shift the focus of the elites’
personal and political activities away from short-term thinking.
BOX 2.1
Historic Explanations of Cross-Country Variation in Financial
Development
Although current policy and institutional conditions explain much cross-
country variation in financial development and efficiency, scholars have
sought to uncover past causal factors, notably in terms of the origins of le-
gal structures, of geographic endowments, and of ethnic mix. Variations
across African countries provide much of the evidence and, as such, are at
the center of the debates on the relative importance of each factor.
The law and finance literature points to legal tradition as a decisive factor
forming contractual frameworks, which are fundamental to financial sector
development. The main divide is between the English Common Law and
the French Civil Code traditions, and in particular the degree of protection
each provides to private property rights and their adaptability to change. At
the risk of caricature, it may be said that the evolution of Common Law was
strongly influenced by the attempt to protect private property rights against
the state, which facilitated the ability of private parties to transact confi-
dently with each other and the state. The Civil Code tradition reflected the
reaction to a corrupt and secretive prerevolutionary judiciary that had sided
with rich property holders against reformist politicians; it thus has its origin
in the state’s attempt to solidify state power over private citizens. Where
the Civil Code tradition distrusts judges and jurisprudence and thus relies
on rigid bright-line rules, the Common Law tradition allows more dynamism
as judges react to changing circumstances on a case-by-case basis, en-
abling the law to adapt quickly to the needs of the economy and especially 
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BOX 2.1 (continued)
the financial system. The Common Law tradition spread throughout the
world with British colonizers; the Napoleonic Code influenced subsequent
codifications in other colonizing nations, such as Belgium, Portugal, and
Spain.
Map 2.3 shows the variation in legal origin across Africa. Consistent with
the stronger protection of property rights and the prediction of dynamism,
Common Law countries have higher levels of financial development than
do Civil Code countries. This holds true not only for a broad sample of for-
mer colonies, but also within Africa—though here the difference is less pro-
nounced and the variation across countries much larger within legal fami-
lies (figure 2.13). 
The law and finance view focuses on the identity of the colonizer. The en-
dowment view has focused on the conditions that colonizers found when
they arrived and the influence those conditions had on the behavior of the
colonial powers (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). Specifically, Eu-
ropean settlers adopted different colonization strategies depending on
whether the disease conditions were friendly to European settlement.
Where conditions were conducive to settlement, settlers chose to re-
create governance structures to support their private property rights and lo-
cal market exchange. Where conditions were less friendly for settlement,
the European colonizers created “extractive colonies, ” establishing institu-
tions that empowered colonizers to extract natural resources without pro-
tecting local business interests (Austen 1987). Congo, which was—in ef-
fect—the personal property of King Leopold I of the Belgians for a
quarter-century, is often quoted as prime example of such an approach. Crit-
ically, these contrasting institutional structures survived the move to inde-
pendence (Arnold 2005; Meredith 2005). 
Nonbank Finance
The remainder of the formal financial system controls far smaller
resources. This characteristic again is typical of low-income countries in
general and not specific to Africa. But there is quite a lot of variation
among African countries, revealing the potential for improvement in those
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Nonbank financing can offer a range and variety of services that are not
part of the standard product range of banks. Furthermore, a strong non-
bank sector can also provide competition for banks. Financial systems in
the advanced market economies are characterized by a very diverse array
of institutions and markets offering a variety of products. Apart from
banks, this array includes capital markets, with both equity and debt secu-
rities and contractual savings institutions, such as insurance companies,
To capture a quantitative indication of the initial colonial conditions, scholars
have used historical records on the death rates of early colonial settlers. In-
terestingly, as shown in figure 2.14, financial depth today is negatively as-
sociated with those early death rates. Within Africa, there is considerable
variation in the early mortality rates: western African countries such as
Ghana and Congo had very high mortality rates, whereas Kenya and Zim-
babwe, for example, had low mortality rates—which were conducive to Eu-
ropean settlement. This variation is also reflected in the levels of financial
development. The choice of institutional structure is not solely caused by
climatic conditions, though: Nunn (2005) notes that the incidence of slav-
ery is also highly correlated with subsequent institutional development.
Under some conditions, ethnic diversity may produce a governing ethnic
group that uses the state’s powers to strengthen its dominance by restrict-
ing the rights of other groups and expropriating their resources, as well as
impeding the growth of industries and sectors that will threaten the gov-
erning ethnic group. Such behavior could lead to rent seeking, inefficient
and reduced allocation of public goods and services, and growth-reducing
policies such as financial repression. In studies of this conjecture, diversity
is measured by the so-called ethnic fractionalization index, which is the
probability that two randomly selected people will not be members of the
same ethnic group. African countries tend to have the highest scores on
this index. However, though there is some econometric evidence that eth-
nic diversity could contribute to low growth in Africa (Easterly and Levine
1997), there is little evidence that it affects financial development in partic-
ular. The same is true of an alternative indicator of precolonial conditions,
namely political centralization, which has been shown to be positively cor-
related with the provision of public goods in Africa (Gennaioli and Rainer
2005). For more detail and references to the literature, see also Beck and
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pension funds, and mutual funds. This wider range of institutional special-
izations has the potential to offer a wider range of financial services and
better risk pooling, at better prices, in a more competitive environment
than is characteristic of the bank-dominated systems observed in most of
Africa and in most low- and lower-middle-income countries around the
globe. In particular, contractual savings institutions can be major forces in
providing patient capital, in equity or loans, for long-term projects. Orga-
nized securities markets help to improve the transparency of funding
arrangements by determining the market-clearing price of equities, as well
as market-clearing interest rates for bonds. Equity markets are particularly
valuable for providing financing to risky ventures, about which there may
be wide differences of opinion: banks are often reluctant to finance such
ventures because the downside risk is insufficiently compensated by the
contractual interest rate; well-resourced investors can build a portfolio of
equity claims on such ventures for which the securities market will pro-
vide an exit mechanism, in due course, for those that are successful.
Securities Markets
With a market capitalization of US$600 billion, the South African (Johan-
nesburg) market is the fourth-largest emerging market in the world (after
MAP 2.3
Common Law and Civil Code Countries
Source: World Bank staff judgment.
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those in the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and India and before
those in Brazil, China, and Hong Kong, China). Yet even Johannesburg is
not a big enough market to retain the primary listings of several of South
Africa’s largest companies. Twenty-one companies listed in Johannesburg
have their primary listings elsewhere—including the mining conglomerate
Anglo American, the banking group Investec, the brewing company SAB-
Miller, the insurance giant Old Mutual, and the technology company
Dimension Data, all of which have their primary listings in London. This list
shows that the context in which African securities markets operate is one in
which the larger companies look abroad as well as to the home market.13
FIGURE 2.13
Private Credit: French and English Legal Origin
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Source: World Bank’s Financial Structure database. 
Note: The figure shows the minimum, maximum, and median of the ratio of private credit to GDP for 84 countries of the world 
(panel a) and for 26 countries in Africa (panel b). The shaded boxes show the interquartile range. All data are for 2005.50 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
Africa has 15 organized securities markets. Several other projects are
under discussion or partly implemented, but not yet active. (This number
does not include Cameroon and Gabon, both of which recently established
stock exchanges but have not yet attracted any listings.) One exchange, the
Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM) headquartered in Abid-
jan, caters to the eight-country Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest
Africaine (UEMOA). The BRVM was expanded from the Abidjan stock
exchange created in 1976. Four other exchanges started operations in the
days of the British Empire: those with headquarters at Nairobi, Lagos,
Harare, and Johannesburg, the last two having histories going back into the
19th century. The older exchanges also have the largest number of equities
listed. These five, along with those established in 1988 and 1989 in
Botswana, Ghana, and Mauritius, were the only exchanges with market
capitalization at the end of 2004 in excess of 10 percent of GDP, even though
market capitalization has been increasing in recent years (figure 2.15).
FIGURE 2.14




































2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0
settler mortality (log of annualized number of deaths)
all other countries Sub-Saharan Africa
Sources: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001.
Note: Country abbreviations are included in the abbreviations list at the front of the book. The figure plots financial depth in 63
countries, as measured by the ratio of private credit to GDP against an index of colonial settler mortality (log of the annualized num-
ber of deaths per thousand). African countries are shown in darker color. All data are for 2004.AFRICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: DEPTH, BREADTH, AND EFFICIENCY 51
Trading data show a different aspect of the contribution of stock
exchanges in developing countries. That contribution is influenced by sec-
ondary market liquidity and also by the degree to which a large fraction of
the shares in developing markets is effectively locked up in the strategic
stakes of controlling shareholders and not normally available for trading. It
should be noted in this context that funds actually raised on these mar-
kets—as on most capital markets14—are but a tiny fraction of market cap-
italization. The eight oldest exchanges also have the most active trading,
with the value traded fluctuating around 2 percent of GDP for the past sev-
eral years (table 2.4; see also figure 2.15). Yet even these more active
African exchanges (Johannesburg aside) cannot be considered to have
much trading. Except for Johannesburg, turnover on all markets is less
than 15 percent of market capitalization. There was no trading on the
Maputo exchange in 2004.
Low turnover is reflected in and feeds back onto a lack of liquidity, as
illustrated by large gaps between buy and sell orders and high price volatil-
FIGURE 2.15
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Source: Compiled from published stock exchange reports.
Note: The figure shows the medians of the eight most active exchanges by value traded other than Johannesburg (that is, for
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ity. This lack of transactions is also somewhat self-reinforcing, as the trans-
action volume does not justify investment in technology either by the
exchange itself or by member brokers. Limited trading discourages listing
and raising money on the exchanges. Even linking different centers elec-
tronically (as in the BRVM or in Namibia, whose exchange is now elec-
tronically linked to the Johannesburg exchange) cannot guarantee much
more trading and liquidity.
In international comparisons of composite indicators of equity market
development (data are available typically only for seven or eight of the
African exchanges), it appears that the main African exchanges fall behind
the average in developing countries, mainly in regard to efficiency, as dis-
tinct from size, stability, and access of issuers (figure 2.16).15 The other
seven markets, all established since 1989, are small by all measures. The
smaller African countries tend to have neither organized exchanges nor
any prospect of one.
TABLE 2.4
Stock Exchanges in Africa
Zero- Number 
Number of  Market  Value  return  Concen- of listed  Year 
listed cap  traded  Turnover  weeks  (%  tration  corporate  estab-
Country firms (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (%) of total) of firms bonds lished
Botswana 25 27.2 0.6 2.1 — 0.21 17 1989
Côte d’Ivoire (BRVM) 39 12.3 0.3 2.5 — 0.21 — 1976
Ghana 30 23.7 0.8 3.2 70 0.12 3 1989
Kenya 47 26.1 2.1 7.9 41 0.20 — 1954
Malawi 8 9.2 1.3 14.1 — — 0 1996
Mauritius 41 36.0 1.6 4.4 48 0.12 1 1988
Mozambique 1 3.0 0.0 0.0 — — — 1999
Namibia 13 6.9 0.3 4.7 57 0.39 4 1992
Nigeria 207 16.7 2.3 13.9 67 0.08 1960
South Africa 403 170.5 76.5 44.9 13 0.06 1887
Swaziland 6 8.3 0.0 0.0 — — 2 1990
Tanzania 6 6.2 0.2 2.5 — — 6 1998
Uganda 5 1.4 0.0 0.2 — — — 1998
Zambia 13 8.0 0.1 1.5 — — 0 1994
Zimbabwe 79 41.3 2.9 7.0 37 0.08 — 1896
Sources: World Bank’s Financial Structure database; World Bank’s Financial Sector Development Indicators database.
Note: — = not available. All data are for 2005, except for Malawi, for which data are from 2002, and zero-return weeks, for which
data are for 2000–04. Zero-return weeks measure the average over all companies of the percentage of weeks for which there was
no price change; this measure indicates illiquidity. Concentration of firms is measured using the Herfindahl index of the market cap-
italization of listed firms. Secondary listings are not included; for example, data for Malawi exclude the Old Mutual cross-listing.AFRICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: DEPTH, BREADTH, AND EFFICIENCY 53
The small size and illiquidity of Africa’s stock exchanges partly reflect
low levels of economic activity, which make it hard to reach a minimum
efficient size or critical mass, and partly reflect the state of company
accounts and their reliability. Several of the exchanges established in the
late 1980s and 1990s were set up mainly to facilitate privatization, in the
hope of attracting inward investment with the modernization and tech-
nology transfer that such investment could convey (Moss 2003). For
example, the stock exchange in Maputo was established in the process of
privatizing Mozambique’s national brewery, which is still the only listed
company and which must bear the operating costs of the stock exchange.
To the extent that the establishment of stock exchanges was driven by
outside influences—rather than emerging from a realistic need felt in the
market, whether by investors or by issuers—it is perhaps unsurprising
that many have so far struggled to reach an effective scale and activity
level.
FIGURE 2.16
International Comparison of Stock Exchange Development: Main African
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Source: World Bank’s Financial Sector Development Indicators database.
Note:The figure shows the mean performance of different groups of exchanges relative to exchanges in high-income countries. De-
veloping countries as a whole have much smaller exchanges than do high-income countries, but it is mainly in their efficiency that
African exchanges fall short of the performance of other developing market exchanges. The composite indicators are defined in
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Pricing on all the markets appears to build in a sizable risk premium, to
judge, for example, from the low price-earnings ratios that have been
prevalent (Moss 2003; Senbet and Otchere 2006). The widespread limita-
tions on foreign holdings of listed shares, although diminishing in recent
years, have also contributed to low prices.16 High risk perceptions affect all
countries, even those with stable macroeconomic environments; indeed,
most countries lack sovereign credit ratings. The perceived risk is reflected
also in the very small amount of funds raised through new issues, includ-
ing initial public offerings (IPOs) and other public sales of equities.17
Nevertheless, issuing activity has picked up. Ghana had five new equity
issues in 2004, accounting for US$60 million. The Kenya Electricity Gen-
erating Company (KenGen) IPO of 2006—the country’s first in five years—
attracted strong demand and enormous public interest, raising more than
US$100 million.18 In Nigeria, the equivalent of almost US$3 billion in
new capital was raised on the exchange in 2003 to 2005 in connection
with the new capital requirements for banks. 
Scale issues in equities have been mirrored in the bond market; only a
limited number of private bonds have been listed, and there is little sec-
ondary market trading. In Tanzania capitalization of corporate bonds
amounts to T Sh 89 billion (about US$90 million); compare that with
equity market capitalization of T Sh 2.3 trillion. Ghana has three corpo-
rate bonds, but 30 listed companies. The bond market capitalization of the
BRVM is relatively higher—about one-fifth of equity market capitaliza-
tion. Most of the larger issues are governmental or from government-
owned enterprises, and trading is very light. 
African governments19 have relied more on foreign debt than on domes-
tic debt, though about half have issued significant domestic debt instruments
(not all of them traded on an organized market), eight with domestic debt-
to-GDP ratios in excess of 20 percent. Banks tend to be the biggest holders,
with about two-thirds of the stock outside the central bank. With an esti-
mated 87 percent of the debt having initial maturities of 12 months or less,
there is little secondary trading (Christensen 2004). Longer-term issues have
only recently appeared (or reappeared) on some of the exchanges. The 7-
and 10-year issues of the regional development banks Banque Ouest
Africaine de Développement (BOAD) and East African Development Bank
(EADB) are noteworthy, together with a handful of government and corpo-
rate bonds. The absence of such issues in most currencies means a lack of
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Insurance, Pension, and Collective Savings Institutions 
Insurance penetration is low across Africa with the notable exception of a
few countries in southern Africa, presumably reflecting the persistence in
that subregion of factors that account for the traditional success of this sub-
sector in the United Kingdom in colonial times (that is, factors that are
partly tax driven). Most countries have insurance penetration ratios (pre-
mium volume relative to GDP) of less than 1 percent. Low income explains
much of the low insurance penetration, with monetary instability and
weak contractual frameworks also contributing. In most countries, insur-
ance is characterized by many small and weak institutions and inadequate
supervision.
Some countries have introduced a funded national social security sys-
tem and funded pensions for public servants; where these funds exist, they
are in an accumulation phase. Although actuarial valuations of several of
these schemes raise questions about their long-run sustainability in the
absence of a change in parameters, for the medium term they will be
increasingly important suppliers of investable funds. To date, however,
most insurance companies and pension funds have invested mainly in real
estate, government securities, and bank deposits and comparatively little
in equities and corporate bonds (table 2.5). 
TABLE 2.5
Portfolio Composition of Selected Life Insurance and Pension Funds 
Cash, Govern-
deposits, ment  Real 
and so  paper  Equities  estate  Other 
Country Fund forth (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) Date
Ghana Social Security and 
National Insurance Trust 8.0 7.2 19.4 35.0 30.4 1999
Ghana Insurance 21.0 14.2 5.0 14.8 45.0 1999
Kenya Insurance 8.2 30.5 7.0 29.0 25.3 2001
Kenya National Social Security Fund 7.3 2.0 10.9 68.8 11.0 2002
Nigeria Life insurance  12.2 3.9 31.3 11.1 41.5 1999
Senegal Life insurance  30.9 12.7 25.0 8.5 22.9 1999
Senegal IPRES (public pension fund) 81.8 8.6 9.6 0.0 0.0 2000
Tanzania National Social Security Fund 26.0 25.0 6.0 24.0 19.0 2002
Tanzania Parastatal Pension Fund 34.0 7.0 7.0 37.0 15.0 2002
Uganda National Social Security Fund 41.9 11.3 8.2 34.8 3.8 2000
Source: World Bank files. Data are for different years over the period 1999 to 2003.56 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
Term Finance
Another striking characteristic of financial systems in Africa is the concen-
tration on short-term claims across all financial institutions and financial
markets. This characteristic is exemplified by the dominance of short-term
rather than long-term government paper. Christensen (2004) found that
the average maturity of government paper in 15 African countries was just
231 days. Four of those countries had average maturities of less than four
months, compared with five and one-half years for developed countries.
This lack of long-term government financing can be explained by reluc-
tance on both sides of trading. Undoubtedly, given the systemic volatility
already discussed, providers of funds are more comfortable with an
arrangement in which they can decide whether to renew short-term
advances on the basis of evolving conditions. Even if borrowers could
secure long-term funding, it would be at unfavorable terms. This concen-
tration on the short-term end is matched in private sector lending and on
the deposit side. In Mozambique, only 35 percent of the local-currency
loan portfolio and 28 percent of the foreign-currency loan portfolio have
an original maturity of more than one year. In Uganda, 35 percent of the
loan volume has an original maturity of more than one year, which is con-
centrated in 12 percent of all loans and mostly financed through donor
lines of credit. A similar picture can be observed on the deposit side. In
Uganda, only 0.4 percent of time deposits have an original maturity of
more than a year. 
Limited evidence from users, however, does not paint as bleak a picture.
Firm-level surveys suggest that firms’ bank loans have the same, if not
longer, terms as bank loans in other regions. The average firm in the
median African economy reports bank loans with maturities of 45 months,
compared with 36 months in South Asia, 40 months in Latin America, and
52 months in high-income countries. 
Illustrative of the limited availability of term finance is the lack of hous-
ing finance in most African economies. Although the stock of housing
finance in Namibia and South Africa comes to 18 to 20 percent of GDP, the
figures for other countries for which data are available are no more than 2
percent (Mali, Rwanda, Senegal) or even 1 percent (Ghana, Tanzania, and
Uganda).20 This figure is not only small in relation to GDP but also as a per-
centage of total private credit. In addition to the general confidence factors
that have worked against the growth of term finance, many specific factors
impede expansion of mortgage credit, including lack of effective title andAFRICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: DEPTH, BREADTH, AND EFFICIENCY 57
collateral registration systems. Attempts by many African governments to
address the dearth of housing finance over the years with government-
owned housing finance intermediaries resulted in skewed allocations of
subsidies to a small number of well-connected borrowers. As with other
state-owned development finance institutions (DFIs), many of these insti-
tutions eventually became insolvent and had to be bailed out—as in Côte
d’Ivoire, Niger, Rwanda, Tanzania, and elsewhere. 
Inclusive Household Finance
The financial service needs of lower-income households in Africa—which
have long been excluded from the formal financial system—have begun to
receive more attention from governments, NGOs, and even banks. The
accelerating expansion of formal and semiformal microfinance and the
political changes in South Africa have been major factors in this change. 
Although the closure of some state-owned banks with broad outreach
may have reduced households’ financial access in some countries, microfi-
nance has grown. Taking account also of the continued effectiveness of some
post offices as suppliers of banking services and piecing together available
information make it possible to generate rough estimates of the percentage
of the adult population with a bank or banklike account. In the median
African country, the figure is less than 20 percent. This percentage is lower
than in other regions, but the gap is, perhaps, smaller for this dimension
than for other aspects of finance (figures 2.17 and 2.18).21 To a significant
extent, the low access percentages reflect general economic conditions (per
capita income can explain a high fraction of the variation in access across
countries).However, African access figures remain about 2 percentage points
lower on average, a figure that is not statistically significant.
Mapping the estimated access percentages shows how widely access
varies (map 2.4). In addition to relatively high percentages in Botswana,
Mauritius, and South Africa, the estimated access percentages are rela-
tively high in Angola, Benin, Gabon, and Niger, as well as in Zimbabwe.
Several of the largest financial intermediaries in terms of numbers of
clients are post office savings banks (even allowing for the fact that some
accounts may be dormant). Although not all have been continuously effec-
tive over their lengthy histories, there have been successful turnarounds,
and they remain very important in the market for small deposits and pay-
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It is worth stressing that these estimates do not purport to include tradi-
tional informal finance. In addition, of course, most Africans—perhaps as
many as 80 percent—are involved in informal finance groups. Important
though these informal financial services are, they are not the focus of this
book. A more in-depth picture of household financial access can be
obtained by survey methods, and a new wave of surveys focusing on
finance is under way. So far, these kinds of data are available for only a
handful of African countries, all south of the Limpopo River.
Numerous factors contribute to low access percentages. The low popu-
lation densities and communications and transportation deficiencies that
characterize most, although not all, African economies likely increase the
cost of market exchange between different agents in the economy, as peo-
ple, goods, and services must travel longer distances. Further, most Sub-
Saharan African countries have lower branch and ATM penetration, both
demographically and geographically, than developing countries in other
regions. In addition, the difficulties of establishing and maintaining com-
FIGURE 2.17
























































Note: The figure shows the percentage of the adult population with access to an account. It shows mean, median, maximum and
minimum values for countries in each region. The median is higher than the mean in Latin America and the Caribbean and in the
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munication and transportation networks exacerbate the negative effect of
scarcely populated economies by further increasing the cost of market
exchange. Africa has the lowest road density in the world, with the notable
exception of South Asia (which, in contrast, has a much higher population
density). Recent technological advances and innovations, such as mobile
branches or mobile banking (by mobile phones22) have helped reduce this
barrier, as we discuss in more detail in chapter 4.
Affordability is another important barrier. Low levels of income and the
lack of steady income flows make large parts of the population “unbank-
able” in the eyes of traditional financial service providers such as banks.
Seen from the demand side, high minimum balances and monthly fees can
prevent large parts of the population from accessing formal financial serv-
ices.23 In Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda, a sum equivalent to more
than 50 percent of per capita GDP is needed to open a checking account. In
Malawi, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, annual fees associated with
a checking account amount to more than 20 percent of per capita GDP.24
FIGURE 2.18
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Compare this system with many developing and advanced financial sys-
tems that have no minimum balance requirements and no fees associated
with routine checking account use (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and  2006).25
Eligibility is another hurdle for accessing financial services. In Swaziland,
legislation mandates that a woman can be party to a contract (such as open-
ing an account or taking out a loan) only with the consent of her father, her
husband, or another male family member. This requirement might explain
the large gender gap in bank accounts—52 percent of men have accounts,
but only 30 percent of women. Documentation requirements for opening a
bank account can be another important hurdle. Such requirements seem to
be more onerous in African countries than elsewhere. In many African
countries, new customers need a form of identification, payment slip, letter
of reference, and proof of residence before being able to open an account.
Compare these requirements with those of many non-African countries,
where only one or two of these documents are required (Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and  2006). The documents can be hard to obtain. In Nigeria, pass-
ports are issued only for approved travel purposes. Driver licenses are
available only to drivers, and proof of a registered residential address
excludes the population living in rural areas and in informal settlements
(Truen and others 2005). The requirement for proof of formal income
MAP 2.4
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excludes all but government officials and employees of medium and large
enterprises. Anti-money-laundering legislation can have a profound impact
on access, by tightening documentation requirements and preventing inno-
vative financial institutions from working around these traditional identifi-
cation requirements. Chamberlain and Walker (2005) estimate that 35
percent of adults in Namibia and 30 percent in South Africa are not able to
provide proof of their physical address, as required by anti-money-launder-
ing legislation. The situation is even worse in low-income Swaziland, where
75 percent of adults do not have a verifiable address.
Finally, there is the barrier of inappropriate product features. Bank
accounts with all the bells and whistles might be not only too costly but
also inappropriate for large numbers of Africans, who need only simple
transaction or savings accounts. Checking accounts and built-in overdraft
facilities can lead to overindebtedness, especially for individuals who have
irregular income and spending needs. Recently, banks across the continent
have come up with simpler transaction accounts, partly owing to political
pressures. The Mzansi account in South Africa, introduced with the finan-
cial charter, resulted in 1.3 million new accounts over nine months, a 10
percent increase in the “banked” population. Banks in Kenya, Uganda,
and other countries have introduced new account types, as we discuss in
more detail in chapter 4. 
Many financial services are not only costly and unsuitable for low-
income customers, but also of low quality. According to firm-level surveys,
it takes five days to clear a check in South Africa and Uganda, and seven
days in Mozambique—longer than the time for an international wire
transfer. In most Latin American countries, by contrast, it takes two days. 
Affordability, eligibility, and product appropriateness barriers are lower
for nonbank financial intermediaries that cater to lower-income house-
holds. These intermediaries range from post office savings banks to credit
unions and other financial cooperatives to other formal and semiformal
microfinance providers. Accordingly, it is to these intermediaries that most
African households have resort. 
Enterprises Place High Value on Better Financial Services
If a single survey statistic justifies a development focus on finance, it is this
finding: more African enterprises report that access to and the cost of62 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
finance are major constraints on the operation and growth of their firms
than do entrepreneurs in other regions (figure 2.19).26 This finding comes
from firm-level surveys that have enabled us to assess firms’ financing
constraints and patterns since the early 1990s. Here we rely on the most
recent efforts, the World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessment (ICA)
surveys, which also enable international benchmarking of African firms. 
The financing patterns of firms in Africa show some similarities to, but
also some striking differences from, those of firms in other regions, as can
be observed in figure 2.20. African firms finance about 68 percent of their
investment needs with internal funds, more than firms in Latin America
and Asia, but less than firms in the Middle East and North Africa and in
Europe and Central Asia. Firms in Africa finance a smaller share of invest-
ment with bank credit than do firms in East Asia and Latin America, but a
larger share than do firms in the Middle East, Europe and Central Asia,
FIGURE 2.19
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and South Asia. However, firms in Africa finance less investment with
equity finance than do firms in any other region—most likely reflecting
the underdevelopment of capital markets—and they finance less invest-
ment with trade finance than firms in any other region, which might
reflect low levels of trust.
The low reliance on trade credit might seem surprising because supplier
credit has often been seen as a substitute for bank credit (Fisman and Love
2003). Small firms, in particular, can benefit from trade credit from large
firms if the large firms have access to bank finance. Furthermore, the
reliance of trade credit relationships on soft information and their link
with real transactions should make trade credit especially appealing in an
environment so hostile to formal banking credit. Trade credit should be
FIGURE 2.20
Sources of Financing for Investment across Regions
Source: World Bank Investment Climate Assessment Surveys.
Note: The figure shows mean shares of different sources of funds for financing new investments by manufacturing firms.64 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
more appropriate, because it is a more flexible arrangement than formal
banking relationships in the face of unexpected shocks. The degree to
which domestic trade credit at the small scale is confined to networks
largely working within particular ethnic communities, partly as a response
to the difficult business environment (Eifert, Gelb, and Ramachandran
2006), is touched on below.
As elsewhere, small firms in Africa use fewer formal external financing
sources than do large firms (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2004).
Interestingly, the lack of demand for formal external finance does not vary
significantly across firm size (see table 2.6). But firm size eases financing
constraints, which leads to the probability that firms’ unmet credit demand
increases as one moves from large to medium-size to small to micro firms. 
Previous research using ICAs has pointed to a large share of firms that
do not apply for credit. Researchers have inferred a lack of credit demand
by firms—especially small firms. Digging deeper into reasons firms have
not applied, however, yields a very different picture. Table 2.6 lists the per-
centages for three categories of firms; first, firms that applied for and
received a loan; second, a group of firms with no demand for loans; and
third, a group of firms that is credit constrained—that is, that either applied
for a loan and were rejected or did not apply because they did not have
sufficient collateral, the application process was too difficult, interest rates
were too high, or they simply expected to be rejected. Including this last
group of entrepreneurs who are involuntarily excluded from the credit
market in the category of entrepreneurs who applied for a loan and were
rejected not only reduces the share of enterprises with no demand for
credit, but also makes credit-constrained firms the largest group among the
small firms.
TABLE 2.6
Credit Demand and Constraints across African Enterprises
Small enterprises Medium enterprises Large enterprises
Received loan (%) 24.8 32.0 55.6
No credit demand (%) 34.0 39.8 32.5
Credit constraineda (%) 41.2 28.2 11.9
Source: World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessment surveys. 
Note:Calculations are based on surveys from Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, and Uganda. Small enterprises have fewer than 25 em-
ployees, medium have 26 to 100, and large have more than 100. 
a. Includes firms that applied for a loan and were rejected and firms that did not apply because they (a) did not have sufficient col-
lateral, (b) found the application process too difficult, (c) found interest rates too high, or (d) expected to be rejected.AFRICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: DEPTH, BREADTH, AND EFFICIENCY 65
Beyond the observation that smaller firms have less access to financial
services, many observers of firm finance in Africa have commented on the
phenomenon of the missing middle: medium and large firms can access
formal financial institutions, while microfirms often have access to MFIs
(Kaufmann 2005; Sacerdoti 2005). But microfirms that are growing have
difficulty expanding because MFIs are not able to expand lending (because
of lack of funds or regulatory limits on maximum loan amounts), and
banks and finance companies do not consider microfirms formal enough
to extend credit to them. Collateral and documentation requirements often
lie at the core of the reluctance of banks to extend loans to this segment of
firms.
One of the problems faced by many enterprises in countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, as in many other developing countries, is high collateral
requirements—often over 100 percent. On average, 83 percent of firms in
Sub-Saharan Africa must supply lenders with collateral or a deposit, a pro-
portion similar to that in other regions of the world. Lack of sufficient col-
lateral is widely cited as a reason for not applying for or for being refused
credit. In the median African country, firms that must offer collateral must
supply 135 percent of the loan value. This figure is lower than in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa and in Europe and Central Asia, but it is substan-
tially higher than in East and South Asia. 
Numerous financial products available in advanced economies are
largely absent in the African environment. Where this lack cannot be
explained by the broader environmental issues, including the security of
property rights, it may be due to a lack of scale. In some cases, technical
fixes, such as specific legislation or an improved information environ-
ment, could help. This last consideration is especially pertinent for those
products that could potentially compensate for other harder-to-correct
weaknesses in the environment, especially for those small firms in the
missing middle.
Leasing is an efficient financing tool for small and medium enterprises
because it relies on the underlying asset and the cash flows it generates as
collateral rather than on the enterprise’s and the owner’s wealth. Leasing
has developed in some African countries, often jump-started with assis-
tance from the International Finance Corporation, but it is often still ham-
pered by tax complications or regulatory uncertainty because of the lack of
specific legislation. Although leasing has the advantage that the lessor
(lender) owns the leased equipment, this benefit does not always translate66 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
into speedy recovery in the case of delinquency, owing to the complexities
of court procedures, which are often compounded by judicial inefficiency,
if not corruption.
Factoring—which is not a lending technique, strictly speaking—
involves the purchase of accounts receivables by the lender or factor. In
small enterprises with accounts receivable from large reputable enter-
prises, this financing technique is attractive because it does not rely on
information about the borrower, but the obligor. 
In interpreting survey findings, it is important to recognize that the
firms surveyed in the ICAs are mostly formal firms in the manufacturing
sector. In particular, firms engaged in agriculture—so crucial to current
economic well-being across most of Africa (figure 2.21)—are underrep-
resented. It is clear that access to credit and other financial services is
even more restricted in agriculture than in other sectors, and more
restricted in rural settings than in urban ones. Much agricultural activity,
FIGURE 2.21
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Note: The figure shows the contribution of agriculture (value added) to GDP in 99 countries. African countries are shown in color.
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especially subsistence agriculture with staple crops, does not lend itself
easily to traditional loan products. It requires innovative solutions, as
discussed in chapter 4. But even cash crop farmers have a hard time
securing external financing because of frequent crop failure and price
volatility.
As in household finance, informality is often a major hurdle in access-
ing formal financial sources, especially in the absence of formal documen-
tation of ownership claims over immovable assets that could be used as
collateral. Contract claims cannot be enforced against firms that are not
formally registered. Informal economic activity is also disproportionately
important in Africa (figure 2.22).27 There can be no doubt that this sector
too is starved of formal finance, having access to it only indirectly (for
example, through assistance from friends and relatives—including public
servants who access bank credit through salary loans). 
FIGURE 2.22
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Source: World Bank’s Doing Business database.
Note: The figure shows estimates of the informal economy for 110 countries. African countries are shown in color. All data are for
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Notes
1. Throughout this book, Africa refers to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
2. An intriguing recent discovery is that high poverty seems to be associated with
low subsequent national investment rates, but only in countries with low lev-
els of financial depth (Lopez and Serven 2005). 
3. However, one should not overlook the limitations of both indicators. Both are
measures of size; they do not indicate the efficiency with which financial serv-
ices are delivered or the quality of those services. Also, both are measures of
financial aggregates and, as such, do not give any indication of the penetration
of financial services to different agents in the economy—an issue to which we
will come back later.
4. Even if an Africa dummy is not statistically significant, examination of the pat-
tern of outliers is meaningful.
5. The low financial depth, despite moderate inflation, in the two CFA franc
monetary unions—Communauté Financière d’Afrique (West Africa) and
Coopération Financière en Afrique Centrale (Central Africa)—has been long
observed. The relative openness of the capital account and a fear of devalua-
tion were once posited as explanations, though neither explanation has as
much force now as it would have had in the years before the devaluation of
1994. This study uses the term CFA zone to refer to both unions.
6. The level of offshore deposits might also be related to factors unrelated to cap-
ital flight, such as use by multinational enterprises or exporters. However, the
level of capital flight might be understated by the level of offshore deposits
because it does not include capital flight through nonbank channels.
7. In the following, we will use margins (the net interest revenue relative to total
earning assets) rather than spreads (the difference between lending and
deposit rates) owing to better data availability. Margins are generally lower
than spreads because they exclude interest that has not been paid on nonper-
forming loans. 
8. The other main components are loan-loss provisions and noninterest income
(such as fees). Thus (approximately), before tax profits = net interest margin +
noninterest income – overhead costs – loan-loss provisions.
9. The data used here are for the period 2000 to 2004 and include data on 2,157
banks from 110 countries, including 174 banks from 20 African countries. 
10. In 1994, the price level in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire)
increased by a factor of 240.
11. The custom in many English Common Law countries of a general lien against
all assets of a borrower also helps bind the borrower to a specific lender, espe-
cially given the high registration costs of such liens. 
12. It is remarkable that the big-three banks in Nigeria managed to retain as high
a share as they did, given the proliferation of state (provincial) government-
owned banks from the 1960s on and of private commercial and merchant
banks in the late 1980s (Brownbridge and Harvey 1998). The 2005 consolida-AFRICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: DEPTH, BREADTH, AND EFFICIENCY 69
tion will likely lower the effective market power of the big three even if it does
not affect their combined market share by much.
13. For instance, half the stocks listed on the Namibian stock exchange are also
listed on the Johannesburg exchange (a fact whose origins lie in the precise
formulation of Namibian exchange controls, which have allowed fund invest-
ment in what are primarily South African companies, provided they are locally
listed; see Moss 2003). Five other exchanges—those in Botswana, Ghana,
Malawi, and Nigeria, and Zambia’s Lusaka exchange—also have primary or
secondary listings of one or two firms that are listed in Johannesburg. The
largest company listed on the Ghana exchange, AngloGold Ashanti, has its pri-
mary listing in Johannesburg and is listed on six other exchanges; most of the
trading in AngloGold Ashanti occurs on the New York Stock Exchange. There
are also cross-listings between the East African exchanges.
14. Some exchanges have listed firms that have not issued any new securities;
market valuation of firms can also increase without the firms raising any new
funds.
15. These concepts are spelled out in World Bank (2006).
16. Such rules refer both to the maximum percentage of a company’s equity
allowed to be controlled by any one foreign investor (5 or 10 percent in
exchanges such as those of Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zim-
babwe) and to ceilings on the total percentage of foreign ownership of the
share (or at least on foreign ownership of the free float). These ceilings are 49
percent in Malawi and Zimbabwe, 55 percent in Botswana, 60 percent in Tan-
zania (which did not allow foreign portfolio investment in listed equities
before 2004), 74 percent in Ghana, and 75 percent in Kenya, for example.
There are no particular restrictions of foreign ownership of shares in Mauri-
tius, Uganda, or Zambia.
17. The reluctance of domestic investors to commit themselves to sizable stakes is
exemplified by the flotation of Ghana’s Produce Buying Company in 2000,
which failed to raise the expected funds from the general private sector, leav-
ing the social security fund holding a much higher share (49 percent) than the
20 percent originally envisaged. Moss (2003) documents the risk factors that
were probably in the minds of investors.
18. The issue was greatly oversubscribed, and the shares went to a premium of
326 percent on the issue price in the first day’s trading. The number of appli-
cants exceeded 250,000—two and a half times the previous number of regis-
tered shareholders in the market.
19. With the exception of those in Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa.
20. For comparison, housing finance comes to between 15 and 21 percent in
Chile, Malaysia, and Thailand and reaches 65 percent in Ireland and 78 per-
cent in the Netherlands. 
21. Note that the curve-fitting methodology used to arrive at these estimates was
chosen so as to, if anything, err on the high side for countries at the low end,
thereby perhaps exaggerating access percentages for some low-income African70 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
countries (Honohan 2006). The overall figure of 20 percent should therefore
be taken as an upper estimate. 
22. Countries in Africa have some of the lowest telephone penetration rates in the
world, whether fixed line or mobile, but mobile penetration is increasing rap-
idly.
23. There seem to be different pricing models for account services. Some banks
seem to rely more on large unremunerated minimum balances, while others
rely on large monthly fees. A third model, such as in South Africa, tries to
impose individual charges on each account-related service. 
24. A sad story is told of a widow in Ghana whose c907,000 savings deposit (more
than US$100), accumulated from savings earned carrying goods in Accra’s
Makola market, was completely eroded over a period of two years (2003–05)
by annual charges imposed by her bank after they increased the minimum
balance requirement on savings deposits (Adabre 2005).
25. The cross-country data are based on survey responses from the largest banks
in each country. They are averages for all banks that responded, weighted by
their share in the deposit market. Fore more detail see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt,
and Martínez Pería (2006). 
26. Although these are subjective assessments, note that Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt,
and Levine (2006) find that in countries where firms report greater financing
obstacles, industries that depend more on external finance grow relatively
more slowly and investment resources are reallocated more slowly as demand
changes across industries. Also, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic
(2005) find a significant negative impact of financing obstacles on firm growth.
27. On average, more of the economy is informal in Sub-Saharan Africa than in
other continents. Schneider (2005) estimates the average share of GDP con-
tributed by the informal sector in 32 Sub-Saharan African countries other
than South Africa at 44 percent, compared with 43 percent in Latin America,
40 percent in Central and Eastern Europe and the countries of the former
Soviet Union, and 30 percent in Asia. The International Labour Organization
(ILO 2002) data (for fewer countries) show the share of informal employment
in nonagricultural employment as 78 percent for Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries other than South Africa; 65 percent for Asia, 51 percent for Latin Amer-
ica, and 48 percent for North Africa. Introduction: Mainstream Financial Institutions
Finance’s contribution to growth and stability
This chapter deals with the functioning of mainstream financial institu-
tions as mobilizers of funds, providers of risk management services, and
financiers of medium- and large-scale enterprises and government. It is in
these ways that finance makes its major contribution to sustained eco-
nomic growth and stability. 
With the prospect of an increased flow of external funds of various
forms, the major challenge facing African financial systems is that of
absorption. How can policy help ensure that these funds are effectively
channeled into productive growth, generating uses in both rural and
urban areas?
We begin with banking, noting the endemic high liquidity in much of
Africa’s banks and considering how this liquidity could be more effectively
employed over time. Here, of the quartet of distinctive African environ-
mental factors—scale, informality, governance, and shocks—the last two
are especially evident. 
A need to improve contract enforcement and transparency of information
An ever-growing body of evidence supports the relevance of a proposition
that has been reiterated by modernist observers for decades—namely that
CHAPTER 3
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improving information and contract enforcement is important for helping
manage idiosyncratic shocks. We show that this proposition is especially
important in Africa and also highlight the importance of avoiding overly
activist prudential regulations that constrain banking effectiveness with-
out materially improving systemic stability. 
Ownership of African banks has been evolving rapidly. The likely effect
of the return of the international banks (including, but not limited to,
those based in South Africa) is reviewed, as is the growth of regional banks;
both are positive developments. Recurrent political interest in state-
sponsored development finance institutions (DFIs), by contrast, is unlikely
to produce results any more successful than the last wave of such institu-
tions, essentially because of governance problems. 
Governments are not the best source of long-term funds—
In particular, government-owned and -operated DFIs are not the most
promising sources of long-term resources. Long-term funds can be
sourced from pension and social security funds, given the right gover-
nance structures, and complemented by a more energetic approach to
investment banking by the leading intermediaries. Good allocation of
long-term funds will benefit from effective securities markets to help
make pricing transparent. The regulatory model of existing African
securities markets may not be the most appropriate one, however, at
least for the smaller countries, as we will explain: in regulation, the
modernist model may have been taken too far. The housing and infra-
structure sectors demand longer-term funds with specific and typically
more limited risks. We review the prospects for financing each, using
new approaches.
—But they do need to provide a stable macroeconomic environment
The last section of the chapter turns to macroeconomic issues, pointing
out the need to ensure that government policy does not destabilize
wholesale financial markets either through debt management policy or
through the response of the monetary authorities to shocks such as those
resulting from aid inflows. The potential for further regional integration
is briefly explored, highlighting the desirability of focusing efforts on
those steps that can help improve governance and those that can help
overcome the costs of operating at too small a scale.FINANCE FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH 73
Improving the Banking System’s Ability to Intermediate Funds
Ensuring Bank Lending Capacity 
For the foreseeable future, the bulk of investable funds mobilized by
African countries’ financial systems will be intermediated by national
banking systems. Ensuring that the banking system does a good job of
intermediating is crucial to the effectiveness of banking systems; neglect-
ing this sector will mean stagnation.
What can Africans hope to get from their banking systems? Certainly
they can get more than just credit. Bundled into the operating methodol-
ogy of all commercial banks is a range of liquidity, risk reduction, payment,
and credit services. Credit is a key ingredient in and a major contributor to
the functioning of the economic system. Yet African bankers and their cus-
tomers complain about inadequate volumes of credit. Both would like to
see greater volumes of credit, provided it was going to be profitable. From
the points of view of borrowing firms and of farms, better availability of
affordable credit would remove a significant constraint to expansion. 
So why do African banks not lend enough? By their own accounts, in a
remarkable number of African countries it is not a lack of mobilized funds that
constrains the bankers. As noted in chapter 2, many African banking systems
are rather liquid by international standards. As shown in figure 3.1, this is
nothing new. Indeed, the median ratio of liquid assets to lending in the aggre-
gate banking balance sheet of African countries has crept up over the years. 
Plotting bank liquidity—here defined broadly to include foreign assets
as well as local-currency reserves—against monetary depth—the ratio of
broad money to gross domestic product (GDP)—helps identify the coun-
tries that are most affected by this endemic excess liquidity. It also puts
this information in a perspective that shows that excess liquidity can
coexist with very limited investable funds (figure 3.2). The International
Monetary Fund (IMF 2006) provides a complementary analysis in terms
of required and excess domestic reserves. The systems that have mobi-
lized the most resources are not the ones that experience the most excess
liquidity. Indeed, if anything, the downward sloping pattern of the plot
suggests that excess liquidity tends to coincide more often with limited
monetization: the population is unwilling to save in monetary form, and
the banks are unable to lend even the limited resources that they have.174 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
Some of this trend reflects the capital restructuring of failed banks
that saw their loan book written down or removed.2 But it clearly indi-
cates either a problem with generating sufficient satisfactory loan busi-
ness or a response to perceived liquidity risk. Bankers generally point to
the former, though some banks—often foreign-owned ones—are in a
position of currency mismatch, having taken more deposits denomi-
nated in foreign currency than can prudently be lent out in the local
economy (box 3.1). First, and most stridently, bankers complain of a
lack of acceptable or “bankable” loan applications. Second, some banks
(often the smaller ones) feel constrained by regulatory requirements for
diversification of risks: when a single loan must not exceed a quarter of
the bank’s capital, they find that they do not have enough capital to
finance certain large projects. These issues are not new; they have per-
sisted through the past couple of decades. Bankers’ avowed inability to
lend the resources they have mobilized slows their efforts at mobiliza-
tion (branches, services) and discourages expansion. We consider both
issues in turn, concluding that lack of bankability is likely the more
acute and intractable problem. Still, some easily implemented measures
on the regulatory side could help.
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reserves plus foreign assets of banking institutions divided by the total credit, as in the International Monetary Fund’s Internation-
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BOX 3.1
Dollarization 
The share of bank deposits denominated in foreign currency in African
banking systems has risen sharply in recent years. This phenomenon has
been relatively unremarked, so policy makers experiencing it in their own
country tend to see it as unique to them. In fact, dollarization ratios for the
two dozen African countries for which data are available display distribution
and growth to similar ratios in other parts of the world (see table). 
Dollarization of Bank Deposits 
(foreign currency as a percentage of total deposits)
Africa World  Africa 
(2004 or latest year) (2004) (change since 1994)
Mean 33.7 32.6 12.7
Median 29.3 29.5 16.4
Upper quartile 44.1 47.9 16.2
Lower quartile 12.8 10.4 7.1
Sources: De Nicoló, Honohan, and Ize 2005; Levy-Yeyati 2006.
Information and Contract Enforcement
In contrast to the experience of bankers in advanced economies, where
lending is usually more profitable than holding government securities or
liquid assets abroad, bankers in Africa have often found lending to be a rel-
atively unprofitable line of business. This trend has been shown, for exam-
ple, in two detailed recent studies of Nigerian and Ugandan banks (Beck,
Cull, and Jerome 2005; Clarke, Cull, and Fuchs 2006). It is easy to see why,
generally speaking and in normal times, lending can contribute much
more to value added and to the profitability of banks. After all, it is through
lending that banks exploit their comparative advantage in credit appraisal
and monitoring. Why has it been otherwise in Africa? At times, in some
countries, heavy government reliance on domestic borrowing has sent the
yield on national government securities so high as to choke off demand
from nongovernmental borrowers. But crowding out is far from the whole
story and has not occurred in all countries. FINANCE FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH 77
Instead, bankers are unanimous on the two main factors that discour-
age lending. First is the difficulty of obtaining the information about poten-
tial clients that they need to assess those clients’ creditworthiness. Second
is the difficulty of enforcing creditor rights. Without these two essential
ingredients, the banks are left with costly, time-consuming, and unreliable
procedures for precredit appraisal and without the comfort of speedy
recourse to foreclosure if things go wrong. 
Africa is not alone in being deficient in these respects. Indeed, of the six
major regions with which the World Bank deals, Sub-Saharan Africa scores
third in business confidence in the judicial system and in the World Bank’s
index of property rights (figure 3.3).3 And reforms are taking place. 
A special commercial court established in Tanzania was greeted with
enthusiasm by the business community, though—perhaps inevitably—
early achievements were not fully maintained. In Rwanda, the time taken
to resolve a dispute fell by 22 percent following the introduction of a spe-
cialized court for business, financial, and tax matters (World Bank’s Doing
About a third of bank deposits in African countries for which data are available
are denominated in foreign currencies. The highest figures recorded are for
Liberia (90 percent), the Democratic Republic of Congo (86 percent), Angola (72
percent), and Mozambique (60 percent). For the countries for which data are
also available for 1994, there has been an increase of about 1.0 to 1.5 percent per
year on average, close also to the worldwide average rate of increase in dollar-
ization. Cross-country research suggests that past inflation and confidence fac-
tors are influential in increasing the rate of dollarization. By stabilizing the macro-
economy some countries have managed to reverse dollarization, but overall
there has been an upward worldwide trend (De Nicoló, Honohan, and Ize 2005).
Dollarization presents prudential risks and limits the ability of the banks to
onlend their mobilized resources in local currency. On average, one of every
two dollars mobilized in foreign-currency deposits tends to be invested
abroad. But given the perceived exchange rate risks that induce depositors
to hold foreign-currency accounts, the alternative is offshore deposits. Out-
lawing foreign-currency deposits is unlikely to be a preferred option. But
any taxes and regulations that favor foreign-currency deposits should be re-
viewed. For example, Liberia had, until recently, much lower reserve re-
quirements on foreign-currency deposits. And maintenance of a stable
macro and monetary environment can help limit the growth of dollarization. 78 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
Business database 2006). The idea of a special commercial court is most
attractive when it comes to complex commercial cases that require special-
ist expertise on the part of the relevant judiciary body; the logic of estab-
lishing a special court to deal with more routine contract enforcement
matters is less compelling. 
Procedural changes, many requiring legislation, can represent a more
immediate and less costly kind of reform. Here Africa has a relatively poor
record, second among the six World Bank regions in number of proce-
dures and in time taken to resolve disputes.4 For instance, measures to
streamline debtor appeals (for example, confining the appeal to matters of
law and procedure, not the original evidence) and impose time limits on
their filing have been introduced in several African countries. The World
Bank’s 2006 Doing Business database states, “The time and cost savings
allowed more businesses to use the courts. Uganda saw a 62 percent
increase in commercial cases filed.... ‘We have more faith in the courts
now, more trust,’ says Musoke, a local businessman. ‘The president is now
mentioning us in his speeches,’ adds a judge in Kampala.” Evidently the
reforms are believed to improve the enforcement (box 3.2).
FIGURE 3.3
Business Opinion on Courts and on the Recoverability of Overdue Amounts
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BOX 3.2
Points to Look For in an Effective Legal System 
A well-functioning legal system is a confluence of modern laws, procedur-
al regulations, and strong institutions, backed with proper enforcement
mechanisms. 
Laws and Regulations
Whereas the commercial legal frameworks of former colonial powers have
been significantly modified in the past half-century, the English Common
Law and French Civil Code systems inherited by African countries at inde-
pendence have rarely been updated. For example, advanced economies
have modified their commercial legal frameworks to accommodate the var-
ied types of trading and complex financing arrangements (including con-
cepts such as leasing, securitization, and derivatives trading) that character-
ize modern and evolving market economies. A particular difficulty for
countries with a Civil Code tradition is their inability to take advantage of
many new financial instruments, because they have not been able to intro-
duce the Common Law concept of a trust upon which such instruments are
based.
To further strengthen their economies, advanced economies have also
sought to shift the balance of protections traditionally enjoyed by contract-
ing parties and have evolved different rights and responsibilities for different
classes of agents. Realizing the close links between having access to cred-
it and stimulating entrepreneurship, they have sought to ensure that the
default risk was minimized through the legal system. 
It is time for Africa to incorporate these kinds of changes, appropriately
adapted to suit its particular circumstances. For instance, the key agricul-
ture sector could benefit from laws facilitating the use of agricultural prod-
ucts as collateral, such as by introducing the concept of warehousing, and
from better price discovery mechanisms for farmers, such as could result
from derivative trading in agricultural products. A move toward a stream-
lined system of conclusive land title registration would add to lenders’ con-
fidence in land as collateral, thereby promoting credit flows. In addition, col-
lateral registration procedures need simplification, and the database should 
(Box continues on the following page.)80 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
BOX 3.2 (continued)
be easily accessible so as to assist in prior-charge verification, thereby pre-
venting disputes. Similarly, the introduction of a credit information database
would prevent credit arbitrage and would reward honest borrowers. 
The threat of insolvency, both corporate and personal, needs to be made
real and effective. A specialized approach to insolvency is required. Person-
al bankruptcy in most countries in Africa is a relic of the early 20th century;
corporate insolvency is a part of a companies act that, in most cases, is
based on concepts that have not prevailed widely for decades. A mecha-
nism to restructure and rehabilitate viable enterprises with the active partic-
ipation of the creditor community needs to be adopted.
Regulatory Institutions and Transparency Requirements
Increasing penetration of financial services such as banking, insurance,
pensions, and microfinance necessitates both an enabling environment for
these services to grow and a good regulatory structure to prevent diversion
of funds. Unscrupulous elements can exploit the cloak of limited liability to
defraud unsuspecting individuals of their hard-earned money. Opacity in
the functioning of institutions that access public money and provide public
services can lead to disastrous events. Good corporate governance prac-
tices, supplemented by proper accounting and auditing principles, are a
must, particularly for companies that operate in these sectors. To enable
them to highlight weak internal governance in these companies, independ-
ent professionals need to be trained through capacity-building efforts. Es-
tablishing appropriate disclosure standards and strict, efficient enforce-
As far as credit information is concerned, African countries tend to be
behind the rest of the world. Partly this tendency reflects a delayed
catch-up to a new wave: worldwide, the proportion of countries with a
credit registry jumped from 46 percent in 1988 to 70 percent in 1998
and to 80 percent in 2003; in Africa, the percentage is still just 60 per-
cent. Furthermore, the coverage of the population and the extent of
information that registries contain are lower than in other regions—
much lower, except for South Africa and its small neighbors (World
Bank’s Doing Business database 2006). Part of the problem here is the
informality of residence and the lack of stable individual identifiers.
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being built even in anglophone African countries in which they were
not traditionally used, such as Kenya and Uganda, and are being
expanded to cover all incidents of delinquency in countries that did not
cover these issues before.
Bankers have often developed imperfect but workable bilateral arrange-
ments for providing credit references. So they are not always in the fore-
front of movements to improve credit registries if doing so will entail
compulsory sharing of their information with other lenders, even outside
the circle of traditional banking. Therefore, although bankers need to be
involved in plans for improving credit registries, authorities may need to
push beyond the point where bankers want to go. 
ment procedures should be a priority. The availability of information in the
public domain can lead to proper vigilance and quick remedial measures in
case problems occur. Strong regulatory institutions can enforce these dis-
closure standards and other regulations and ensure that the whole system
functions well.
Traditional Court System and Enforcement Mechanisms
Quite apart from the necessity of having modern laws, existing legal insti-
tutions (as well as new ones) also need adequate staffing and other infra-
structure resources. Financial and functional independence from other
branches of the government should be encouraged because excessive re-
liance on the government (often the most significant litigant) usually endan-
gers judicial impartiality. 
Despite the growth in the number of legal disputes, legal and judicial insti-
tutions have remained static. There has been no corresponding increase in
the number of courts or tribunals, or in the number of court personnel to
service the courts. Of particular concern are the extreme delays and high
levels of frustration encountered in enforcing judgments. An insufficient
staff and a lack of incentives to promptly enforce judgments result in the
primary relief becoming illusory. Compensation levels have remained low,
and there has been little, if any, upgrading of technical skills to keep up with
the changing nature of legal disputes. Even the clerical staff needs training
on how to keep records and manage excessive caseloads. Without a signif-
icant investment in these soft skills, improvements in automation and the
introduction of modern case-tracking tools will be wasted.82 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
Property registries, where liens can be recorded and quickly accessed,
are also part of the recommended toolkit for facilitating collateralized lend-
ing. These registries, too, are something on which many African countries
are working, introducing computerized systems that can leapfrog them
into quite an efficient system of collateralized lending.
The lack of reliable company accounts is also largely a function of the
informality of the economies. Most countries have now adopted the Inter-
national Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), so that doctrinal issues are
at a minimum. But enforcing prompt filing of reliable accounts and ensur-
ing that the auditing profession is competent and honest are necessarily
medium-term projects.
Good information and strong creditor rights are two keys to expanding
credit availability. It is clear from increasingly elaborate econometric work,
using the extensive cross-country databases maintained by the World Bank,
that countries with stronger creditor rights and better credit information
enjoy a higher volume of credit (even controlling for other explanatory fac-
tors). The borrower benefits through availability when the lender is made
secure. Digging deeper, though, we notice that for poor countries, credit
information seems more important in influencing the volume of lending
than are the legal protections (Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer forthcom-
ing). If that is so, it is good news for Africa, because fully reforming legal
protections is likely to be a long and drawn-out process in poor countries,
at least when it comes to protecting the creditor rights of banks against
politically protected borrowers. In fact, in countries with weak creditor
rights, coverage of credit registries tends to be better and vice versa: infor-
mation seems to have emerged as a partial substitute for creditor rights in
the countries where such rights were weaker. (This is conspicuously the
case in Africa, where countries with a credit registry have an average score
of only 1.1 on the World Bank’s Doing Business index of creditor rights,
whereas those without a credit registry score 3.7 on average.)5 It leaves
open considerable potential for those African countries that still have no
credit registries to introduce them—and for those that have them to
enhance the extent, quality, and depth of the information collected.
It is not only for medium and large firms that better credit information helps
improve credit availability. Indeed, the evidence shows that strengthening this
area will yield even greater benefits for micro, small, and medium-scale enter-
prises (MSMEs) and households (Love and Mylenko 2003). Improving finan-
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of that discussion—notably suggesting that lenders themselves can do more to
develop relationship-type lending so as to overcome some of the environmen-
tal difficulties—are also relevant for the middle market.
The Role of Prudential Regulation
Could deregulation be another part of the answer to helping increase the flow
of credit? To consider this, we need to review why so much attention has
been paid in the past few years to upgrading prudential regulation systems. 
African financial systems, like most others around the world, experi-
enced widespread banking failures in the 1980s and 1990s. The World
Bank’s Banking Crisis database records 53 episodes of bank insolvency in
41 African countries since 1980, of which 40 episodes in 32 countries were
logged as systemic crises. Many of these events were very costly, whether
we measure the effects in terms of the fiscal outlays made to meet deposi-
tors’ claims (although not all depositors were paid in all cases) or in terms
of the subsequent output dip potentially attributable to the crisis. For those
events for which data are available, average fiscal costs amounted to 10.6
percent of annual GDP, whereas output losses were estimated at an aver-
age of 13.1 percent of GDP (Caprio and others 2005). These figures are all
broadly comparable with those recorded in other developing regions. 
However, closer familiarity with the nature and evolution of African
banking crises reveals that the mix of causes and symptoms was somewhat
different from that in other regions. Specifically, while Africa experienced
each of the three main syndromes—banking weaknesses attributable to
macroeconomic boom and bust, banking weaknesses attributable to bad
banking by private banking insiders, and banking weaknesses attributable
to government action undermining the solvency of the banks—there were
relatively few of the first type and relatively more of the last type. In par-
ticular, contrary to what is sometimes suggested, not a single systemic cri-
sis in Africa was caused by maturity mismatches in the banks’ portfolios.
Even where boom-and-bust cycles (a characteristically Latin American
source of crisis) were at work—for example, following the mid-1980s com-
modity boom in the Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine
(UEMOA) countries—government influences were also at work. Paras-
tatals and firms that had acted as unpaid suppliers to governments and
their agencies were prominent in the list of defaulting borrowers.6 Bad
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(Bank of Credit and Commerce International, an international banking
group headquartered in Luxembourg that successfully mobilized the
deposits of wealthy individuals and state enterprises in several African
countries before it failed in 1991) and Meridien-BIAO (the successor of the
Banque de l’Afrique Occidentale, or BAO, a historic former bank of issue
in francophone West Africa, which, when its parent was liquidated, was
acquired by an aggressive but unsound banker based in Zambia before col-
lapsing in 1995, affecting numerous countries across western and central
Africa, including Swaziland and Equatorial Guinea).7
Smaller bank failures in Kenya,8 Nigeria, and other countries were also
associated with insider lending and looting, often involving politically
well-connected insiders.9 But the largest losses related to the nonperform-
ing portfolios of dominant state-owned banks in countries such as Ghana,
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia and of majority state-controlled banks in
Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and other countries of the two
African currency unions; in the Democratic Republic of Congo; in Angola
and Mozambique; and elsewhere. 
Bank regulation and banking supervision can be effective against
incompetent or reckless management of a privately owned bank: the bank-
ing supervisors act to protect the interests of the depositors and of the
wider functioning of the banking and payments system in case failures of
such institutions are extensive enough to threaten that system. 
By insisting on adequate capitalization, supervisors can also help protect
the system against the failure of an international bank. But their abilities
in such a case are limited, as witness what happened with the failure of
BCCI. Despite formal agreements with the supervisors of such interna-
tional banks in their home countries, the full strength of the local sub-
sidiary may be exaggerated in its accounts to the extent that some losses or
fragilities are hidden in related-party transactions with the parent bank
that are opaque to the local supervisor.10,11
When it comes to state-owned banks, the role of the supervisor is, in prac-
tice, often even weaker. Although the supervisor can point to balance sheet
weaknesses of a state-owned bank, if the government is determined to chan-
nel the resources of the bank to favored borrowers who do not have the abil-
ity or at least the intention to repay, few banking supervision authorities
have the political independence to suspend that bank’s operations.
Even if limited independence meant that bank supervisors were largely
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future. The greatly reduced role of state-owned banks in most African coun-
tries suggests that any future banking crises are more likely than before to
have their roots in boom and bust or in bad banking.12 Classic techniques of
bank supervision may thus be more relevant than they were before. Most
African bank supervisory agencies have been upgrading their capacity in
recent years. However, that does not mean that every regulatory prudential
measure that seems to add to the safety of banks is to be applauded. On the
contrary, many such regulations are ineffective and, if they constrain the
development of essentially sound risk taking by well-managed banks, could
damage growth by far more than any supposed gain in safety (box 3.3).
Undue restrictions on the scope of bank operations can weaken rather
than strengthen banks by limiting their profit opportunities. Recent exam-
BOX 3.3
Bank Regulation:Avoid Reliance on Extensive Discretionary
Powers
Recent research on the effectiveness of prudential regulation questions the
unthinking transplantation of practices from rich countries into the very differ-
ent political and institutional settings that prevail in most countries. Detailed
examination of cross-country evidence points to the limited effectiveness—
and, in many respects, the counterproductivity—in developing countries of
some standard regulatory and supervisory practices. In particular it suggests
that too much reliance on discretionary powers given to government officials
to keep the banking system safe, sound, and efficient may be misguided.
Strikingly, it turns out that countries that grant the largest discretionary pow-
ers to their bank supervisors exhibit the most corruption in banking.
Certainly, unthinking application of the Basel II accord is not the way to go
for many countries (box 3.4). Instead, in order to have banks that promote
social welfare, a country needs political and other institutions that induce
its officials to develop policies that maximize social welfare, not the private
welfare of officials or bankers. The results also suggest certain practical
rules: err on the side of liberality in entry and licensing and in relation to the
permitted range of activities. The potential role of market discipline proves
to be surprisingly strong, even in poor countries (see Barth, Caprio, and
Levine 2005; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2006).86 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
ples of such restrictions from the African environment include overuse of
collateral requirements, unduly demanding risk concentration rules, and
limits on the amount of lending to below-prime borrowers. 
In some countries, banks are obliged to fully provision large, uncollater-
alized loans even if they are performing. For instance, recently Tanzanian
regulations required 125 percent collateral for any individual loans larger
than 5 percent of the bank’s capital. In effect, such uncollateralized lend-
ing must be fully financed out of the bank’s capital and not at all out of
deposits. This practice cannot fail to place a brake on what might otherwise
be sound lending backed by a credible projection of cash flow. However, as
quantified in chapter 2, collateral requirements seem to be ingrained in
African banking practice even where not imposed by regulation. Defend-
ers of high collateral requirements point to the cost and difficulty of recov-
ering even on apparently overcollateralized loans. However valid this
consideration may be, it also points to the complementary importance of
considerations other than collateral in loan appraisal.
Loan concentration limits can also be too constraining—though they
are not always so. In the UEMOA, a single loan can reach 75 percent of the
bank’s capital before hitting the ceiling; this limit is probably too lenient.
But if having as few as 10 loans, each just 10 percent of a bank’s capital, is
enough to violate aggregate loan concentration limits—as is the case in
some other countries—even relatively large banks will have difficulty both
in complying with the regulation and in meeting credit needs, even of cus-
tomers who require no more than the equivalent of just a few million U.S.
dollars. Financing large projects without hitting loan concentration ceil-
ings tends to be a problem, particularly in smaller countries with low
aggregate financial depth. After all, aggregate bank capital in Rwanda is
about US$50 million, in Chad about US$70 million, in Mozambique about
US$350 million, and in Tanzania about US$300 million. 
Banks have ways around this problem (apart from securing exemptions
from the regulatory authorities, a practice that, if widespread, both under-
mines the coherence of regulation and introduces the sort of regulatory dis-
cretion that can lead to corruption). For example, they can form lending
consortia with other onshore banks or with offshore banks, including affil-
iates. However, such collaboration is costly and complicated by exchange
controls and other factors. By forcing an excessive degree of information
sharing, requirements for such collaboration reduce the incentive for banks
to make the effort to determine the creditworthiness of large projects.FINANCE FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH 87
In francophone countries, the tradition of obtaining official preapproval
of borrowers has been slow to die out. With its origins in the formerly wide-
spread practice of rediscounting a sizable share of banking loans at the cen-
tral bank, the system of preapproval itself was abolished many years ago. But
in the UEMOA, a remnant survives in the form of the rule that at least 60
percent of each bank’s portfolio must be loaned to borrowers that have been
classified as eligible for refinancing. Because this regulation is not enforced,
it may, in practice, be little more than a nuisance, but it is hard to square with
a developmental policy. Furthermore, the idea that the banking regulator
should pass judgment on the bankability of most borrowers certainly sug-
gests a lack of official confidence in the ability of the banks to do their job.
Banking regulators need to act with restraint, therefore, in fulfilling their
remit to keep banking systems safe and sound. Aggressive measures that
are likely to constrain the ability of banks to take reasonable and prudent
credit risks should be avoided. This is not really a question of accepting
materially higher risks of failure; rather it is the avoidance of unnecessarily
restrictive precautions. Adoption of the sophisticated versions of the recent
Basel II accord on bank regulation is unlikely to help matters: indeed, it
would be premature for most African countries (box 3.4). All in all, though,
the widespread availability of exemptions and the fact that banks complain
only weakly about overregulation suggests that it is not only—or even
mainly—a regulatory credit crunch that limits credit growth in Africa.
Ownership and Industrial Structure of the Banking System
If the banking system is going to deliver the credit services so badly needed
by African economies, how is it best organized? Are African banking sys-
tems too concentrated, too dependent on foreign ownership? Or are there
too many small banks? What role should the government play? Here orga-
nizational and internationalization issues come to the fore. 
Building Strong African Banking Systems
As mentioned in chapter 2, African banking systems are highly concen-
trated. Studies have shown that liberal entry policies can offset the market
power that might otherwise be conferred by concentration (Berger and
others 2004). Ensuring an adequate supply of solid banking competitors88 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
BOX 3.4
Basel II in Africa
Banking supervisors across Africa are coming under new pressures follow-
ing the introduction of the new international accord among the bank regu-
lators of advanced economies known as Basel II. There is no official com-
pulsion on regulators in developing countries to adopt the accord, and,
indeed, the relatively sophisticated techniques envisaged in parts of the
Basel II approach could be quite dangerous if applied in an environment for
which the basic data and skills are not available. 
For instance, the “standardized” approach to measuring bank capital re-
quirements in Basel II envisages the use of credit rating agencies. These
agencies would assign ratings to different borrowers on the basis of the
capital required by banks to back loans to such borrowers. It is hard to
imagine a credibly independent and authoritative rating industry emerg-
ing in small, poor economies. For one thing, there would be little or no
market pressure on a rating agency to moderate its ratings, as both bank
and borrower would prefer to see a higher rating. An alternative approach
in Basel II is to use bankers’ own internal rating systems to assign the
amount of capital needed. That approach requires the banks to be able to
assign credible ratings on the basis of a statistical model of default risk.
has been a constant concern for African banking authorities, especially
given the small size of the market.
Bigger financial markets can accommodate competition among large inter-
mediaries. Squaring the circle of competition and scale thus requires financial
deepening within countries, as well as more cross-border and regional bank-
ing. So far, the degree of competition provided for the main banks by local
near-bank institutions is limited; however, they do have stiff competition
from offshore banks for large deposits and the best corporate clients.
Changes in bank ownership
The recent pickup in economic growth across the region has contributed to
some new entry and expansion in branch numbers. As mentioned in chap-
ter 2, even credit-to-GDP ratios have been picking up. In addition, recent
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three structural changes. First are improvements in international commu-
nications (airline connections and telecommunications) in the region,
which have facilitated the expansion of regional banks. Second is the bed-
ding down of the reforms that cleaned up the portfolios of long-insolvent
banks, many of them state owned, and passed their control to new share-
holders. Third is the reemergence of South African banks as investors.
It is unlikely that the new wave of multinational banks in Africa would have
occurred without the improvements in communications. The largest such net-
works so far are Ecobank and the Bank of Africa, both with their roots in the
otherwise already integrated UEMOA. Recently, though, both these groups
have reached beyond that zone, with the Bank of Africa opening in Kenya and
Madagascar and planning an even wider network. Ecobank’s proposed joint
venture with the larger FirstBank of Nigeria will build scale substantially. Table
3.1 illustrates the range of cross-border banking north of the Limpopo River. 
The data to build such a model do not yet exist in Africa north of the
Limpopo River. 
Yet international banks, already struggling to meet the new requirements for
their home operations, have been urging regulators in developing countries
to adopt Basel II in order to harmonize the reporting requirements banks
face. Such pressure should be resisted. It is not all that hard for internation-
al bankers to prepare returns on the old basis (indeed, reporting to a region-
wide regulator would achieve a greater saving, as discussed below). Also,
given the complexity of the internal rating models, host regulators could not
justify the expense of tooling up to assess the quality of such a model.
Above all, if local banks were also allowed to use the more advanced ap-
proaches to capital requirements, the difficulty and ambiguity of assessing
whether these systems were measuring risk adequately, combined with
what is, in practice, a limited degree of political independence of the regula-
tor, would quickly result de facto in a regulatory free-for-all. Although the use
of statistical risk models by banks will and should become increasingly wide-
spread in the years ahead, adoption of the advanced capital measurement
methods of Basel II should be postponed for the present in Africa.
Africa will likely be affected by the implementation of Basel II in advanced
economies, to the extent that it will result in higher capital requirements to
back international bank lending to the region, which could constrain access
by larger enterprises to offshore borrowing.9
0
TABLE 3.1
Cross-Border Banking in Africa: Locations of Branches or Subsidiaries of 26 International Banking Groups
Banking group (country)
Belgolaisea (Belgium) ✓✓ ✓ ✓
Financial Bank (Benin) ✓✓
Finabank (Botswana) ✓
Afriland First (Cameroon) ✓✓ ✓
FOTSO (Cameroon) ✓✓ ✓
Cofipa (Côte d’Ivoire) ✓✓ ✓ ✓
BNP Paribas (France) ✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Calyon (France) ✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
SGB (France) ✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
BGFI (Gabon) ✓✓ ✓
First International (Gambia) ✓
Novobanco (Procredit) (Germany) ✓✓ ✓
International Commercial (Ghana) ✓✓
Kenya Commercial (Kenya) ✓
BSIC (Libya) ✓✓ ✓
Ecobank (Mali) ✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Capricorn I H (Namibia) ✓
Guaranty Trust (Nigeria) ✓✓
Intercontinental (Nigeria) ✓
Millennium BCP (Portugal) ✓
Bank of Africa (Togo) ✓✓ ✓
Absa (South Africa) ✓ ✓✓ ✓
Stanbic (South Africa) ✓✓ ✓✓
Barclays (United Kingdom) ✓ ✓✓
Stanchart (United Kingdom) ✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

















































Belgolaisea (Belgium) ✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Financial Bank (Benin)
Finabank (Botswana) ✓
Afriland First (Cameroon) ✓
FOTSO (Cameroon) ✓
Cofipa (Côte d’Ivoire) ✓
BNP Paribas (France) ✓✓ ✓
Calyon (France) ✓✓ ✓
SGB (France) ✓✓
BGFI (Gabon)
First International (Gambia) ✓ ✓
Novobanco (Procredit) (Germany) ✓
International Commercial (Ghana)
Kenya Commercial (Kenya)
BSIC (Libya) ✓✓ ✓ ✓
Ecobank (Mali) ✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Capricorn I H (Namibia) ✓
Guaranty Trust (Nigeria) ✓✓
Intercontinental (Nigeria) ✓
Millennium BCP (Portugal) ✓
Absa (South Africa) ✓ ✓
Stanbic (South Africa) ✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓✓✓
Bank of Africa (Togo) ✓✓ ✓ ✓
Barclays (United Kingdom) ✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Stanchart (United Kingdom) ✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Citi (United States) ✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Source: Assembled from bank Web sites.
a. Fortis, the new parent of Belgolaise, announced in 2005 that it is winding down the operations of Belgolaise.92 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
Banks based in South Africa have long been heavily involved in the
provision of banking services in neighboring countries (Botswana,
Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland). More recently, Stanbic13 and, to a lesser
extent, Absa have seized opportunities to acquire sizable banks further
north. In 2005, UK-based Barclays acquired a controlling stake in Absa; it
plans, subject to regulatory approval, to transfer all its African operations
to Absa ownership and control. Thus, even if Absa is ultimately controlled
by Barclays, two of the three largest banking groups outside South Africa
will be run by South African concerns.
The privatization process has been long and drawn out, and it remains
incomplete.14 State-owned commercial banks emerged during the early
decades of independence, whether as a result of outright nationalization of
existing banks by socialist governments (as in Guinea, Mozambique,
Sudan,15 and Tanzania16); as a stand-alone initiative (as in Ghana, Lesotho,
and Uganda); or by a process of gradual Africanization of the equity (as in
most CFA countries, Kenya, and Nigeria17). The collapse of the BCCI and
Meridien-BIAO left other governments holding ownership of their local
subsidiaries. Increasing disenchantment with the performance of state-
owned banks—not only the fiscal costs of meeting unanticipated loan
losses but also disappointing functional performance—combined with
encouragement from the donor community led most governments to seek
to reduce their commercial bank shareholdings and to open the door to
new entrants.
They adopted a range of privatization strategies. Transferring the state’s
shareholding to national social security funds or other parastatal entities
was one approach, unlikely to influence governance by much. Another
involved selling a minority stake to the general public in an IPO, as in
Kenya and Nigeria; even this strategy is a weak form of restraint on man-
agement that is still largely appointed by the government. Other partial
privatizations also included strategic stakeholders, sometimes with a man-
agement contract. In many cases, those stakeholders were the same
foreign-owned banks as had been active in colonial times (or their succes-
sors), who entered or reentered as strategic investors. Thus, while their
African networks are smaller than before, the Société Générale, Crédit
Agricole, and BNP Paribas of France are again the main foreign players in
the CFA zone, the last two being successors to Crédit Lyonnais and the BCI
consortium that were active up to the 1980s.18 In the anglophone world,
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bic), with Citigroup, are again among the most prominent foreign banks.
Portuguese banks have reentered the Angola and Mozambique markets.
Few African governments have stood resolutely against the wave of
denationalization. As discussed in chapter 2, in only three countries are
most of the banking systems in the hands of the government, whereas in
20 countries foreign shareholders control more than 60 percent of the sys-
tems. (Figure 3.4 shows that Africa has gone even further than the rest of
the developing world in reducing reliance on government-owned banks
and relying on foreign ownership.) Even Ethiopia has permitted the emer-
gence of private—though not foreign-owned—banks. Yet all have dis-
played a reluctance to cede government ownership and control altogether.
In part this unwillingness has been driven by a concern that privatization
of large commercial banks that provided essential financial services across
the country, including in relatively remote parts, would be followed by clo-
sure of the less active and unprofitable branches. The political conse-
quences of extensive layoffs of excess staff members have also been a
concern. Broader concerns include the long-term commitment of private
owners19 and their likely responsiveness to matters of national impor-
tance. Finally, it is clear that retaining a majority stake of the biggest bank
in national hands, even if that stake is diffused among many holders,
sometimes remains a political goal for broader ideological reasons.20
Scale
The influence of ownership structure depends on the strategies and capac-
ities of the resulting bank management. The goal of cross-border African
bank management is to do profitable banking, as distinct from mainly
financing existing economic groups in the home country. By sharing cer-
tain functions, such banks can also achieve economies of scale, even
though for the present groups such as Bank of Africa and Ecobank remain
quite small, with little more than US$2 billion in total assets (though the
FirstBank-Ecobank combination would have total assets of US$6 billion).
Of course, these attributes can be attained by national banks, especially in
the larger markets such as those of Nigeria as well as those of Kenya and
Tanzania, Cameroon, and (in quieter times) Angola and Côte d’Ivoire. 
Achieving scale was also a goal of the Nigerian authorities’ decision to
impose an exceptionally high minimum capital for banks of  25 billion—
almost US$200 million. This decision has led to a very dramatic consolida-
tion in the Nigerian banking market, as banks moved to merge and also to94 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
raise new capital ahead of the end-2005 deadline. The number of banks—
which had expanded substantially in the years of multiple exchange rates
to take advantage of special profit opportunities that the regime offered—
has shrunk from 89 to 25. An additional side benefit may have been that
FIGURE 3.4





























Source: Authors’ estimates based on table 2.3 and the World Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey. 
Note: Mainly government controlled, mainly foreign, and mainly local mean that more than 60 percent of total assets are held by
banks majority owned by the government or majority owned by foreign or local shareholders. Foreign plus governmentmeans these
two categories together hold more than 70 percent. Equally shared is a residual category.FINANCE FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH 95
the shake-up of ownership structures may have led to a realignment of
existing centers of economic and financial power in Nigeria, potentially
leading banks to focus more on seeking banking profitability than on serv-
ing long-established clients and thereby opening the door to hitherto
underserved businesses. It is too soon to evaluate the success of the Niger-
ian experiment: Could it have limited entry unduly? Might the expansion
of bank capital lead to a surge of unsound lending? But what is certain is
that the future course of banking has been altered, not only in Nigeria but
in West Africa as a whole.
Scale is what the large international banks have in plenty, and it should
be a dimension from which host countries may benefit with lower costs, if
competitive conditions are favorable. Each national subsidiary can draw
on an enviable range of head-office services and on financial resources as
needed. (Indeed, subsidiaries of the larger international banks increasingly
outsource much of what can be automated to their global operations.) But
their business models and goals often differ from those of domestic own-
ers. It is clear that banks such as the African subsidiaries of BNP Paribas
and Standard Chartered focus especially on serving larger, internationally
trading companies and wealthy individuals. They also have important for-
eign clients trading with Africa. It would take a substantial change in their
strategy before they chose to focus, for example, on small and medium-
scale enterprises (SMEs). 
Client focus
The international evidence suggests that foreign bank entry will not leave
SMEs unprovided for; even if the foreign banks do not cater to this seg-
ment of firms, the intensified competition for large clients will induce local
banks to move downscale (box 3.5). This result is important, because it
could be a serious matter if all foreign banks focused mainly on large
clients. After all, in some African countries (such as Mozambique and
Madagascar) foreign shareholders control almost all commercial banking.
But the indications are that the business models and practices of interna-
tional banks active in Africa vary. Certainly Stanbic and Absa assert that
their focus now extends to the full range of banking services and a wide
clientele, and their behavior appears to bear this out. Possibly these South
African banks see greater commonality between their home market and
other parts of Africa. New initiatives in South Africa to reach a lower-
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BOX 3.5
Foreign Banks and SME Lending: Evidence from 
Cross-Country Studies
Foreign bank entry is a controversial issue everywhere. On the one hand,
foreign banks are supposed to bring fresh resources, new technologies,
and more efficient techniques and new skills to their host banking markets
and to induce competitive pressure into the banking systems of their host
markets. On the other hand, a larger presence of foreign banks might re-
duce access to credit, especially for SMEs, because these firms rely more
on relationship lending. Furthermore, foreign banks might have less loyalty
to their host countries and might withdraw in times of crises or even be-
cause of shocks in third countries and in response to global portfolio shifts.
Cross-country evidence has confirmed that foreign-owned banks are more
efficient than domestic banks in developing countries and that foreign bank
entry does, indeed, exert competitive pressure on domestic banks to be-
come more efficient (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga 2001). 
The empirical evidence on the effect of foreign bank entry on access to cred-
it has been at worst mixed, if not in fact favorable. On the one hand, borrow-
ers in countries with higher foreign bank presence report lower financing ob-
stacles and are more likely to have access to bank credit (Clarke, Cull, and
Martínez Pería 2001). Foreign bank entry helps reduce related lending and its
negative effects on resource allocation (Bonin and Imai 2005; Giannetti and
Ongena 2005). On the other hand, research on specific developing countries
has shown that foreign-owned banks are less likely to lend to more opaque
borrowers and rely more on hard rather than soft information (Mian 2006).
Also, the short-term benefits of foreign bank presence are not evident in
cross-country econometric studies confined to low-income countries—some
studies even report negative effects (Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel 2005).
Although some evidence suggests that foreign banks might have the po-
tential to transmit shocks from their home countries to their host countries,
their lending generally does not decline during financial crises in their host
countries (Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney 2000; but see Peek and Rosengren
2001). The withdrawal of some foreign banks from Argentina following the
crisis of 2001 might be cited as a contrary case, but there it was the arbi-
trary and uneven government treatment of assets and liabilities denominat-
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cussed further in chapter 4) have also strengthened these banks’ under-
standing of and capacity to serve middle-market customers in the sparsely
populated African environment.
It is hard to be definitive about which ownership structures will work
best. Although it is comforting to see clear evidence of changed attitudes
from the narrow focus all banks had in colonial times (not least in the
more extensive use of senior management staff from the region), it would
be naive to think that the return of foreign banks is a panacea for African
business. Nevertheless, careful analysis of available quantitative evidence
suggests that some concerns about privatization and about sales of key
banks to foreign owners have been misplaced or at least exaggerated. Even
in Nigeria, where the government divested itself of substantial, albeit
mostly minority, stakes in some 14 banks in the early 1990s—mainly
through public share offerings to Nigerians (a method that has not been
very effective in other countries), profitability was turned around fairly
quickly. Beck, Cull, and Jerome (2005) find that, although the govern-
ment appears to have selected the weakest of its banks for privatization
through the public sale of shares, the profitability of these banks—which
together accounted for half of the system—reached the levels of private
banks and did so without shifting the privatized banks’ portfolios into gov-
ernment bonds (even though banks that held bonds in those years found
them to be more profitable than lending). 
The more recent case of Stanbic’s purchase of the Uganda Commercial
Bank (UCB) shows even more promising features, according to a new
study by Clarke, Cull, and Fuchs (2006). Not only has Stanbic, which
integrated the former state monopoly bank into its own Ugandan opera-
tion, achieved profitability (greatly assisted by the comprehensive recapi-
talization of the UCB by the government before sale), but more
remarkably, only one branch has been closed, and several previously
unprofitable branches have been returned to profitability. Furthermore,
whereas Stanbic’s lending to agriculture was hitherto below even the
average for foreign-owned banks (as was UCB’s in recent years), post-
merger data suggest that the combined operation may have already
expanded agricultural lending to a level that, albeit modest, is comparable
to that of other foreign-owned banks. There are other positive signs: an
SME business development unit was established, and minimum deposit
requirements have been drastically lowered. Still, it is too soon to pass
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To be sure, international banks are not in the business for charity.
Indeed, examination of the accounts of multinational banks in Sub-
Saharan Africa shows that they have much higher returns on assets and
equity than do subsidiaries of the same banks in non-African developing
countries. This finding can, in part, reflect a risk premium for Africa. But
multinational banks in Africa also tend to be more profitable than locally
owned banks. Some of this profitability reflects not only superior products,
organization, and cost control, but also the benefits of market power. Most
administrative controls designed to curb the exercise of market power in
banking tend to have a more damaging effect of limiting access than a ben-
eficial one of restraining excessive profits.21 The only viable solution to
overcharging is to ensure a policy environment that not only permits
entry22 but also creates the conditions under which competitors will wish
to enter the market to exploit the dynamic profit possibilities of market
growth.
Ensuring a competitive environment will remain a challenge, however,
especially as the trend toward banking consolidation continues worldwide.
In Mozambique, the dominating position of the largest bank is due to the
merger of the parents of the two largest banks in their home market of
Portugal. And the acquisition by Barclays of Absa, owners of the Tanzan-
ian market leader National Bank of Commerce, has increased bank con-
centration in that country. It remains to be seen how the exit of Belgolaise
will play out, as its regional subsidiaries are absorbed by other owners.
However, bearing in mind how small and fragmented the African markets
appear to the major international groups, it may well be that future
dynamism in competition will come more from African-owned banks
expanding across the continent—and not only from Nigeria and South
Africa.23,24
Populist politics often mobilizes support around hostility to foreign
banks, and this hostility can create challenges for political leaders who
wish to bring the benefits of foreign bank entry to their countries. The
banks also do well to use antennae receptive to political sensitivities. The
politics of foreign bank entry in Africa is too little understood, as indeed
are other political economy aspects of financial sector reform in Africa. For
instance, it may well be that a predominantly locally owned banking sys-
tem (as in Nigeria) could generate a stronger political constituency for
wider governance reform, though there is not enough evidence to support
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State-Owned DFIs
An earlier generation of policy makers reached naturally to the creation of
state-controlled specialized intermediaries to help channel investable
resources into development projects. Some DFIs date back to colonial
times, and the rationale for their existence has been the perceived market
failures in long-term, agricultural, and small-scale finance. Private institu-
tions see these sectors as costly to service and as offering inadequate
returns given the risks. The results of state-owned DFI creation were dis-
appointing, and not only in Africa. Although the crisis of the 1980s brought
to light deficiencies in all segments of the financial system, these problems
were even more pronounced in the state-owned DFI sector. In addition,
funding dried up as international donors had second thoughts about the
efficiency and sustainability of many DFIs in channeling funds. State-
owned DFIs generally did poorly in reaching the ostensible target market,
failed to recover loans, and overall imposed heavy fiscal costs. Part of the
problem was political interference, part was poor alignment of incentives,
and part was excessive intermediary cost structures. Many have been
closed; most were downsized.
But state-owned DFIs—even poorly performing ones—have proved to
be tenacious survivors. By no means have they all vanished from the
scene. Indeed, more than 60 DFIs operate in Africa today. But in many
countries, from Tanzania to Zambia to Mali, state-owned specialized banks
have remained in a semifrozen situation, largely illiquid and delivering
few services, with their solvency precarious and conditional on support
from the government. 
Why is it that governments have chosen to continue a half-century-
long liaison with DFIs? Partly it is because the perceived gaps in the mar-
ket, whether for housing finance, industrial development finance, or
agricultural finance, are still evident. The authorities’ reluctance to take
decisive steps to sell or rehabilitate these institutions partly reflects the ten-
sion between (a) a continued perception that something needs to be done
about the market gaps and (b) the fact that putting banks back onto sound
financial footing will entail committing fiscal funds that cannot easily be
diverted from other uses. That is why many of these entities remain in a
state of suspended animation.
Given that this is clearly an unsatisfactory compromise, which way
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ments, or somewhere else? For many years now, the World Bank has been
generally discouraging on the matter of state-owned DFIs, a fact that puz-
zles many given that the World Bank itself can be seen as a state-owned
DFI, albeit at a global level, and given the sponsorship by rich country gov-
ernments of regional and subregional development banks.
In fact, the state-owned DFI model sits most uneasily with contempo-
rary understandings of how market-based financial systems work most
effectively. This is essentially because—being conceptualized from a plan-
ning perspective—the state-owned DFI model blurs crucial differences:
between a loan and a grant, between social and private return, and
between the promoters’ projections and realistic evaluations. It is one
thing to embark on a publicly funded development scheme with full
awareness and accounting of the risks and uncertainties involved and with
politicians taking responsibility for the outlay of public money. Such an
approach fits well in a public finance planning perspective. But a financial
institution is established with the intention and expectation that it will be
a sustainable and self-financing revolving fund. Adding a mandate to make
long-term loans with defined social objectives results in a confusion of
roles—and a deferral of evaluation that makes it inherently unlikely that
both the financial and social returns will be acceptable. The long terms of
the investments and the absence of a secondary market for assessing their
evolving value makes manager accountability problematic. Even if doubts
about the financial soundness of the investment emerge, it is all too easy
for state-owned DFI management to hide behind the smokescreen of social
justification. By the time failure becomes evident, those responsible have
long since moved on. Thus are the conditions for elite capture created.
Those with experience of state-owned DFIs in Africa or in other regions
know that this view is not purely theoretical. One case—Nigeria—is
explored in box 3.6. Unfortunately, Nigeria is no exception. The Nigerian
snapshot in 2000 could be replicated for numerous countries across the
continent. Because these stories are not widely understood or because fail-
ures have been wrongly attributed to bad luck, public-spirited people still
propose the establishment, rehabilitation, or recapitalization of develop-
ment banks across Africa. In Nigeria a bill to this effect was introduced in
parliament early in 2006.
Proximate reasons for the failure of state-owned DFIs are manifold:
exchange rate and other macroeconomic shocks; gross political interfer-
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BOX 3.6
One Country’s Experience with State-Owned DFIs
In just one large and well-documented case, the Nigerian DFI sector was
found by a Alawode and others (2000) report to present a “relatively dismal
financial picture. ” Available data for seven Nigerian DFIs (the Nigeria Indus-
trial Development Bank, Nigeria Bank for Commerce and Industry, NEXIM,
National Economic Reconstruction Fund, Urban Development Bank, Nige-
ria Education Bank, and Nigerian Agricultural and Credit Bank) in 1997 and
1998 showed
• A combined annual loss of 9 percent of total assets and accumulated
losses of 45 percent of total assets (equivalent in 2000 to about
US$100 million, despite inflation and currency depreciation)
• Negative net worth of 25 percent of assets (even on the optimistic ac-
counting that was used)
• An average of 78 percent of the loan portfolio not performing (for the
four DFIs for which data were available)
Several of the institutions had started up in a vigorous and promising man-
ner, but they made poor loans, charged insufficient interest spreads, in-
curred excessive foreign exchange risks, and never built a strong credit ap-
praisal culture. As nonperforming loans began to spiral out of control, the
availability of cash for new lending began to dry up. Even borrowers that
could have repaid had a reduced incentive to do so as the prospects of new
loans evaporated. Better-qualified staff left.
• By the late 1990s, the Nigeria Industrial Development Bank had stopped
lending to its medium- and large-scale clients, more than half of which
were losing money or being liquidated.
• Of the Nigeria Bank for Commerce and Industry’s book of loans to
SMEs, 98 percent had arrears of payments and essentially all the bank’s
cash flow was going to pay for staff expenses. Even so, management
was planning a new head-office building.
• In the export-promotion bank NEXIM, 99.7 percent of its portfolio was
nonperforming within six years of its establishment. Actually, much of 
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forgiveness); and inadequate staff skills, often compounded by decisions to
underprice lending. But these reasons all come down to the fundamental
ambivalence of the model: is the DFI’s goal to make profits as a sustainable,
market-driven financial intermediary, or is its goal to achieve specified
social or developmental objectives?
A publicly sponsored credit guarantee agency is an idea that is increas-
ingly discussed in development banking circles as an alternative way for-
ward, bypassing what is now the conventional avoidance of new DFIs.
Credit guarantees of one sort or another are indeed becoming widespread
in the financial systems of advanced economies. They include the securiti-
zation of credits by banks and their sale in whole or part (typically with
some form of credit guarantee attached) to other banks, nonbank financial
institutions such as insurance companies, or other managed funds.25
BOX 3.6 (continued)
its portfolio had been inherited from the Central Bank of Nigeria, which
had provided funds for onlending to several banks that soon became in-
solvent. As with the National Economic Reconstruction Fund, an Apex
institution also providing funds to banks for onlending, the weaker banks
were attracted.
• The Urban Development Bank, tasked with providing financing for urban
development, failed to mobilize external resources and relied largely on
its capital endowment to finance the limited investments it made. These
investments were priced at between 2 and 4 percent below commercial
rates. Difficulties in recovering discouraged the bank from making fur-
ther loans or investments beyond the 10 percent of total assets that had
been reached by 1997 . But the Urban Development Bank retained a siz-
able staff and four offices, leading to administrative costs equivalent to
four dollars per dollar lent.
• Possibly the most disappointing case was that of the Nigeria Education
Bank, which, seven years after it was established to help finance the
higher education sector, had failed to make a single loan, despite em-
ploying 261 staff in 21 offices.
Overall, this experience has been one not only of financial unsustainability
but of social failure too: by 2000, the Nigerian DFIs had achieved neither
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So could this new form of financial technology provide finance for spe-
cialized or more risky sectors, where commercial banks seem reluctant to
go, or for longer terms than are attractive to commercial banks? The
answer to this question needs to be a nuanced one. First, it is important to
recognize that many public credit guarantee schemes have embedded hid-
den subsidies—even Korea’s scheme has been losing approximately
US$1 billion a year in recent years. To the extent that the repackaging of
loans puts them into forms that make them suitable to be held in nonbank
portfolios, at home or abroad, then (as in the advanced economies) such
schemes could have something to offer. However, it may take the develop-
ment of a more active secondary market to attract really sizable invest-
ments by nonbanks. But a second driver of credit derivatives and the credit
guarantee business has been regulatory arbitrage. Risks are transferred
from entities such as commercial banks, which are subject to prudential
regulation, to entities such as managed funds, specialized credit guarantee
companies, and insurance firms, which are less tightly regulated or not
regulated at all. If the ultimate holders of risk have deep pockets then this
may be all right, but if the failure of the ultimate holders feeds back into
the public purse through forced bailouts, then the regulatory arbitrage will
prove to have been a costly evasion.
By bringing together different participants in the financial market, some
recent experiments with credit guarantee schemes have discovered unex-
ploited investment banking opportunities. The Fonds de Garantie
Hypothecaire du Mali (FGHM) was established by local banking insurance
and government entities with a simple basic objective: to cross-guarantee
mortgage loans. Although that remains its basic business26—with an aver-
age loan guaranteed of US$23,000 and a total loan book guaranteed of
about US$20 million—FGHM has found that its staff’s investment banking
expertise enables it to get involved in related investment banking-type
activities, such as promoting and arranging the sale of a portfolio of mort-
gage loans. If these initiatives continue to be successful and can be
expanded without incurring heavy contingent liabilities for FGHM, per-
haps sponsoring and introducing this investment banking expertise into
the market will become FGHM’s most important social role and chief con-
tribution to financial development in Mali.
But many DFIs have ended up costing the government a multiple of the
capital originally injected (because government provided either explicit or
implicit guarantees of the DFI’s borrowings). Similarly, a guarantee scheme104 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
almost automatically triggers very sizable contingent liabilities, in excess of
the amount envisaged by the initial explicit investment. The hidden con-
tingent liabilities are far greater than parliament or the general public ini-
tially understand. As with state-owned DFIs, the ability to generate these
contingent liabilities represents a large honey pot attracting rent seekers.
It is not just that state-owned DFIs failed financially; they also seem gen-
erally to have failed to achieve their development goals. Although private
sector entities may not have been keen to enter the targeted sectors, they
were certainly discouraged from any notion of doing so by the presence of
a subsidized competitor. Worse, in many cases no attempt was made to set
clear goals for these entities, measure their performance against these goals,
and count the cost in a coherent way. For a government operating a DFI
now, no exercise is more useful for guiding future policy than undertaking
such a cost-benefit review (Yaron, Benjamin, and Charitonenko 1998). As
well as informing government decisions directly, a cost-benefit review can
have a political economy dynamic. Making the results of these analyses
public as a matter of course would provide the basis for a public debate,
which could help undermine elite capture of the DFI.
Not all state-owned DFIs have failed in their mission, but the odds of
success have been too low. It seems that the DFI model has a good chance
of working only if exceptionally strong governance practices and proce-
dures can be maintained and in a responsive and well-informed political
environment (box 3.7). This likely explains why more DFI success stories
occur in advanced economies, where political, civic, and legal infrastruc-
tures to support governance are stronger. Rich countries with strong insti-
tutions of governance can afford to risk what is for them relatively small
sums on state-owned DFIs. Those countries can absorb prospective losses
and deter abuses with the credible threat of sanctions. Multinational devel-
opment banks, whether at the continental level (such as the African Devel-
opment Bank) or at the subregional level (such as the East African
Development Bank and Development Bank of Southern Africa, or DBSA),
also have the advantage of being less dependent on the politics of a single
country. But for African countries whose governments are contemplating
an expansion of state-owned DFIs, the gamble is unattractive. The scale of
potential losses in relation to national income, the poor inherent incentive
structures, and the perception that sanctions against abuse are unlikely all
make the expected cost-benefit calculation unfavorable for most state-
owned DFI initiatives in Africa today. Yet there are some signs of improvedFINANCE FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH 105
BOX 3.7
Governance Arrangements for DFIs
Examination of the corporate governance practices of some of the most re-
spected public sector financial institutions worldwide suggests a number
of features that are worth trying to incorporate in any surviving DFI, so as
to reduce the risk of costly failures. Overall, these features aim to establish
a level playing field between DFIs and other financial intermediaries, there-
by ensuring that the DFI does not gain a privileged position in some seg-
ment of the market that could be provided, perhaps more effectively, by
others. In particular, all the standard governance requirements for a private
company should apply also to any DFI that the government retains. These
requirements relate, for example, to the role and responsibility of the board
of directors and its various specialized committees (audit, risk manage-
ment, remuneration) with respect to financial accounting, auditing, and
transparency. 
Clarity of the function of each public entity is key. There should be a clear
administrative separation of responsibilities within government between
the exercise of DFI ownership (somebody must be designated the owner’s
representative), the exercise of ownership functions for state-owned non-
financial firms, and the setting of relevant private sector development poli-
cies. Law and transparent, publicly disseminated regulation should clearly
• Identify and delimit the social and public policy objectives of the DFI—
that is, the specific elements of the state’s ownership policy
• Define the respective roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the gov-
ernance bodies of the DFI (owner’s representative, board of directors,
senior management)
• Provide guidance on how the costs associated with the provision by the
DFI of social or public services are to be covered
• Specify the nature of any state obligations to recapitalize or to repay the
debts of the DFI
• Provide for adequate transparency and disclosure requirements in re-
gard to the performance of the public policy mandate
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governance on the continent; perhaps in time the need for health warn-
ings about state-owned DFIs will diminish. 
Given that the private market does not function very well in these dif-
ficult sectors and yet it seems difficult to reliably overcome the governance
and political interference challenges that have marred the performance of
so many state-owned DFIs, what is the safest and most promising way for-
ward in African development finance today? Can existing state-owned
DFIs be rehabilitated with private ownership participation, diversified
lending products, or more dependable sources of local currency? Propo-
nents are already experimenting along these lines. For example,
Johannesburg-based DBSA—which has been active in the rehabilitation of
DFIs in neighboring countries—is optimistic, even though its management
understands that success with these ventures depends crucially on ensur-
ing adequate governance. In some cases, the move to private control has
meant a shift toward commercial banking, as with the DFCU Group in
Uganda, the Development Bank of Kenya, and, to an extent, Austral Bank
in Mozambique. That shift may imply commercial survival of the interme-
diary but, if taken to extremes, can result in an institution that is a devel-
opment bank only in name.
BOX 3.7 (continued)
In addition to the normal financial reporting requirements applicable to any
company should be a regular public report on the performance of the DFI in
furthering the social and public policy objectives established for it. A per-
formance report requires applying a clear evaluation methodology, using
measurable and verifiable social and public policy outcome indicators. It
also entails a clear statement of the nature and extent of any state financial
assistance, including, for example, subsidies, tax concessions, or
guarantees.
Some African DFIs have begun to assess their governance arrangements
against these or similar criteria. However, the effectiveness of such proce-
dures depends crucially on a sufficient segment of the public being finan-
cially and economically literate, on the ability and willingness of the press
to inform public opinion, and on the responsiveness of the political process.
These prerequisites are not yet widely present in the region. 
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More generally, private banks might be willing to enter some of the dif-
ficult segments if they are not undercut. Indeed, development banking, in
the sense of banking that is focused on longer-term objectives with partic-
ular attention to creating social benefit alongside profitability, could be
viable for a private investor (or for external development partners, a point
taken up again in chapter 4). But in addition, nonbank finance could play
a larger role in filling the term- and risk-finance gaps in a sustainable
manner.
One good rule of thumb seems to be that publicly financed development
banking initiatives are more worth trying if the downside risks are limited.
Investment banking services that arrange and broker deals without taking
major positions (as in the Mali example) can fill a knowledge gap that
undoubtedly exists today in most African financial markets. The limited
and manageable subsidies that might be required to launch investment
banking firms with such a remit could be well rewarded. This could happen
if the firms successfully (a) attract foreign or local venture capital, (b) advise
on the financing aspects of public-private partnership (PPP) infrastructure
deals, or (c) catalyze market development and new instruments for mort-
gage finance and, more generally, for bringing together potential providers
of long-term or risk finance, at home or abroad, and users—especially in
productive sectors that have export potential in the long run.
Term Finance and Risk Finance: Beyond Commercial Banking
The preoccupation with long-term finance that has driven much of the
interest in DFIs is not unique to Africa but has been seen down the decades
in country after country. Of course not only long-term finance is needed;
even export and other trade financing can be scarce and costly in Africa.
But there does seem to be evidence that access to medium- and long-term
financing enhances firms’ growth prospects (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksi-
movic 1999). Although we cannot point to much quantitative evidence
that the long-term lending situation in Africa is particularly difficult, it is
certainly true that long-term finance is far from plentiful. Indeed, in few
countries do banks routinely extend loans with maturities beyond three
years, even for high-quality borrowers. And, as shown by the survey data
reviewed in chapter 2, to the extent that enterprises use the financial sys-
tem for external financing, it is to banks that they mainly turn.108 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
Yet many productive investment projects, especially in infrastructure,
capital goods, or housing stock, are best financed with long-term funds
involving maturities of 5, 10, or even 20 years. This is because, although
they produce high rates of return and can service and repay significant
amounts of debt in the long run, they cannot repay investments out of the
cash flows generated within the short-term financing horizons offered in
African markets. They require loan repayment profiles that match the
long-term cash flow profiles. Of course, some borrowers, finding that
lenders will not grant long-term loans, proceed on the assumption that
their current borrowing facilities will be rolled over, but all too often the
refinancing risks are just too high for the project to go ahead. In housing
finance, most middle-class households in Africa could service and repay
sufficiently large mortgages to develop adequate housing, if amortization
were to be spread over a long enough horizon to reduce monthly mort-
gage payments to serviceable levels. 
It is easy to see why long-term funds may not be as forthcoming as
short-term funds. From the perspective of the provider of funds, long-term
lending is riskier than short-term lending. Uncertainty and lack of infor-
mation about the future loom larger. As long as contractual repayments
are being met, the long-term lender forgoes the ability to take control or to
influence the borrower to take corrective action if the risk of default seems
to have increased. 
Also, the provider’s own liquidity is placed at risk.27 A bank may recog-
nize that most of its nominally short-term deposits are in practice highly
stable, but this stability may depend on macroeconomic conditions. If there
is a surge of withdrawals, African banks may not have liquid money mar-
kets on which to draw in a hurry. Thus, although the transformation of
short-term deposits into longer-term loans is at the heart of conventional
banking, the willingness of African banks to push this maturity transfor-
mation very far is limited, even where they are not restricted by regulation.
Access to formal risk equity financing is even scarcer. To be sure,
retained earnings finance the bulk of working capital needs as well as
expansion capital. They are a form of equity, but there is little recourse to
public issues, and the organized equity markets are small and inactive and
of interest only to a very limited number of large companies, multilaterals,
and financial institutions. Private placements are largely on an ad hoc
basis. To the extent that other entrepreneurs secure outside equity, it is
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Part of the problem for equity finance is the difficulty that the outside
equity holder has in monitoring the firm’s performance. Perhaps the insid-
ers have found ways to channel much of the true profit of the firm to
themselves and their associates, effectively expropriating the outside
equity holders of their equity. These monitoring problems are pervasive in
equity finance worldwide, but they are worse where information is scarce
and unreliable, as in many parts of Africa.
Yet African markets have natural providers of long-term funds and of
equity funds. Some are foreign based, and we will have less to say about
those. But the elements of the local financial markets have not yet per-
formed in this dimension as they could. Institutional investors, organized
securities markets, and certain specific instruments and innovations
related to housing and infrastructure finance that can help so far tend to be
underprovided in current African conditions. They are briefly reviewed
below.
Pension Funds and Other Institutional Investors as Natural
Providers of Long-Term Financing
An exception to the general rule that most providers of funds are reluctant
to go long-term relates to pension and social security funds. Although such
funds are not entirely free of the concerns that discourage other investors,
they do have a natural affinity for long-term instruments because the
maturity of their liabilities is also long term. Given a rapidly growing pop-
ulation and formal workforce, broad-based social security and government
employee pension funds in Africa often have sizable and growing sums
that need to be invested for a long term. 
At the same time, there is a degree of concern about the actuarial viabil-
ity of many of these funds. The doubts may relate to the parameters of the
underlying schemes, with promised pensions or other benefits that are too
generous to be affordable at current rates of contribution. In addition, col-
lecting contributions is not always very effective, and even those who have
a very broken contribution record may be able to claim a pension in due
course—and if they can, they certainly will. Rising death rates related to
AIDS also complicate evaluation of the solvency of pension funds. Depend-
ing on death benefits, an increase in early deaths of scheme members may
improve or worsen the solvency of the funds; furthermore, death rates
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investment policies have often seen an erosion of value instead of market-
related returns. Investment in low-yielding government securities, losses
of real value caused by unexpected inflation, deposits frozen in insolvent
commercial or development banks, and other failed investments have
been all too common. The poor investment returns often reflected man-
dates by cash-poor governments and to that extent reflect more a diver-
gence between a stated funding policy and an unfunded reality, not
dissimilar to the pay-as-you-go schemes in some advanced economies.
Sometimes they reflected other types of poor governance of the funds.
Even a scheme in actuarial deficit, though, is likely to generate substan-
tial surpluses for the next couple of decades in most African countries.
Therefore, the effective maturity of its liabilities will be long term. For the
present, then, these schemes have sizable sums to invest for the long term;
to the extent that these funds are not channeled into funding the govern-
ment deficit (as they are in the United States and many other countries),
they could be available to augment long-term investable funds in the
financial market.
An increasing number of social security funds are moving from the
defined-benefit model—sometimes unfunded—to a fully funded defined-
contribution scheme. One of the expectations of the reformers behind
these schemes is that such reform will result in more long-term savings for
investment. Yet even when they are being managed at arm’s length from
the government’s fiscal managers, too many of the investable funds of
pension and social security schemes are still being placed in short-term
bank deposits or short-term government papers. This can be seen, for
example, in Senegal and Uganda (see table 2.3). In effect, many
countries—and not just in Africa—suffer to a degree from reverse maturity
transformation.
The potential for institutional investors to expand the availability of
long-term funds is not being realized for various reasons. In some cases,
investment restrictions imposed by prudential regulation or policy unduly
restrict the scope of pension fund investment policy. Managers of large
pension funds do experience pressures from those who seek an easy route
to long-term financing of their projects. The challenge is to ensure that
governance of these funds is adequate. In advanced financial systems,
most of a pension fund’s assets can be marked to market, thereby provid-
ing interim evaluations of the quality of investment decisions. That is not
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why, when they do move away from bank deposits and government
bonds, pension fund managers in many African countries tend to favor
property. Property is visible and easier to value than private equity or,
indeed, large loans to unlisted companies, let alone more complex instru-
ments such as asset-backed securities. This is where organized securities
markets can help anchor and benchmark investment strategies and con-
tribute to the evaluation and maintenance of quality governance.
As well as directly investing, pension funds and others with long-term
resources should be willing purchasers of packages of mortgages or
mortgage-backed bonds or other long-term instruments arranged by or
through intermediaries that do not themselves have long-term resources,
such as commercial banks or investment banks. Indeed, the scope for the
investment banking skills needed to bridge the gap between pension funds
and ultimate borrowers is considerable. 
Other forms of institutional and managed funds can also play an increas-
ing role in African term and risk finance over time. The insurance sector in
Africa is still small and dominated in almost all countries by nonlife business,
with life insurance just beginning to develop. In addition, a number of col-
lective investment schemes have recently been licensed throughout Africa
but are not significant market players yet. A handful of foreign institutional
investors have been active in African markets and should be seen in a posi-
tive light not only because of the investment funds that they import, but also
because of the technology transfer that can result from their activities.28
Experience in other parts of the world suggests that foreign direct or portfo-
lio investors are unlikely to be the most significant contributors to macroeco-
nomic or capital flow volatility. Instead, foreign direct investment (FDI) will
be a crucial catalyst in boosting African growth on a sustained basis.29
Securities Markets as Catalysts of Long-Term Financing
Organized securities markets could play a key role in facilitating the flow
of long-term and risk finance from institutional investors and others to
productive enterprises in manufacturing, agribusiness, services, to utilities,
and—indirectly—to middle-class house purchasers. But this potential has
scarcely been realized to date in Africa.
Despite a considerable pickup in activity, listings, and funds raised in the
past few years, it remains true (as described in chapter 2) that, the Johan-
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low level of equity trading and limited raising of new capital. Nigeria is the
most active of the other markets; a flurry of issues there is connected with
the increased minimum bank capital. Some of the listed companies have
sourced sizable funds for expansion from equity issues, as documented, for
example, in Amo Yartey (2006). Overall, though, most of the larger listings
in recent years have arisen out of privatizations, tax incentives,30 manda-
tory listings for banks, and what might be called vanity listings by multina-
tional or regional firms. 
The last category requires explanation. A vanity listing is the issue of a
relatively small fraction of the equity of a local subsidiary in a context
where the parent has no need for the resources that will be raised. Some
vanity issuers see such listings as a publicity device, as well as a way of both
signaling commitment to the host country and establishing a potential
lobby group of local shareholders that may act as political insurance. Other
similar listings are a historical legacy: In 2004, Guinness Ghana bought
99.6 percent of Ghana Breweries, but the latter remains a listed company.
Local listings allow such firms to offer remuneration to workers in the
form of stock (as, for example, with Compagnie Ivoirienne d’Electricité, 69
percent of whose shares are held by a large French utility group). One way
or another, foreigners own a sizable proportion of the shares on most of
the exchanges, and most of these proportions are strategic stakes. Even in
Nigeria, the foreign-owned share is put at just under one-half.
These are reasonable ways for an exchange to begin life. Even vanity
issues can provide useful savings vehicles for domestic institutions.31 But
so far, the lack of significant secondary trading in most shares limits the liq-
uidity of shareholdings and means that prices on the exchange are unlikely
to represent a reliable indicator of the true value of a block holding of the
shares. Besides, most of the shares are effectively locked up in controlling
or strategic stakes and are not available for sale.
Bond issues have until recently been few and in some exchanges have
required third-party guarantees, with the result that they too do not allow
the market to reveal a consensus value on the debt of the issuing company.
Although some markets do list medium- and long-term government
bonds, in most countries they are still not issued with sufficient regularity
to a sufficiently broad investor base or with a sufficiently low perceived
default risk to allow the market to establish a reliable yield curve for the
national currency (that is, a set of default-free interest rates for different
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In short, the paucity of securities and the lack of trading activity limit
the ability of most of these markets to provide a platform for price discov-
ery and benchmarking of other securities. Transaction volumes do not jus-
tify investment in technology by either the exchange or member brokers.
Limited trading discourages listing and raising money on the exchanges. In
a form of vicious circle, the limited number and small size of transactions
raise, in turn, transaction costs. 
It is in these dimensions that strengthening of the stock markets needs
to be envisaged. It may be that too much emphasis has been placed in
recent years on building costly regulatory regimes designed to ensure a
high level of protection for the retail customer in the secondary market.
Such regimes represent a substantial up-front investment, partly in sys-
tems and infrastructure but mostly in processes, legislation, regulation,
and supervision. Although the technology costs of a basic trading platform
have fallen,32 the more substantial costs and administrative challenges of
establishing an operating environment conducive for an exchange have, if
anything, increased. These fixed costs make sense in a market with heavy
volumes but are not so easy to justify for a start-up market. They lead to
high costs, which in turn limit volumes even further. Compliance costs are
also potentially high. 
The success of the model of regulation that has been adopted depends
on a high degree of efficiency in regulation and governance. In the absence
of a dependable environment (including accounting standards, supervi-
sion, and enforcement), the investment in legislation, regulation, and
processes is stranded. The regulatory and judicial regime is not, in many
cases, capable of identifying and punishing offenders, and it is therefore
likely that compliance is in fact low. Besides, in practice, the main actual
and prospective investors in most African equities and bonds are likely to
be relatively sophisticated and may not need or benefit much from such
protection as the regulatory system can truly provide.
Market architecture should be chosen on the basis of local needs and
capacities. It may well be that most African firms would be better served by
a lighter regulatory approach, along the lines of “second boards” in
advanced economies. The emphasis would be on increasing primary mar-
ket issuance more than on high-frequency trading efficiency. A lighter reg-
ulatory approach, one step beyond the private equity and
over-the-counter markets, can work to an extent on the basis of caveat
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ulations (for filing, disclosure, and corporate governance) would, of
course, exist, but they would be designed with a light touch and chosen in
such a way as to be relatively easy to enforce. Some regulators, such as the
UK Financial Services Authority (FSA), are already mandated to conduct a
benefit-to-cost assessment of all new regulations. And even in the United
States, a high-profile committee has recently reported on the need to
establish more cost-effective ways of furthering the goals of good gover-
nance and transparency, especially in regard to smaller companies (U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission 2006).34 Similar sentiments should
guide African regulation also, but with even greater force.
Several African exchanges—Ghana, Nairobi, Nigeria, and Bourse
Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM) in West Africa—have multiple
listing segments that differ, for example, by permitted ownership concen-
tration and prelisting profit record. The suggestion here is that the second-
board model could be the main regulatory approach for small African
exchanges rather than being an add-on. Also, in contrast to several second-
board markets in advanced economies, which have focused on rapid-
growth or high-tech companies, the goal in Africa would be to target small
and medium-size companies in general.
Doing so would offer most firms a low-cost market at home. Their offer-
ings on such a market, albeit more lightly regulated, would still appeal to
local institutional investors, who would expect a return commensurate
with the risks taken. It is not that the tougher requirements are useless—
indeed, tighter listing requirements and regulations can increase market
liquidity and prices, as has been shown for larger markets. But they result
in a compliance cost barrier that shuts out too many African firms that
could benefit from outside equity.35
For larger companies—able and willing to genuinely establish high gov-
ernance and transparency standards in order to benefit from a lower cost
of capital and to reach a wider international investor clientele—listing on
advanced markets such as the Johannesburg or London exchange repre-
sents a viable alternative. Mention has been made in chapter 2 of the
extent to which larger South African companies have their primary listings
in advanced economy exchanges such as those in London, Luxembourg,
and Australia. 
The migration of the larger companies to international markets is a
process that has been experienced worldwide. If such companies raise
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investor interest for smaller firms that are not at present served. Trading
tends to concentrate in the most liquid market, so it is not surprising that
the migration of listings can result in lower trading at home of the migrated
companies. Indeed, where such migration has happened from previously
active markets, some loss of overall liquidity has been observed (Levine
and Schmukler 2006). But Africa’s exchanges are at a stage from which
they can only improve. 
This two-tier approach—low-cost local markets for the smaller firms,
access to major markets abroad for the larger firms—could be an alterna-
tive for or a complement to an expansion of the concept of a regional secu-
rities market. The prospect for regional unions of exchanges is discussed
later. 
Other complementary policies are needed if securities markets are to
flourish. They include a stable and predictable tax environment. Further-
more, stock exchange participants will need to start thinking in terms of
fostering smaller companies as their future client base by promoting busi-
ness advisory services. Ultimately, the optimal strategy for developing
organized securities markets in Africa will ensure that firms have better
access to patient capital. It will not necessarily entail a local securities
exchange whose sophistication may act as a barrier to entry for local enter-
prises in attracting capital.
Long-Term Finance for Housing 
Although the lack of well-functioning mortgage markets is far from being
the only cause of poor housing quality in Africa, better availability of long-
term housing finance could greatly improve housing quality as well as pro-
vide a useful outlet for long-term funds. Housing finance can make a
lumpy investment into the building, renovation, or expansion of a house
more affordable by spreading the costs over time. It can also provide a suit-
able investment to match the long-term liabilities accumulated by pension
funds and insurance companies.
Many middle-class African households have stable and secure incomes
and could afford to service long-term mortgages that are sufficient to pay
for good housing. Instead, the very limited availability of long-term mort-
gage finance leaves far too many in the unsatisfactory situation of having
to improve their housing only on a “build-as-you-earn” basis, with the
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As documented in chapter 2, most African financial sectors lend very lit-
tle for housing. If housing finance is available, it is mostly limited to the
upper classes and expatriate community. At the other end of the spectrum,
as mentioned later, microfinance clients may have access to loans that can
be used to improve their housing. It is in the large gap between these two
segments that development of the mortgage market can help. 
Numerous impediments hold back housing finance in Africa: macroeco-
nomic instability, deficient property rights systems and markets, and lack
of proper funding mechanisms. Although damaging for most financial
contracts, high inflation is ruinous for the mortgage market. It tends to
frontload repayments (with high nominal interest rates required to com-
pensate for expected inflation), making the servicing charges very high in
the early years. It can also erode savings and exacerbate financial uncer-
tainty. However, inflation is not the principal barrier to mortgage market
development in most African countries today. Long-term finance for hous-
ing is typically constrained both on the origination (primary) side and on
the funding (secondary) side. Financial institutions are reluctant to extend
long maturities to mortgagees because of the weak lending and opera-
tional framework. Furthermore, they cannot themselves access long-term
financing.36
Primary mortgage markets are constrained by inadequate legal and
institutional frameworks. Weak legal protection of secured lending and
weak enforcement of collateral, incomplete land titles and registration,
land transfer restrictions, insufficient credit information on retail borrow-
ers, and lack of building standards and valuation procedures limit the abil-
ity of financial institutions to provide long-term finance for housing. In
addition, deficiencies in the supply chain often make housing prices unaf-
fordable. In particular, inefficient mechanisms for financing and delivering
primary infrastructure make the costs of land development prohibitive.
Furthermore, small markets with few transactions reduce the value of col-
lateral and lending costs for banks.
Despite those impediments, lenders in several countries have entered or
aggressively expanded the housing finance markets. Banks in South Africa
have committed to expanding housing finance to low-income households
and have started offering housing finance products targeted to that mar-
ket. Donor-financed financial institutions, such as the DFCU Group in
Uganda, have entered the middle-income housing market. With the aim of
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sigiso in Mali as well as other microlenders in West Africa have introduced
housing-related savings products in the French style.
Another important impediment to long-term housing finance is the
lack of long-term resources. Mortgages in most countries, including Euro-
pean countries and the United States, are still funded chiefly through
deposit resources. However, this method requires a reasonably stable
deposit base and the opportunity for banks to manage liquidity using inter-
bank and repo markets. But there has been increasing interest in employ-
ing secondary markets to fund long-term housing loans. One approach is
a market in fully securitized mortgage bonds, or at least a market for
mortgage-related bonds. Developing an adequate framework for selling
and trading securitized mortgage packages is challenging. Given the lack of
organized exchanges and the high listing costs and limited trading on such
exchanges as do exist, full securitization may be difficult or at least prema-
ture in most African countries. Instead, banks and other mortgage origina-
tors are likely to achieve similar benefits with lower setup costs by issuing
mortgage-related bonds, which are secured by priority claims on the mort-
gage portfolios on the bank’s balance sheet, or similar types of securities.
Pension funds and insurance companies would be the prime candidates to
purchase such bonds and provide the necessary funding. 
Second-tier liquidity facilities, which use proceeds from bond issues
(often with partial support and risk sharing by governments or donors) to
refinance primary mortgage issuers, have proven an effective alternative
for providing long-term finance in many countries. These and other forms
of public facility—such as take-out guarantees with adequate financial
backing to support long-term funding instruments—can signal govern-
ment commitment to maintaining a sustainable macroeconomic policy
framework. However, if introduced too soon and without adequate gover-
nance, they risk generating a dependence of the type familiar from the
experience with housing and other DFIs in the past, which conspicuously
failed to meet housing finance objectives over the years.
Helping the market develop the necessary funding mechanisms is a
more promising approach than previous attempts to provide housing
finance directly through state-owned intermediaries. Numerous such insti-
tutions (in Cameroon, Rwanda, and Tanzania, for example) have failed
both financially as well as in reaching their target clientele. Similarly, cre-
ating a funding base through a compulsory savings scheme, as in the case
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remuneration, nontransparent management of savers’ funds, and lengthy
borrower waiting lists. 
Many households are too poor and lack sufficient creditworthiness to be
granted long-term mortgages of sufficient size to pay for a whole house. In
such cases, improved step-by-step financing remains a feasible middle
course, as discussed in chapter 4. Remittances play an important role in
financing housing developments in many African countries. Microlevel
surveys in countries such as Ghana and Nigeria suggest that a significant
share of remittance flows is channeled into housing construction. Linking
remittances with functioning mortgage markets by leveraging them as
equity in support of mortgage loans could play an important role in kick-
starting housing finance in recipient communities. Developing payment
systems and products to provide incentives to make a larger share of infor-
mally transmitted remittances available for intermediation in the formal
financial system will contribute toward improving the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of remittance finance for housing development. 
Innovative Financing Instruments for Infrastructure
The domestic financial system could play a larger role in financing infra-
structure, whether by investing in infrastructure-related bonds or by par-
ticipating in the financing of PPPs in infrastructure.37 Given their high
capital intensity, long time to cost recovery, and relatively predictable cash
flows, infrastructure projects provide a natural investment opportunity for
long-term savings. By financing infrastructure, local institutional investors
can help avoid reverse maturity transformation and improve the risk-
return profile of their portfolios.
Local-currency financing of infrastructure may also be a better match
for the flow of benefits or service charges, resulting in reduced risk for the
lender and a more predictable servicing burden for the provider or user of
the infrastructure. Depending on the tariff regime, lower financing costs
can ultimately translate into lower user fees. 
Depending on whether infrastructure provision is by a public authority,
a privately owned utility, or a PPP, a range of financial instruments can be
envisaged. Public funding solutions for infrastructure include infrastruc-
ture bonds. Depending on the government’s general creditworthiness,
these could be more attractive than conventional government bonds if
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taxes. If a privately owned utility or PPP38 is involved, unsecured corporate
bond issues and initial public share offerings by existing utilities can pro-
vide local-currency financing for their domestic costs while equally devel-
oping capital markets through new investment opportunities. In addition,
securitization of existing utilities’ revenues could provide an alternative
source of funding in capital markets with a robust legal framework. 
The contribution of domestic financial markets to infrastructure finance
has been limited to date in Africa. Government and private project spon-
sors have brought their own financing or have borrowed from interna-
tional banks. Only a few infrastructure bonds have been floated on
domestic capital markets—mainly for the telecommunications sector,
where investments can be recovered more quickly, prices are often not
regulated, and markets have significant upside potential. 
Both sides of the market will need build up relevant investment bank-
ing skills if more ambitious domestic financing solutions are to succeed. It
may be realistic to begin by funding existing creditworthy utilities before
attempting to finance greenfield infrastructure projects.
One problem is the lack of a long-term yield curve against which to
establish a realistic price for the bonds. But even more important is the
limited ability of banks and institutional investors to analyze, structure,
and monitor long-term project risks. Among these risks are a variety of
political and regulatory ones. In most African countries, regulatory regimes
for infrastructure are incomplete, and future tariff regimes are therefore
uncertain. In addition, there may be a high credit risk for projects that
depend on government off-take arrangements.39 Significant technical and
commercial losses resulting from fraud, nonpayment, and the absence of
metering technologies increase commercial risks. Of course, the whole
point of tying the bond to the infrastructure project is to achieve an
improved sharing of these risks, but this may be hard to do when the risks
are difficult to evaluate.40
As with mortgage-related bonds, investors are more reluctant to buy
long-term instruments where no liquid securities market provides them
with an exit in case they need liquidity. This situation has led to sugges-
tions that a public liquidity facility might be set up to provide a refinancing
option with an interest rate cap, mitigating long-term refinancing risk. The
facility could also be used for bank loans after an agreed maturity and
could equally provide take-out financing for private equity investors after
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able contingent risks for the public authorities and require careful structur-
ing in order to preserve a reasonable balance of risks and to protect the
public interest. The application of investment banking and public finance
economic evaluation skills in devising and evaluating all such initiatives is
crucial if the public interest is to be well served.
Macroeconomic Aspects: Building Confidence and 
Absorptive Capacity
The ability of national financial systems to function effectively is strongly
conditioned by macroeconomic conditions at home and by fiscal pressures
on financial markets. And their effectiveness is, or can be, influenced by
the wider regional environment, especially where intergovernmental
regional cooperation is in place. 
Macroeconomic Benefits and Barriers
If current efforts to strengthen the lending ability of domestic financial sys-
tems are successful, the incidence of chronic excess banking liquidity will
diminish. Furthermore, deeper and more efficient systems will then be
able to help economies absorb what could be a growing flow of investable
resources from the doubling of aid that has been promised—together with
a return onshore of savings now placed offshore—without succumbing to
Dutch disease.41 Instead of simply routing the additional resources that
they mobilize into foreign placements or government securities, banks will
find it advantageous to onlend them prudently to borrowers whose invest-
ment opportunities will spin off wide-ranging benefits to the economy at
large. The resulting increase in productive capital will help ensure that the
inflows do not create inflationary pressures and that their expansionary
effect does not have to be choked off through excessive increases in policy
interest rates. The growth effect of such inflows will then be much more
lasting.
Indeed, if the effectiveness of financial systems in intermediating funds
increases as it should, the relatively low domestic savings rates in Africa
and the placement of such large funds both offshore and in foreign-
currency deposits onshore will become an increasing constraint (Aryeetey
and Udry 2000). After all, most African countries already rely heavily onFINANCE FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH 121
foreign savings to augment a meager domestic savings rate. The savings
ratio (gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP) for the median
African economy has averaged only 8 percent for the past decade, without
much sign of an increase. Indeed, in aggregate, foreign transfers and bor-
rowing (mostly aid but also recently including private capital inflows) have
financed as much of gross domestic investment as have domestic savings
(figure 3.5). In contrast, for low- and middle-income countries across the
world as a whole, domestic savings have exceeded domestic investment in
every year for the past three decades.
Stabilizing Wholesale Financial Markets 
Broad confidence issues permeate all discussion of how to stabilize the per-
formance of wholesale financial markets in Africa. Africans’ relatively
large external holdings of bank deposits can partly be traced to confidence
factors.42 High yields paid on government bonds denominated in local cur-
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rency also reflect the fear that repayment difficulties will result in delays,
special taxes, or sudden devaluation, as does the growth in the dollariza-
tion of bank deposits (see box 3.1). 
The perceived systemic risk in African countries is high. It is not only a
question of the natural hazards (discussed in chapter 2). Instead, political
risk seems to dominate. As just one example of current external percep-
tions, African countries score an average of 4.5 on a political risk rating
scale of 0 to 7 produced by the Belgian export credit agency. This score
contrasts with an average of 2.4 for the rest of the world.43
The most important lines of solution to these difficulties lie in dimen-
sions that go beyond the scope of this report, covering not only fiscal man-
agement but more broadly the functioning of political and social
institutions of governance. Nevertheless, a number of relevant elements
lie within the scope of financial sector policy. It is appropriate to mention
two briefly: management of the domestic government debt and financial
policy responses to aid fluctuations.
Management of government debt
Quite apart from its direct impact on government indebtedness, the cost of
capital, and vulnerability to shifts in confidence, excessive reliance on
domestic government borrowing has a corrosive effect on incentives for
banks. It becomes too easy for them to make short-term profits without
having to exercise their credit appraisal skills. Thus, such reliance hampers
the flow of funds to productive uses. It can also leave banks vulnerable
later when rates come down again, resulting in a boom-and-bust cycle.
But a coherently planned, moderate, and managed program of govern-
ment borrowing through the issue of bonds in a transparent market can
help build infrastructure that can support private bond issues also. 
Investors in African financial markets are typically considered risk
averse—a phenomenon long observed (see Austen 1987). Lacking trust in
the sustainability of macroeconomic reforms, market participants main-
tain conservative risk practices. Building confidence in the stabilization of
fiscal and macroeconomic policies is a key challenge for reform-oriented
policy makers. This learning process benefits from transparent and pre-
dictable monetary policy frameworks and clear rules and procedures.
Communication of monetary policy targets, provision of reliable market
information, and coordination between key government agencies such as
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steps in preventing unnecessary market shocks and surprises that hinder
investor confidence. 
Especially in the initial phases, while confidence is still being built, vari-
able rather than fixed interest rates are more likely to appeal to investors
in longer-term financing instruments. Long-term infrastructure bonds,
discussed previously, can be a very useful means of lengthening maturities. 
With confidence increasing, the government debt manager can stan-
dardize the bonds that are being traded in the market and concentrate on
a few key maturities, establishing a stable and representative yield for the
highest-quality bonds at these maturities. This yield can then serve as a
reference rate not only for the issuance of private bonds, but also for all
sorts of present and future value calculations that are made in the econ-
omy. This is what is meant by establishing a yield curve. 
In some environments, inflation-indexed instruments could offer
attractive protection for pension funds and other long-term investors.
Inflation-indexed instruments are most useful where borrower cash flows
or security provide a natural inflation hedge like real estate, capital invest-
ments in the retail sector, or infrastructure products with strong local cash
flows.
Surges in aid and other external flows
The promised doubling of overall aid to Africa will present absorption chal-
lenges that can be tackled successfully only if the structural strengthening
of domestic financial systems is achieved. Furthermore, the flows are
unlikely to increase in a smooth manner. Aid has already been a quite
volatile element in the balance of payments of African countries. There
have been surges in aid flows, often associated with a change of govern-
ment or policy orientation or with a postconflict situation. Inflow surges in
individual countries are likely to become more common with the increased
overall flow of aid. These surges can create challenges for aggregate credit
policy. 
Aid is not the only source of inflow volatility. Export quantities and
prices have also caused booms and busts in the past, often poorly man-
aged. The latest of these is now benefiting petroleum-producing African
countries. Private capital flows can also be volatile—as seen in particular
episodes affecting Kenya and South Africa, for example. Most of Africa has
not experienced such episodes, though, reflecting the minor importance of
inward portfolio investment stocks.124 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
There is no mechanical rulebook for quantifying the optimal response by
the fiscal and especially the monetary authorities to surges in inflows. But
the problem is not as mysterious as it is sometimes made out to be. The first
question for the monetary authorities can be boiled down to asking
whether the surge is likely to be associated with an increase in the demand
for real money balances. If it is, this increased demand should not be choked
off by aggressive policy. If it is not, then the relaxed monetary conditions
that will result from an accommodating approach will likely result in some
combination of inflation, currency depreciation, and current account pay-
ments deficit. Mechanical adherence to fixed quantitative targets for the
monetary and credit aggregates is not an adequate response. More promis-
ing is an “inflation-targeting lite” approach, in which active feedback from
market developments allows the shifting demand for money function to be
accommodated, thereby ensuring avoidance of mistakes on either side. This
approach should ensure, on the one hand, that the flows are not overster-
ilized by interest rates being pushed up, thereby hampering the output and
development response, and, on the other hand, that temporary surges are
not allowed to splash into unsustainable spending patterns (box 3.8).
Regional Collaboration
We have already mentioned the potential for regional collaboration in
banking and insurance supervision and in securities market trading and
governance. Other possible areas of collaboration include accounting and
auditing, credit information, payments systems, and—of course—a com-
mon currency. Initiatives have been taken in all of these areas and more.
Some have been up and running for decades, especially in the CFA zone. 
Three key questions must be asked about each new initiative in this area:
Will it reduce transactions costs? Will it increase effectiveness and enhance
confidence by effectively increasing the independence of the regional insti-
tution from national political pressures? What countries should be
included? These questions await definitive answers, but several considera-
tions need to be kept in mind: 
• First, some forms of financial service can cross borders without the need
for an elaborate supranational or multinational regulatory structure to
govern them. The proliferation of cross-border banks in Africa illus-
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BOX 3.8
Surges in External Inflows and Implications for Financial
Stability
Sudden changes in the level of aid flows or other external flows (such as
payment surpluses now being generated for oil-producing countries by the
exceptional levels of oil prices) present issues of macroeconomic and mon-
etary management and demand improvements in intermediation capacity. 
To the extent that aid flows and oil money are directly spent on imports with-
out adding to domestic demand, no evident macroeconomic consequences
may occur. But more generally, if aid money implies an increase in domestic
spending, a sustained increase in such flows implies that the rest of the eco-
nomic system will adjust—in particular, key variables including real interest
rates, income, and exchange rates. Literature on the subject is extensive:
the issue arises even in a model as simple as that of Mundell and Fleming,
as well as in models of the Dutch disease; for a recent analysis applied to
low-income countries, see O’Connell and others (2006). Nonetheless, it is
not sufficiently widely recognized that these adjustments need to be taken
into account in adapting monetary policy to the new equilibrium.
The equilibrium adjustments of real interest rates and real income (increas-
es) and the real exchange rate (appreciation) that will be needed to clear do-
mestic goods, money, and foreign exchange markets in response to a sus-
tained surge in inflows could be sizable. Their size will depend in particular
on the marginal propensity to import out of increased income, the price
elasticity of imports, and the interest sensitivity of money demand. If either
or both of the first two are high—which is likely in many African countries,
though precise and reliable estimates are not generally available—the equi-
librium changes will be small. Nevertheless, they will have an effect on the
demand for real money balances.
From the point of view of monetary and credit policy, clearly the goal should
be to accomplish the adjustment without any impact on inflation. Doing so
implies, for example, that the planned growth path of nominal monetary
aggregates—including the target for reserve money—should be compati-
ble with the preexisting intended path of prices and the new equilibrium
money demand.
(Box continues on the following page.)126 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
ing in multiple jurisdictions in order to expand their operations into a
wider market. These developments may add to the complexity of the
supervisor’s job, but the point is that they can happen without being
pushed by a cooperative international effort by public authorities. 
• Second, even when considered together, the economies and financial
systems of most groups of African countries are still small. To achieve a
deep and efficient financial system, African countries really need to
think of integrating more into the global financial system—not just with
their neighboring countries. Cooperation among African regulators and
financial trade with neighboring countries can be very valuable, and an
understanding of regional conditions means that such dealings are the
most natural places to start. But they do not fully solve the problems of
small scale. 
• Third, it could be a mistake to transplant in an unthinking manner ideas
that work in the European Union (EU). The smooth functioning of gov-
ernance and judicial infrastructures that underpin the operations of the
EU cannot at present be ensured in all African regions. Furthermore,
the delicate balance of power between large and small nations that has
been maintained over the years in the EU may be difficult to replicate in
several of the African groups. The economic dominance of South Africa
in any African group of which it is a member and of Nigeria in the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for example,
BOX 3.8 (continued)
In practice, none of these magnitudes will be known with precision. Never-
theless, an intended (target) path for reserve money, corresponding to the
planned inflation rate, and an expected path of interest rate and exchange
rate should be calculated in accordance with the best information available.
Then, as events unfold, the deviations of actual from expected can be fed
back into the model underlying the original forecasts in order to revise the
parameters. Higher inflation or a lower-than-expected interest or exchange
rate appreciation would signal the need to tighten the reserve money tar-
get, and so on. The monetary targets thus need constant attention in case
the demand for money and other relevant relationships should prove to be
different than what was expected. Mohanty and Turner (2006) and IMF
(2006) discuss these issues in the current African context further.FINANCE FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH 127
presents difficult challenges to effective cooperation given the other
countries’ fear that they could be swamped by the largest member of a
group they join.
Lack of progress in previous initiatives has made many African policy
makers somewhat skeptical about new ideas in this sphere. Doubts can
best be overcome by selectivity and prioritization in considering new ini-
tiatives, placing the emphasis on efforts that both offer the prospect of siz-
able concrete gains and are politically and organizationally feasible. 
Currency unions
Currency unions have been placed firmly on the political agenda. If we
include the Common Monetary Area (CMA) arrangement linking the cur-
rencies of Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland along with the
two unions of the CFA zone, Africa has three working examples—the sur-
vivors of a more numerous set of colonial era relationships. This book is
not the place for a full discussion of the common-currency issue. Despite
political commitment to single-currency programs (undoubtedly inspired
by the European Monetary Union project), most practitioners do not
expect further single currencies to become a reality in any short time-
scale—especially given the diversity of national macroeconomic policy
conditions and the inability of most African governments to provide a fully
credible commitment to a single currency.44
Regulation and supervision
A regional approach seems to offers the most plausible scenario for gains
in the area of intermediary regulation and supervision. Given the limited
skill base that exists or can be afforded in these highly specialized areas,
there must be significant potential benefits from pooling these skills for a
multicountry region so that they can be deployed quickly in a crisis to
where they are most needed. A multicountry approach also offers some
additional political distance or independence. The experiences of the two
regional banking commissions and the single regional insurance commis-
sion (covering all 13 states) in the CFA franc zone seem to bear this out, at
least to some extent. The full potential is not realized even here, given the
degree to which some powers related to licensing and sanctions remain at
the national level. The Southern African Development Community
(SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA) have also taken steps toward harmonizing banking regulation128 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
and supervision, but these initiatives have not yet progressed very far.
There is also the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti Money Laundering
Group (ESAAMLG).
If a regional regulatory approach were extended to allow cross-border
banking on the “single passport” principle adopted by the EU, it could
enhance bank competition for small member states within the regulatory
region. Banks could provide services across borders without incurring all
the costs of separate incorporation in each jurisdiction. A single passport is
in effect in both CFA zones, but it is not automatic either in theory or in
practice. However, the barriers to entry do not seem to discriminate in
practice between CFA and non-CFA applicants, thereby avoiding the dan-
ger that a regional approach could raise barriers to entry from solid inter-
national banks. SADC, in particular, needs to be alert to this danger,
considering the importance of South African banks in many SADC coun-
tries already and the risk that they could form a lobby to resist the entry of
international banks from outside SADC (Jansen and Vennes 2006). Simi-
lar arguments may apply even more to capital market regulation, espe-
cially since few African countries have or could have capital markets
sufficiently large to fully justify the irreducible fixed cost of setting up a
regulatory body that complies fully with international standards. 
There is the countervailing danger that despite joining a regional associa-
tion, members will forgo the potential cost savings by insisting on duplication
of office facilities in each country (as seems to have happened, to a degree, in
the CFA zone). Indeed, there can be diseconomies of regional cooperation
also, if there is a multiplication of international representative meetings
between the members. The opportunity for achieving operational and func-
tional independence from national governments may also be missed, depend-
ing on the appointments and tenure procedures that are adopted.
A degree of harmonization of the legal framework for banking regula-
tion would seem to be a prerequisite for a joint approach to banking super-
vision. It has also been suggested that such harmonization (for example, of
minimum-percentage risk capital requirements) would be required to
ensure a competitive, level playing field for foreign-owned and interna-
tional banks, though this proposition is not so evident.
Securities markets
Recent technological advances have made it easier to link the operations of
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kets, existing exchanges could expand their volume of business and the
number of market participants. The theoretical attractions are clear: larger
markets are more likely to gain from the vertical and horizontal integra-
tion of services and products. Regional securities markets could provide
larger economies of scale and increase firms’ access to debt and equity.
From an investor’s perspective, regionalization would theoretically offer
opportunities to diversify risk by allowing investment in a wider range of
instruments and debt and equity issuers. The development of larger mar-
kets would encourage the entry of emerging market funds, which provide
access to a global pool of savings for equity issuers. A variety of overlap-
ping initiatives, all of which generally promote greater integration of stock
exchanges in Africa, are under discussion (see Irving 2005; for East Africa,
see Alawode and others 2002).
There is no doubt that cross-border cooperation and technology trans-
fer can be helpful, especially if they help contain operating and regulatory
costs. However, the inescapable fixed costs of establishing a simple, small
trading platform are no longer very high. And cross-listing (rather than
integration) can allow issuers to access a wider pool of investors. There-
fore, the main operating advantage of integrating the functioning of secu-
rities markets is to improve liquidity on an hour-to-hour and day-to-day
basis. But it is not clear how much would be gained in absolute terms even
by pooling all the smaller African securities markets: the result would still
be a small and illiquid market. Exchange controls operating between par-
ticipating countries would eliminate most of the short-term liquidity
advantage. (Also, bonds quoted in different national currencies might not
attract much cross-border investment.) 
Indeed, any proposals for regional securities exchanges must deal effec-
tively with exchange control and other restrictions on cross-border invest-
ments in the securities. This point may seem obvious, but such restrictions
are often imposed for policy and political reasons that will trump the objec-
tives of securities market integration, and their resolution must be a pre-
requisite. If the time is not ripe for a general liberalization, limited forms of
liberalization—allowing, for example, long-term investments by approved
institutional investors—can be a viable halfway measure.
The success of the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières in Abidjan has
been modest. Cross-border investment using the market has been growing,
but volumes are still small. Ivorian firms still dominate the equity board,45
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its regulation and supervision) are lower than they would have been had
Senegal, say, opted for a stand-alone exchange. In the other CFA zone (Com-
munauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale, or CEMAC),
plans for a regional exchange have not received uniform acceptance.46
More regionalization is likely to produce gains, but they would not all
require an elaborate regionally adopted solution. Indeed, the technical,
legal, and administrative efforts required for governments to establish and
maintain a jointly controlled and fully integrated multilateral regional
exchange (even if exchange control issues were overcome) suggest that less
costly step-by-step solutions should have a higher priority. Each element of
potential regionalization can be considered as a module. What is the best
way to achieve regional economies of scale, liquidity, and risk pooling?
Outsourcing to a common service provider for some services might be more
effective than insisting on building a new, jointly owned multinational
provider. For instance, back-office clearing and settlement services might be
efficiently provided to a number of different exchanges by a single entity,
even if those exchanges remained otherwise unlinked. Hammering out
common regional software and technology standards might be unnecessary
when satisfactory existing standards can be taken off the shelf.
Again, the use of linked trading platforms across several countries can
be envisaged even if regulation and supervision remains national. A small
country could exploit the existence of a well-functioning exchange in a
larger neighbor, thereby bringing the advantages of better technology to
the home market at lower cost.47 This hub-and-spoke approach is much
less demanding of political and administrative coordination than the mul-
tilateral approach, and it could be seen as a potentially promising path
toward wider market integration. It can be designed in such a way as to
prevent the danger of medium-size companies from poorer countries get-
ting lost among the numerous listings on the larger exchanges. However,
it does nothing to restrain the dominance of a small number of exchanges,
which can seem unattractive for noneconomic reasons. 
Cross-market listings in different countries are another, more limited,
alternative to full regionalization. Such listings are already being tried, for
example, with the cross-listing of Nairobi-based East African Breweries and
Kenya Airways in Dar es Salaam and on the Uganda exchange. An available
alternative for larger companies seeking a wider and more liquid market is
simply to cross-list on a large international exchange, whether that of Johan-
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It is instructive in this context to see the extent to which consolidation of
the larger European securities markets is being driven more by private than
by government initiative, through mergers and takeovers between existing
firms that operate exchanges and related services. There is intergovernmen-
tal action in the EU to harmonize and coordinate regulation of these mar-
kets, but with exchange controls long since removed, government action
has tended to follow rather than lead market integration in this sphere. 
Legal framework and accounting 
A common set of commercial laws is already in place in the CFA franc zone
and could perhaps be achieved in the East African Community, where the
member states share the English Common Law tradition. But a compre-
hensive unification of business law in a wider regional grouping that cov-
ers both countries with a Civil Code tradition and those with a Common
Law tradition seems a rather remote prospect. Instead, legal harmoniza-
tion efforts are better directed at more limited initiatives to draft certain
framework laws to govern and help facilitate other cooperative arrange-
ments in finance. In contrast, there seems more to be gained, at low risk
and low cost, in seeking collaborative arrangements for accounting and
auditing. There will be some efficiencies of shared learning and possibilities
for cross-border auditing. And a region that has set up a common frame-
work for adoption of the IFRS presents no barriers to further integration in
the rest of the continent.
Supplementing the specific cooperative initiatives that may be adopted in
these fields, a policy of “thinking regionally, but moving first to deliver the
national prerequisites” is likely to be beneficial. This thinking is already
embodied in the various macroeconomic and budgetary goals that have been
set in African regional groups that aim to create or preserve a common cur-
rency and an economic union. It can also guide reforms in other areas (includ-
ing payments) where cross-country collaborative projects are not yet active.
Notes
1. The Democratic Republic of Congo in the early 2000s is a good example here:
civil war eroded monetization, and the banks placed much of their resources
abroad. Equatorial Guinea is a good illustration of the limited absorptive capac-
ity of a banking system in the face of large inflows—in this case of oil-related
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2. The trend may in part reflect required reserves, though the monetary author-
ities’ choice of required reserves can be influenced by the actual level of the
bank’s desired reserves, notably if the authorities wish to limit the emergence
of sizable excess reserves. Anyway, while required reserves are high in several
countries, a majority of African countries do have sizable excess reserves (IMF
2006).
3. If the survey had been confined to bankers, the responses might have been
more critical. Furthermore, things are not so good when it comes to overdue
payments, which are reported by 84 percent of African businesses—second
only to South Asia. But this finding may be best interpreted as an indication of
the informality of payment practices rather than of enforcement per se.
4. It also has the second-highest overall recovery cost, if this cost is expressed as
a percentage of per capita income.
5. However, the correlation between credit registry coverage (numbers covered
as a share of population) and creditor rights across countries in Africa is signif-
icantly positive at +0.61, essentially because large household-level credit reg-
istries are largely confined to South Africa and its small neighbors.
6. Azam, Biais, and Dia (2004) discuss the UEMOA banking crisis of the 1980s in
terms of a model in which government interference could continue to influ-
ence the incentives of international bankers after a crisis.
7. Ironically, it was the ill-fated Meridien-BIAO that became the first private
bank to be licensed in Tanzania, in 1991, after a quarter-century of state-
monopoly banking.
8. Interestingly, in Kenya resolution of the events of the late 1990s involved
large depositors taking considerable losses in some banks, as a result of conver-
sion of part of their deposits to equity as a condition of the bank’s survival. 
9. Good accounts for the anglophone countries appear in Brownbridge and Har-
vey (1998). They describe, for instance, the Nigerian experience: liberalization
after 1986 resulted in numerous entrants seeking the privileged access to
rationed foreign exchange or the opportunity to indulge in looting and insider
lending. Most of a previous wave of public sector banks (owned by provincial
governments) were in distress by the early 1990s. The three biggest banks,
each with a venerable history, survived better. They too had accumulated siz-
able nonperforming loans, perhaps 40 percent of their total lending, by the
mid-1990s, but they stayed afloat thanks to their high liquidity and the over-
all lack of competitive pressure in the market, which allowed high margins on
performing business. Another useful overview of African bank failures is con-
tained in Daumont, Le Gall, and Leroux (2004).
10. One partial success story that illustrates the problems is the abortive first pri-
vatization attempt of the Uganda Commercial Bank to a company registered in
Malaysia. That company proved to be a front for persons that were deemed
unsuitable by the Ugandan authorities and who proceeded to self-lend on a
large scale (Clarke, Cull, and Fuchs 2006).
11. Sometimes incentive can work in the opposite direction, with the strength of
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12. An additional threat to be considered is the impact of HIV/AIDS, which adds
costs and presents a variety of default and underwriting risks where the epi-
demic is severe. At the same time, financial intermediaries can be well placed to
measure and manage these risks. See Kalavakonda (2005) and Magill (2003).
13. This is the name under which Standard Bank of South Africa (until 1987 a
subsidiary of Standard Chartered Bank) operates in several other African
countries. In 2000, Stanbic acquired the African operations of ANZ Grindlays,
successor to the National Bank of India (but the main Kenya operations of the
National Bank of India had become Kenya Commercial Bank).
14. The World Bank’s Privatization database records 39 banking privatizations in
Africa between 1988 and 2003, with total proceeds coming to US$329 million.
A further 50 nonbank financial sector privatizations—many in the insurance
sector—for US$100 million are recorded. See Senbet and Otchere (2006) for a
critical view of the postprivatization profitability performance of African
banks.
15. The tone of the letter received by the director of Barclays in Khartoum sug-
gests a very polite takeover: “According to Revolutionary Council decision
dated 25th May, 1970, Banks in the Sudan have been nationalized. Barclays
Bank is now called State Bank for Foreign Trade. . . . You are therefore
requested to report to your office at 10 a.m. tomorrow morning . . . in order to
hand over your work. . . . Board of Directors of State Bank for Foreign Trade
extend their thanks to the services you rendered in this country and wish you
a pleasant future” (Ackrill and Hannah 2001).
16. In Tanzania, the operations of all seven existing private banks were merged
into the new National Bank of Commerce.
17. In Nigeria, it is interesting to note that foreign banks were reluctant to accede
to local incorporation. Barclays insisted on removal of the international brand
when its shareholding in what became Union Bank of Nigeria was reduced to
20 percent as part of government policy. Contrast this reaction with the mod-
ern concern that fly-by-night foreign bankers will use their international
brand name to build business, while limiting their exposure by hiding behind
local incorporation. 
18. Senegal’s Compagnie Bancaire de l’Afrique Occidentale has assumed the 150-
year heritage of the other colonial French bank, the BAO, whose travails in
the 1990s are mentioned later.
19. The recent decision by the Dutch group Fortis to dispose of the Belgolaise net-
work indicates that such concerns are not entirely unfounded.
20. For example, a ceiling of 49 percent was placed on the stake in Tanzania’s
NMB (National Microfinance Bank), which was acquired in 2005 by the con-
sortium led by Rabobank and (prospectively) on Rabobank’s share in Zambia’s
ZNCB (Zambia National Commercial Bank), though in both cases further
share sales to nationals are planned.
21. Requiring accurate publication of charges is an exception. It can be a valuable
consumer protection measure, albeit one that is only moderately effective in
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22. Entry, that is, of credible institutions with adequate capital and fit and proper
management. The need for new entrants cannot absolve the regulators from
due diligence. And there has to be some caution about embryonic proposals in
the context of the World Trade Organization to have countries bind them-
selves to accepting entry of a bank licensed in any jurisdiction.
23. In the past those seeking to build stable banking systems sometimes advocated
formal deposit insurance. However, cross-country research strongly suggests
that unintended incentive side effects of formal schemes mean that their intro-
duction is likely to be counterproductive in countries with weak overall gov-
ernance institutions (Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane 2002). Only five such schemes
are fully in operation in Africa today.
24. Only a few African countries (mainly Kenya, Malawi, and Zimbabwe) have
made significant commitments binding themselves under the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services to permit market access in financial services. Given
the risk that unsound entrants from poorly regulated foreign countries may
take advantage of such commitments where host country supervisory capac-
ity is weak, this caution is probably well founded. It is solid and well-managed
banks whose entry should be encouraged.
25. The somewhat ambiguous term risk mitigation is sometimes used in this con-
text where risk shifting would be more accurate. If credit guarantee schemes
shift some of the risk to parties who are able to contribute to risk assessment
or for whom the assumption of risk can act as a hedge in their portfolio, then
there is a real gain. But if the motivation for the transaction is to benefit from
a hidden subsidy or a flaw in prudential regulation, then risk is not being mit-
igated in the system as a whole and may in fact be amplified.
26. Although the guarantee company does some appraisal diligence on the loans
guaranteed, this business may be partly a regulatory arbitrage.
27. Long-term lending at fixed interest cannot safely be funded by short-term
deposits, given the repricing risk, a risk that can be very high in periods of
macroeconomic volatility. This problem can be overstated, though, inasmuch
as most borrowers will accept a floating interest rate as the price of getting
security of funding for a term. Banks are increasingly aware of the need to
ensure that this repricing is written into the contract and that the formula is a
fair and transparent one. 
28. Several such funds have been active in Africa including Actis (http://www.act
.is) and Equator’s Africa Growth Fund (http://www.mbendi.co.za). There may
be some prospect in the future for deeper international engagement in risk
sharing through such mechanisms as international credit derivatives.
29. Although the spinoff benefits for the poor of some FDI, especially some min-
ing investment, can be questioned, there is no doubt that inward FDI already
has and will increasingly have a positive effect on firm productivity and
national economic growth. Analysis of microlevel data on firms shows sizable
productivity gains from FDI into Africa (Moss, Ramachandran, and Shah
2004). At the macro level, FDI inflows, unlike capital market integration gen-
erally, are strongly associated with African growth (Collins 2004).FINANCE FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH 135
30. Even if no funds are raised and if the listed shares attract little or no trading.
31. One possible example: Tanzania Breweries, the largest firm on the Dar es
Salaam stock exchange, with a market capitalization of close to US$400 mil-
lion and a dividend yield of more than 11 percent. Its principal shareholders,
accounting for 94 percent of the total, are South African Breweries, 53 per-
cent; East African Breweries, 20 percent; Unit Trust of Tanzania, 6 percent;
Treasury Registrar, United Republic of Tanzania, 4 percent; International
Finance Corporation, 4 percent; Public Service Pensions Fund, 3 percent;
Umoja Fund, 2 percent; Parastatal Pensions Fund, 1 percent; and National
Social Security Fund, 1 percent. 
32. And, in any case, traditional nonelectronic callover trading methods, if effi-
ciently organized—as in Dar es Salaam, for example—can be fully adequate
for the volume of local trading and the small number of listings.
33. Second-board markets in advanced economies make different and, in some
respects, lower demands on the issuer (lower, for example, in regard to hav-
ing a track record of profitability, a minimum market capitalization, and a
minimum number of shareholders; higher sometimes in regard to disclosure).
Of course, the costs of going or staying public depend not only on regulations
(in a narrow sense) but also on capital market architecture and industry effi-
ciency. The experience of the AIM (Alternative Investment Market) in Lon-
don(http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/products/companyservices/
ourmarkets/aim_new) in seeking to minimize these costs for listing firms is
instructive. The key is to adapt rules on corporate governance and disclosure
in a pragmatic and appropriate manner and to remove regulations that are
unenforceable in the local environment. For example, it might be useful to
follow the AIM in placing the primary responsibility for much of the compli-
ance with regulations on the “nominated adviser,” the financial intermediary
bringing the firm to market (Grose and Friedman 2006). With governance
issues largely devolved to the nominated adviser, AIM does not require (a) any
minimum number of shares to be in public hands, (b) any trading record or
minimum market capitalization, or (c) any prior shareholder approval for
acquisitions (except reverse takeovers). Legal theory underlying the idea of
adapting financial regulation to local conditions is discussed in Pistor and Xu
(2002).
34. Considering that, by smaller companies, the U.S. committee means those with
a market capitalization of less than US$787 million, it is clear that these con-
siderations are relevant for virtually all African enterprises. 
35. Even minimal transparency requirements can frighten off potential listers.
Moss (2003) suggests that this was one reason Ghana Telecom was not listed
in the late 1990s after the sale of a strategic stake to Telekom Malaysia. Trans-
parency to the market also implies transparency to others, including govern-
ment. Moss also argues that owners of firms often have reason to be reluctant
to make this commitment. 
36. Akuffo (2006) provides an interesting account illustrating the difficulty of
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needs. He describes the gradual mutation of an intermediary that was originally
intended as the basis of a sustainable housing finance system in Ghana, with
innovative product design, into a commercial bank initiating fewer than 100
mortgages a year and keeping just 30 percent of its assets in mortgage loans.
37. Africa’s experience with private participation in infrastructure is well reviewed
in Nellis (2005).
38. PPPs in infrastructure trigger further financing alternatives. A well-designed
PPP embodies the idea that each party should bear the risks that it is equipped
to manage at least cost. For example, the private sector could bear construc-
tion, commercial, and financial risks, while the public sector bears political,
regulatory, and legal risks. Demand risk is frequently shared because it is influ-
enced both by regulatory policies and by market conditions. However, experi-
ence with PPPs in Africa has shown that the actual transfer of risks to the
private party is often limited while private sector returns are high, suggesting
a limited capacity of governments to negotiate such transactions effectively. If
the benefit of a PPP is to exceed its cost (by comparison with public provision),
attention needs to be paid in particular to avoiding large contingent liabilities
through, for example, guarantees.
39. Investor confidence could be strengthened by an enhanced approach to the
planning of public investment spending, including (a) a rigorous and transpar-
ent approach to macroeconomic tradeoffs between social expenditure and
capital investment in infrastructure; (b) systematic economic and financial
cost-benefit analysis as a basis for project selection and prioritization for invest-
ment; (c) targeting of areas that cannot be financed by the private sector; (d)
institutional structures and capacity to analyze, structure, and negotiate
options for private participation; and (e) a transparent and fiscally prudent
approach to potential government support in PPPs, such as direct subsidies or
guarantees. In addition, further progress in regulatory reforms is required to
reduce regulatory risk and move toward long-term financial sustainability of
infrastructure sectors.
40. There have been suggestions that, in order to boost market development,
international financial institutions or other donors might (a) step in to provide
complementary funding, such as project equity or subordinated debt finance,
where private markets fail and (b) provide partial guarantees to the providers
of infrastructure finance against, for example, regulatory risk. Once again, it
requires a balancing act to ensure that such interventions actually support
market development rather than create a dependency.
41. Or they could help economies absorb sharply increasing revenues from natu-
ral resources, as has recently been occurring in Angola, Chad, the Republic of
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, and Nigeria.
42. Evidently this applies even to those external holdings that arise because of the
need to hold cash collateral against import shipments.
43. Other export credit insurance agencies have broadly similar ratings. The same
agency’s commercial risk index, running from 0 to 2, places the average
African country at 1.83, compared with 1.18 for the rest of the world.FINANCE FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH 137
44. There have been numerous proposals for currency unions in Africa besides
those currently in operation in the CFA franc zone (Fielding 2006) and in the
CMA of southern Africa. Indeed, as far back as 1963, a common currency for
the whole of Africa was an objective of the Organization of African Unity, and
it remains a long-term goal of the African Union. Probably the most active cur-
rent proposals are for the East African Community (EAC), which consists of
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, with the likely future membership of Burundi
and Rwanda), which aims for monetary union as early as 2010, and the West
African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), which consists of Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, with the future planned membership of Liberia. The
EAC aims for monetary union as early as 2010, and the WAMZ now aims for
monetary union by December 2009. Later, there might be a merger of the
UEMOA and WAMZ currencies to achieve the longstanding objective (since
1975) of an ECOWAS monetary union. Although the institutional arrange-
ments for a monetary union could act as an agency of restraint (Stasavage
2000), this can be undermined by fiscal pressures and, as Masson and Pattillo
(2005) have argued, divergent policy interests between prospective members
could make joining costly for many. The potential gains in intraunion trade are
not likely to be large. The EU experience has underlined just how much can
be achieved in terms of financial integration without a monetary union, while
showing that a single currency can contribute to financial efficiencies (Hono-
han and Lane 2001). 
45. Although the Bank of Africa has joined Senegal’s Sonatel as a non-Ivorian
equity issuer, the bond market has a wider country representation. In addition
to the West African Development Bank and the governments of Burkina Faso,
Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal, bonds are listed from state-owned utilities in Benin
and Senegal and from other issuers from Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and
Mali.
46. The fact of a common currency gives the BRVM bond market a huge advan-
tage relative to other regional projects covering multicurrency country groups.
Only if the bonds are denominated in the same currency can there be any
question of a common yield curve.
47. The electronic links between the Namibia and Johannesburg exchanges are an
illustration. Indeed, the Johannesburg stock exchange has been encouraging a
wider use of its technology—though so far others have been cautious about
ceding leadership to Johannesburg.Introduction: Access to Formal Financial Services
Fewer than 20 percent of African adults have an account with a formal or
semiformal financial intermediary. However one may wish to measure it,
finance for all is still a rather distant goal. This is as true for the savings and
payment systems as it is for credit and lending. This chapter examines
what steps need to be taken to increase this share—because it must
increase if small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) and the poor are to
benefit from modern financial technology.
An increased emphasis on the formal sector over the informal sector
To be sure, many more Africans have recourse to informal finance for both
household and enterprise needs. It is not to diminish the importance of
these networks to confine the present discussion to the formal financial
sector. The existence of an extensive population of informal financial enti-
ties represents an important background for formal intermediaries. In par-
ticular, it should not be thought that microfinance institutions (MFIs) as
we know them today provide a perfect substitute for the services gener-
ated by informal and traditional financial arrangements in much of Africa.
However, as African economies modernize and grow, the formal financial
sector will increase its relative and absolute importance in serving African
households and firms (box 4.1). Access to formal financial services is an
CHAPTER 4
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BOX 4.1
Ignoring Informal Finance?
Africa enjoys a vibrant informal finance sector, ranging from shaky susu
collectors in the marketplaces of Monrovia, to sizable rotating savings
and credit schemes in Nairobi, which embody complex but effective in-
centive designs that have intrigued economic theorists, to njangi (ton-
tines) in Yaoundé patronized by the upper-middle classes and processing
sizable sums. The vigor of informal systems of intermediation in Africa is
documented by numerous studies (Anderson and Baland 2002; Aryeetey
and others 1997a, 1997b). When all types, formal and informal, are taken
into consideration, perhaps 80 percent of the population has dealings
with some form of financial intermediary, even if it is just a money collec-
tor or suitcase banker. In addition, as is the case worldwide, friends, rela-
tions, and business contacts provide important elements of financial sup-
port to SMEs.
Some scholars have assigned a deeper role to informal finance in African
societies, discussing, for example, the distinctive role of ROSCAs in medi-
ating interpersonal relationships—a function that has little resemblance to
the performance of the formal financial system (Rowlands 1995). Udry
(2000) provides some reflections on the wider role of social networks in un-
derstanding African economic activity.
That this book does not focus much on informal finance does not imply that
it is unimportant or, indeed, that it will not survive the modernization
process of which we speak. To be sure, the MFI revolution has, to a degree,
built on the experience of these informal structures, and at the bottom end,
some of the smallest licensed MFIs have little to distinguish them from in-
formal arrangements. 
At the smallest scale, formal and informal intermediaries will continue to
function side by side for the foreseeable future—though the formal ones
will tend to pull ahead. But the real effectiveness of formal finance lies in its
ability to provide a wider range of services at a larger scale and offer a pool-
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area in which considerable progress can be envisaged in the years ahead.
New technology, in terms of both financial engineering and information
and communications technology (ICT), can be brought to bear on the
problem. Some of the financial technologies discussed are not really new,
even in Africa, but have not been applied as extensively as they could be. 
Microfinance can service the financial needs of the poor—
The microfinance revolution has given MFIs the confidence to provide
deposit and lending services to poor people. Different MFIs use different
methodologies, and each claims special advantages for its techniques.
Regardless, it is clear that, given the will and management skills, this sec-
tor can reach out to the low-income strata of the population in much of
Africa—sometimes even without any subsidy, although the high interest
rates that are often involved (even when far below moneylender rates)
can limit borrowing to the most high-yielding uses of capital.1 Here the
challenge is to achieve scale and reach remote areas without losing man-
agement control of costs2 and of loan appraisal quality. 
—And also of SMEs
But this chapter addresses not only the needs of the very poor. With such
huge swathes of the economy excluded in practice from access to financial
services, attention needs to be paid to what may be described as the mid-
dle market. Small or even medium-size firms with credit needs of several
thousand U.S. dollars may, given the state of many African economies, be
on the margins of informality. They are not in a position to maintain proper
business accounts. They are poorly catered to by banks, whose procedures
presume a greater degree of formality. Farmers above the subsistence level
are often in the same situation. 
Good management is more important than organizational model
Who will deliver these enhanced services to these market segments? A
proliferation of formal and semiformal intermediaries3—more than a
thousand across Africa—is currently engaged in microfinance of one form
or another. They vary enormously in scale, sophistication, and organiza-
tional design. 
Advocates of mutuality sometimes argue that cooperatives should take
the lead in delivering finance for all. This view has been implicit in the leg-
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Africaine (UEMOA) countries of West Africa. Others argue that the
economies of scale and scope of multiservice banks will ultimately give
them an unbeatable cost advantage in catering to the majority. The fact
that intermediaries representing a wide variety of organizational models
have been successful in Africa argues against any dogmatic view either
way on this point. At present, diversity and experimentation in organiza-
tional structure and business strategies seem to offer the best prospect for
broader outreach. What are needed above all are improved management
and cost control, as well as a greater awareness of the business opportuni-
ties by commercial financiers, who have hitherto neglected the “bottom of
the pyramid.”
The broader financial policy environment also needs to be conducive to
the expansion of microfinance. Ensuring sufficient competition to spur
intermediaries into finding ways of safely serving a wider clientele—as
well as ensuring that unnecessary regulations do not prevent such
efforts—is a key requirement. Among the most important regulatory issues
in this context are those relating to interest ceilings. Abuses of predatory
lending are better tackled through policies of transparency and codes of
practice with regard to lending procedures. South Africa has been a leader
in the development and enforcement of such policies. At the same time,
lenders cannot be complacent about costs that prevent them from reach-
ing a wider market through lower interest rates. In addition, the higher the
interest rates are, the greater the threat of a political backlash that would
impose damagingly low ceilings. 
In this chapter, all of the quartet of distinctive African environmental
factors—scale, informality, governance, and shocks—are in evidence.
Many of the microfinance innovations that have been seen worldwide and
have been applied in Africa are specifically adapted to dealing with issues
of scale and informality and also have application to certain governance
issues. So far as shocks are concerned, though, microeconomic or idiosyn-
cratic risk, rather than systemic risk, is most relevant for this chapter; par-
adoxically, microfinance may be more robust in the face of national
systemic risk than in the face of local shocks. 
In all cases, the key to ensuring access for smallholders and the poor is
the use of innovative financial engineering and modern technology, com-
bined with ruthless attention to low cost. Although some of this effort can
be profitable, it is likely for the foreseeable future that at least some of the
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activists whose job satisfaction comes from the social value of what they
are achieving, rather than assurance that they are earning their opportu-
nity wage in the global financial market. The modernist model alone will
not be enough.
Technology and Financial Engineering
Many of the products conventionally offered by banks and even by MFIs
in Africa are ill adapted to poor customers’ needs. Sometimes the mis-
match is painfully obvious, and the solution straightforward. Inflexible
regular savings schedules are inappropriate for poor households with
volatile cash flows. The same is true of overly flexible transactions accounts
that allow costly overdrafts to be triggered inadvertently. Likewise, loan
repayment schedules that do not take account of crop cycles are a poor
match for smallholder farmers. Although many African intermediaries
have developed a product mix that recognizes these problems, too many
others have not. It must be stressed that, as much as one must look to
novel solutions using the potential of innovative modern technology, long-
established and proven financial technologies that can greatly improve
financial access for poor people are often not yet in place in Africa. Cor-
recting this situation will require training and outreach. By moving beyond
what is generally established, modern technology offers some possibilities
for leapfrogging some of the obstacles placed by slow-adjusting infrastruc-
tures and other African environmental challenges (Ivaturi 2006). 
What kinds of innovations might work well for Africa? Evidently they
need to be able to cope with some of the barriers that have been discussed;
in addition, they need to have low unit costs. Innovations whose major
cost relates to their initial development and other fixed costs, with very
low marginal costs per transaction or per new customer engaged, offer
important prospects for expanding access to financial services at the bot-
tom of the pyramid.
Some examples already exist in Africa and elsewhere of the use of elec-
tronic or financial technologies to meet specific financial access problems.
These examples show the potential and the limitations of solutions devel-
oped so far. They share some common features: the electronic accumula-
tion, processing, and dissemination of information; the use of cell-phone
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problems; and risk pooling through the use of observable correlates for
individual risk. Each of these features is associated with relatively low mar-
ginal unit costs; however, their setup costs are often considerable. 
Credit Innovations
Although many practitioners have rightly reminded us of the importance
of other dimensions of financial service access, policy discussions inevitably
return to credit. Improvements in the credit environment can be expected
from the range of meso-level policy innovations flagged in chapter 3.
Improving the stock and usability of collateral is a clear priority. Some steps
in this direction, including the improvement of laws governing leasing,
hire-purchase, and factoring, can achieve much even without very effec-
tive judicial performance or wider governance improvements. Building
effective title registries—adapted to local conditions and local concepts of
user rights (Fleisig and de la Peña 2003)—helps the process of making col-
lateralized borrowing available. Indeed, if borrowing is collateralized by
exportable commodities or if the borrower has a subsupply contract from,
say, a multinational mining corporation, credit can be easy to obtain in
Africa. But what if neither believable numbers nor good collateral (direct
or indirect) are present? What then can the would-be lender do to help
appraise creditworthiness? What else is possible, other than to use
collateral?
The first subsection here looks at four techniques that seek to do answer
these questions.4 These are clearly part of the modernist agenda. The sec-
ond subsection asks what is possible when reliance on an individual cred-
itworthiness appraisal cannot be avoided, as is the case with much SME
credit.
Techniques for reducing credit risk
In this subsection, we review four credit problems or financing gaps (rang-
ing from agricultural inputs to construction of low-income housing) that
have found solutions in parts of Africa. A key question here is whether the
modernist agenda does it all: increasing reliance on automated credit
approval systems based on verifiable information including accurate, inex-
pensive, and comprehensive credit registries; speedy enforcement of unbi-
ased court judgments; and so forth. Or is there also a necessary and
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Experiences from African farm finance suggest that both dimensions
may be necessary.5 Take the examples of contract farming and warehouse
receipts finance. Both credit technologies are as old as finance itself, and
both seek to resolve issues that are of considerable practical relevance.
Expanding both has been high on many agencies’ agendas for strengthen-
ing farm finance in Africa for several years (Kloeppinger-Todd 2005). Con-
tract farming fits with the modernist agenda, with its credit aspects
requiring no more than the basic legal infrastructures combined with pri-
vate efforts. Indeed, specific legislation may not be required, as has been
seen in Uganda. By contrast, warehouse receipts financing for small farm-
ers does not get established without active specific intervention by a
sponsor—though sometimes a private bank will find it advantageous to fill
that role.
Credit associated with contract farming. In regions where export commodities
are farmed on a smallholder basis, underuse of fertilizers is a well-known
and longstanding problem to which solutions have been sought for gener-
ations. Cash credit for fertilizers (or other inputs) for smallholders is
unavailable in eastern and central Africa. But wholesalers, exporters, and
processors want to secure a reliable supply of the commodities to ensure
that they can operate their facilities profitably. Over the years, in most
African countries, private merchants have become the dominant suppliers
of fertilizer on credit, as part of a contract farming arrangement, with the
credit to be repaid out of the proceeds of the harvest (which are to be sold
to the creditor).6 The benefit to the farmer is increased productivity; the
potential downside is the possibly high cost of credit concealed in a low
product price offered at harvest. The benefit of the arrangement for the
merchant is the prospect of a good supply of product; the risk is that the
smallholder might sell the crop on the side to another merchant and
default on the loan.7
In practice, the arrangement often works well, when times are good. An
International Fund for Agricultural Development study (Ruotsi 2003)
found that, in the three countries studied, only the cotton supply chain in
Mozambique exhibited evidence of market-power abuse by the lender.
The lender had been granted a monopoly on cotton purchase in this case
as a way of reducing the problem of side sales. One innovative way of lim-
iting the risk of opportunist side sales is for the loan to be made to a coop-
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arrangement from year to year is likely more stable than that of any one of
their members, and collectively they can exploit small-group dynamics to
keep members in line—though this approach has not always worked out
well in practice. But reflecting further on this supply-chain credit arrange-
ment reveals that it is rather limited in terms of the range of financial serv-
ices offered to the farmer, as noted by Pearce (2003). Besides, the amounts
of credit are rather small. About half a million smallholders in Kenya use
such an arrangement for tea, but the average loan is only about US$30—a
sum whose main value may be as a catalyst encouraging a more compre-
hensive shift to higher-value crops and methods of production. 
Farmers seeking to take advantage of predictable seasonal price fluctuations. An
alternative to the contract farming model has the farmer, or farmers’ coop-
erative, financing inputs independently of the supply chain and selling the
product directly onto the market. In this case, however, the farmer may be
at the mercy of price fluctuations around the time of the harvest, unless
credit is available to allow the timing of the sale to be optimized. Ware-
house receipt finance—a technique that has been known for millennia but
is still insufficiently used in Africa, despite numerous successful
examples—can form the basis of a solution to this problem. By storing
grain of verified quality in an approved independent warehouse, the
farmer can offer considerably greater security to the lender. 
But getting this kind of arrangement up and running for small farmers
is not automatic. Because of scale issues, no group of small farmers will be
able to do it on its own. Participation by large as well as small farmers will
be essential to reach a viable scale. Then the warehouse operator also
needs to establish creditworthiness—perhaps by being part of a warehouse
network operating with peer review as a self-regulatory organization. The
contract needs to be drawn up in a way that ensures that the banker really
does have the semiautomatic security (grain is not released unless the loan
is repaid; grain passes to ownership of the bank in case of delinquency)
that the approach envisages. Experiences in Ghana and Zambia, for exam-
ple, have shown how these issues—especially that of scale—have been
decisive in making the difference between warehouse finance schemes
that are viable and work well for small farmers and those that are not
viable (Onumah 2003). Here, then, although the financial technology is
very old, a degree of activism is still required by some sponsor who can
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Two more examples, showing the effectiveness and the limitations of
the modernist approach, come not from rural finance but from the cities:
from the world of the salaried worker, a part of African society that is
growing and will likely become much more important in the future, and
from housing finance for low-income households. In one case, banks rely
on the formality of their dealings with the employer to generate a surro-
gate for collateral; in the other case, a misguided modernist attempt to
ensure housing quality backfired on what could have been a useful dimen-
sion to microcredit.
Salary loans. Low- and middle-income families with secure income often
cannot capitalize their future earnings. Salary loans (another technique
that has a long history but whose use has exploded in several African
countries) can represent one limited but useful component of the solution
to this problem. Technology is at work here too, in that electronic payroll
administration makes this solution available and cost-effective for the
credit provider. The bank—often one of the large international banks,
which entered this market drawing on rapidly growing and profitable
experience in South Africa—arranges for the loan to be repaid as a first
claim on the salary check. These schemes are popular with employees and
therefore with their employers. The loans can be put to multiple uses.
They can help finance housing improvements and other consumer needs.
In addition, it is said that they have also been used to provide seed capital
for income-generating activities by other household members (with the
primary borrower—the salaried member of the family—effectively acting
as the guarantor of the actual beneficiary of the loan). In this way, at least
some of the urban salary loans can find their way to funding small business
income-generating investments even in rural areas, for example. 
There are drawbacks. The bank has a quasi-monopoly position relative
to the workers in each establishment. This situation may be contributing to
what appear to be exceptionally high interest rates on such loans in some
countries—perhaps resulting in supernormal profits, though this supposi-
tion awaits a thorough analysis. Regardless of whether the rates could be
lower, the demand is high, and borrowers seem glad of the opportunity.
Progressive housing microloans. Classical mortgage finance is out of reach of
the poor in most African countries. For one thing, they generally do not
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regular income that a classic mortgage lender would like to see before
extending a multiyear loan for a sum sufficient to build even a small house.
But without credit, the poor may have to wait for several years of saving
before they can make even modest improvements. Instead of reliance on a
one-time loan, a progressive financing strategy is the preferred solution
being explored by many microlenders wishing to use credit to improve
housing for the poor. Progressive financing is, of course, how homes get
built in the absence of any credit. The addition of credit allows a more sub-
stantial home to be built more quickly. Familiar characteristics of modern
microcredit are employed. The first loan may be small and for a short term,
but progressively larger and longer loans are made as the creditworthiness
of the borrower is established more reliably. The main difference from a
conventional microloan is that the term can go out to three or even four
years. Break-even lending interest rates can also be lower, reflecting the
fact that recovery of loan-processing costs is spread over the longer term. 
As often is the case with microcredit, reliance is not placed on collateral;
instead, such loans are typically offered only to those who have already
established a credit history with the lender. Even if the borrower does not
have formal title, as long as he or she has a de facto security of tenure the
loan will not go to waste. As with housing finance at a higher level of
income, success also hinges on a number of complementary actors, includ-
ing local authorities, on whom the provision of basic infrastructure serv-
ices such as water, electricity, and roads likely devolve. A 2002 study in
Kenya found that building codes drawn up on the assumption that each
housing unit would be built all in one go had the effect of making progres-
sive construction illegal. Thus, a well-intentioned regulation, designed to
protect the purchaser from incompetent or unscrupulous developers, had
the unintended side effect of inhibiting improvements to the shelter of the
poor, because it failed to recognize the impossibility for many to finance
all-at-once construction (Brown and others 2002).
Relationship lending to small enterprises: How it can be done in Africa
The four examples in the previous subsection refer to techniques that, one
way or another, economize on the need to make a costly customized cred-
itworthiness assessment or to carry out borrower monitoring and follow-
up (in several cases by tying the loan to an associated real transaction). An
alternative approach—perhaps underused today by formal intermediaries
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By limiting themselves to financing the large and collateralized borrow-
ers, could banks be missing out on a lucrative market?8 Admittedly, the
profitability in Africa of relationship banking with SME borrowers (as dis-
tinct from microlending) is uncertain. Hence, it may be that this type of
lending should be seen as part of the activist agenda, likely to be sponsored
by donors or in the public interest, rather than with a view solely to the
financial bottom line.9
Observation of the conduct of intrafirm credit business in Africa throws
light on some aspects of the environment that need to be taken into account
if formal finance is to deepen its engagement with the middle market. After
all, intrafirm credit represents a large share of firm financing. Thanks to a
thorough analysis of a set of enterprise surveys in seven African countries
(Biggs and Srivastava 1996; Bigsten and others 1999, 2003; Fafchamps
2004), we know quite a lot about this market (see appendix).10 Thus, lenders
in the African middle market use a multidimensional evaluation of credit-
worthiness in making the loan or credit sale, looking at the borrower’s capac-
ity, business links, reputation, and character, and using soft or qualitative
information where hard data are not available. This approach can be seen as
not too far from the recommendations of banking textbooks, but gathering
information is especially time consuming and costly and presupposes that
the lender is embedded in the local economy. Intrafirm relationship lending
in Africa also uses a flexible enforcement strategy, embodying the concept of
the excusable default, with the borrower not being pursued for repayment
unless and until he or she has the capacity to repay (Fafchamps 2004).11,12
Can the modern African bank find better ways of acquiring more of this
kind of information about their middle-market SME customers? Those
that do can look forward not only to profitable lending, but also to having
made a major contribution to the societies in which they operate. It is evi-
dent that the public authorities should be extra careful not to stifle such
efforts by, for example, adopting regulations that insist on exaggerated lev-
els of collateral or on preapproval of most clients by the central bank or
banking regulator (as discussed in chapter 3). 
Information, Insurance, and Risk Management Innovations
Although many types of financial product can help reduce or hedge risks,13
formal insurance schemes or other specific hedges go further than credit or
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the risk—over many other agents, including those who are more able to
bear it.14 Reducing the net effect of these risks can help increase average
consumption over time as well as reduce its variance. But information prob-
lems of moral hazard and adverse selection, as well as administrative costs,
hamper the viability of formal insurance products for poor households.15
The management of risk in rain-fed agriculture, on which a large major-
ity of Africans depend in one way or another, has proved particularly chal-
lenging.16 Not only is it inherently risky, but the classic approaches of risk
mitigation and insurance are both difficult to implement. Farmers use
multiple approaches to risk management, including loss mitigation tech-
niques (for example, intercropping, production mix, pest and disease con-
trol, water management) and reliance on savings. Agricultural insurance
tends to be more effective in protecting farmers against infrequent and
extreme losses, whereas loss mitigation techniques are more effective
against frequent and small losses. 
In addition to increasing farmer welfare directly, risk management
instruments can facilitate access to agricultural credit at better terms as
they increase the creditworthiness of farmers and other agents of the agri-
cultural sector. To the extent that farm-level risk management instruments
contribute to the overall financial stability of the agribusiness sector, indi-
rect benefits in terms of credit availability may be realized at other levels of
the agribusiness marketing chain. In principle, the first requirement for
risk management is information: identifying, measuring, and tracking17
the risky conditions facing the insured person. This information is often
hard to obtain: those who know it will not care to tell. 
The overall experience of government-sponsored all-perils crop insur-
ance has been financially disappointing almost everywhere, with claims
and administrative costs constantly exceeding premiums. This situation
reflects consistent underestimation of the catastrophic risks involved in
agriculture, as well as uncontrolled moral hazard and adverse selection.
Furthermore, it has not been popular with small farmers, with most of the
uptake coming from (and subsidy going to) large farmers.
A new wave of initiatives being piloted in Africa using recent technolog-
ical and conceptual innovations seeks to design insurance around risks
that are important to farmers while remaining relatively easy to evaluate
and verify and having limited moral hazard. Initial experience with
weather insurance in Malawi is promising (box 4.2), though it remains to
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pilot initiative promoted by CRDB Bank in Tanzania seeks to provide price-
risk insurance to farmer and processor cooperatives (box 4.3). One lesson
is that mainstream banks or other experienced intermediaries are needed
to provide the link with global financial markets for reinsuring the tail or
catastrophic end of the risks. From the users’ point of view, a crucial—and
sometimes decisive—deficiency of many such schemes is the scale of basis
risk—for example, the lack of perfect correlation between the rainfall
observed at the weather station and that experienced by the insured
farmer (Binswanger and van den Brink 2005).
Deposit and Payments Innovations
Although somewhat overshadowed by a popular focus on microcredit, all
who closely study the coping behaviors of poor people at first hand can see
that the poor need simple and reliable savings and payments mechanisms
before they need loans. Income receipts and spending needs do not gener-
ally coincide; household income that cannot be reliably saved at low cost
may be dissipated; and the accumulation of sufficient funds to buy in bulk,
or to buy durables or high-value items, largely depends on savings.18 Trans-
mitting money to family members in remote parts of the country and
receiving remittances from family members abroad are also key financial
needs for most households. 
The challenge for financial service providers is hardly related to credit-
worthiness at all.19 Instead, the main challenge is to drive down unit trans-
actions costs sufficiently. That is not easy in many parts of Africa, given the
remoteness of bank offices and the tiny individual sums involved in the
transactions of poor households.
Some mainstream financial intermediaries have not been interested in
this market. The astronomically high minimum balances and high mini-
mum transaction charges some banks insist on are clearly intended to dis-
courage a mass market for which the bank finds no place in its business
model.20 But the use of innovative product design and modern technology
has allowed other intermediaries to find ways of making this kind of busi-
ness pay. As these innovators scale up, the larger players begin to reassess
whether they could also share in the newly discovered profitability.
Several examples illustrate how financial innovations or communica-
tions technology can work in Africa to solve the problems of remoteness
and small scale. The increasing demand for low-cost and convenient prod-152 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
BOX 4.2
Pilot Weather-Based Insurance in Malawi
Most agriculture in Malawi is rain fed. Malawi also suffers from the cumu-
lative effects of repeated droughts, land degradation, and—in some areas—
flooding. Repeated droughts force rural households to deplete assets and
engage in negative coping strategies; in addition, they create a continual
state of food insecurity for the most vulnerable households. In addition to
the ex post impacts of drought, the risk of a drought event also has signifi-
cant impacts on the growth of the agricultural sector by slowing on-farm in-
vestment and participation in higher-risk, higher-return productive activities.
Drought risk further stifles investment by farmers in higher-value crops be-
cause households cannot access credit to purchase such inputs as seed
and fertilizer. Banks carry the same risks as their agricultural clients, so they
hesitate to invest in agriculture because of potential default during a weath-
er event or losses of revenue associated with low prices. 
Traditional insurance has been tried on a small scale in Malawi in recent
years, when a number of Malawian insurance companies introduced a mul-
tiperil crop insurance product. But after suffering considerable losses
caused by moral hazard and high administrative costs in the first year of
business, the insurance companies chose to get out of the business. After
that experience, Malawian insurers were apprehensive about getting in-
volved in offering agricultural insurance, but they were also interested to
see how an alternative to the traditional multiperil policy would work. 
The National Association of Small Farmers (NASFAM) is working with farm-
ers to develop marketing channels for value added goods and encouraging
its member farmers, who are organized into in clubs of 15 to 20, to become
more invested in higher-return activities. NASFAM has attributed the low
productivity of Malawian farmers to a lack of both access to credit and qual-
ity inputs; in the first year, it chose groundnut as a pilot crop because of its
resistance to drought and its growth potential in Malawi.
Groundnut farmers had little access to the credit needed to purchase
groundnut seed and traditionally relied on local seed, if any, for production.
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groundnut seed in order to improve revenues. Certified seed, while more
costly, has a number of benefits over local seed, such as a higher resist-
ance to such diseases as fungal infections, which can destroy a crop. In ad-
dition, certified seed can be marketed as a named variety of groundnut
seed rather then as a generic version. 
The groundnut growing cycle has three distinct phases: establishment and
vegetative growth, flowering and pod formation, and pod filling and maturi-
ty. Agronomic research data for each district, as well as farmers’ experi-
ence, allow determination of the cumulative rainfall required in each growth
phase to achieve a partial crop and avoid water stress. These rainfall trigger
points have been made the basis of the insurance contract. 
Because these weather contracts could mitigate the weather risk associat-
ed with lending to farmers, two banks, Opportunity International Bank of
Malawi (OIBM) and Malawi Rural Finance Corporation (MRFC), agreed to
lend farmers the money necessary to purchase certified seed if the farm-
ers bought weather insurance. As of March 2006, 892 of NASFAM’s farm-
ers borrowed an average of about US$40 each to pay for the seed, includ-
ing about US$3 each for insurance. The loan agreements stipulate that the
bank will be the first beneficiary if there is a payout from the insurance. In
addition, NASFAM, which will purchase the majority of the groundnut pro-
duction from the participating farmers, has agreed to pay the first proceeds
from the sale of the produce to the bank. If there is no drought, the farm-
ers will benefit from selling the higher-value production. The participating
farmers received information and training on the project jointly from NAS-
FAM, OIBM, and MRFC, to make sure that they fully understood the costs
and benefits before contracting for the product. 
One issue that arose early during the pilot season was poor germination
rates for the seeds. These rates were attributed to the poor quality and rot-
ten seed purchased from the seed provider, not to deficit rainfall. This issue
highlighted the fact that weather insurance is a limited protection against
yield risk for banks. Once the problem was recognized, NASFAM worked
with the seed provider to distribute additional seed to those farmers whose
germinations rates were low. Despite this issue, both lenders and the oth-
er participants in the pilot—farmers, NASFAM, the insurance association—
were reportedly eager to scale up the program in future years.154 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
ucts proves that a client base exists for deposits and payments products.
That demand has pushed providers to come up with innovative ways of
reaching out to these untapped markets. They have combined technology
and financial innovation to lower unit costs and to reach the poor in
sparsely populated areas (Cracknell 2004; Global Development Research
Center 2003; Truen and others 2005). 
BOX 4.3
Price Risk Insurance in Tanzania
Because marketing practices require them to set prices for farmers early
on in the season, intermediaries such as cooperatives and processors in
the coffee and cotton sectors of Tanzania are exposed to substantial price
risk for six to eight months, during the time that these export commodities
are being harvested, purchased, processed, and sold. Intermediary organi-
zations that do not understand or manage this exposure have suffered
large-scale trading losses, which resulted in their inability to meet debt
obligations.
Local banks that lend to these organizations recognize that these financial
exposures are very high. So far, the banks’ response to this risk has been
to manage it by charging high interest rates (12–14 percent) or curtailing
lending when world market prices are moving in adverse directions (Bryla
and others 2003). Recently, however, CRDB Bank in Tanzania initiated a
new program to improve risk management for the bank and for borrowing
clients by offering to intermediate hedging transactions using New York
Board of Trade futures and options contracts. CRDB Bank has a strong in-
centive to actively implement improved risk management practices, be-
cause the bank understands well the risks that borrowers are carrying—
sometimes better than the borrowers themselves. And unlike the
cooperatives, a local bank can be an attractive client for the multinational
banks and brokerage houses that offer hedging products. The local Tanzan-
ian bank can then offer its borrowers customized risk management con-
tracts that help manage the intraseasonal price exposure and reduce the
risk of trading losses for cooperatives and ginners. Ultimately, improved
risk management practices at this level will improve the financial strength
of the sector as a whole and reduce the risk of vulnerability to commodity
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Mobile banking reinvented
For a variety of reasons, Kenya’s Equity Bank receives deserved promi-
nence among those interested in outreach to the poor. One reason is its
practical reintroduction of a relatively simple technology brought up to
date: the mobile banking unit. The bank is doubling its number of vans
and expects to have 100 in operation by the end of 2006. Each van is
equipped with laptops that have telecommunications links to a fixed
branch, allowing the van to provide a wide range of banking services.21
One mobile unit visits each location once a week at a preset time. Already
by mid-2003, two-thirds of loans outstanding were to clients served
through mobile banking units (Wright 2005). 
Equity Bank has also been creative in terms of providing savings prod-
ucts to respond to the needs of lower-income groups with small savings, as
is reflected in its sizable excess of savings mobilized over loans extended (a
relatively unusual feature among MFIs). Among its products is a contrac-
tual savings product called jijenge, designed to provide a disciplined savings
mechanism that allows clients to save for predictable life events, with an
emergency loan facility that allows the saver quick access to an emergency
loan for up to 90 percent of the value of the amount in the savings account.
The product design also gives the client the flexibility to set up a cus-
tomized savings plan whereby he or she determines the length of the con-
tract and the frequency of payments. 
Smart cards
Teba Bank of South Africa has long been an innovator in saving and pay-
ments mechanisms, beginning with its handling of wage payments for
migrant workers in the South African mines.22 Its Bank A-Card project is
intended to use the existing cell-phone network to provide low-cost,
entry-level, electronic banking services to low-income and underserved
communities in poor and urban areas of South Africa. The user purchases
a stored-value card, which can subsequently be topped up. The stored
value can be used to pay for goods and services electronically. When a pur-
chase is made, the amount is automatically deducted from the stored value
and transferred to the merchant. The Bank A-Card has the functionality of
a smart card and can be accepted at all point of sale (PoS) outlets that cur-
rently accept ordinary debit cards (DFID and FDCF 2004). This approach
substitutes cellular technology for much more expensive fixed lines, using
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quented by low-income clients. Simple magnetic-stripe debit cards allow
for registration of accounts and purchases, cash-back functions, transfers
to other accounts, recharges of call time, and third-party payments.
A more sophisticated use of smart cards is exemplified in the Remote
Transaction System (RTS) being piloted by three microfinance institutions
in Uganda. The RTS also uses a robust ICT solution to reach a greater per-
centage of the population in rural areas.23 The RTS allows processing of
loan payments, savings deposits, withdrawals, and transfers. At the front
end, the technology solution comprises a PoS device equipped with a smart
card reader, a printer for generating receipts, and cellular networking capa-
bilities. Each client or client group uses a smart card and personal identifi-
cation number to authenticate and authorize transactions. At the back
end, the RTS includes a server that captures and retains all PoS transac-
tions and connects to each participating MFI’s management information
system and the accounting systems of all participating institutions (Kam
and Tran 2005). 
Following this pilot, the MFIs have been rethinking their business
processes in order to exploit the full potential of the RTS. Without such a
rethink, overlaying the new technology might merely add cost and com-
plexity. The technology has challenged the limits of local physical infra-
structure (erratic telephone connectivity, unreliable electricity sources)
and the literacy of customers. Furthermore, the pilot showed that the cost
associated with building the infrastructure to support this enabling tech-
nology would have been too high for the MFIs to incur on their own and
that only through shared infrastructures and common standards can the
costs of providing financial assistance to a dramatically larger client base
can be realized (Firpo 2005). However, the fixed costs having been
incurred, the consortium has released RTS as a solution available to devel-
opers without a license fee. Here again, we see the logic of both the mod-
ernist agenda—using the most advanced technologies available—and the
activist agenda, pro bono innovators incurring a fixed cost that can lead to
benefits for other smaller MFIs with limited resources and for their
customers.
Cell-phone banking
A growing number of African countries enjoy cell-phone banking, which
has considerable potential outreach given the rapid expansion of cell-
phone use—although it still may not reach the poorest. The value of cell-FINANCE FOR ALL 157
phone banking appears highest where the physical presence of well-
functioning banking institutions is weakest—as, for example, in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo. The payments system introduced by Celpay there
and in Zambia illustrates how such systems work.24 The product allows a
subscriber to use a cell phone to pay bills, an important innovation in a
country where few people have credit or debit cards and carrying cash can
be dangerous. To make a payment, the subscriber sends a text message
with the details to Celpay, which then returns a text message to the sub-
scriber’s cell phone asking for a personal identification number (PIN) to
confirm the transaction. Once that is done, Celpay transfers the money
between the participants’ bank accounts. 
The system already has 2,000 users in Zambia, each making several
transactions per month. The recipient typically pays Celpay between 1
and 2 percent of the value of the transaction in commission. PIN verifi-
cation ensures that the system is secure and that both payer and payee
receive confirmation of the transaction with a unique reference number;
full details of all transactions are available online. The product is simple
to use for anyone who knows how to send an SMS (short message serv-
ice) text message. A registered Celpay user must deposit money into a
Celpay account; spending by cell phone can then commence. The user’s
remaining balance can also be checked by cell phone (Wood and de
Cleene 2004).
Lessons from the innovations 
These examples illustrate the potential of mobile phones, satellite phones,
portable computers, and smart cards in overcoming remoteness and
processing-cost barriers to providing payments and making deposits (and
sometimes other financial services). They also illustrate a more client-
oriented approach to savings product design. If the financial intermediary
is focused on reaching the poor, it can easily overcome other barriers—
such as the reluctance of poor people to approach an intermediary for fear
of being treated with disrespect.
But experience has also shown the sizable setup costs. Piloting was
important in nearly all these cases in order to refine the model before
rolling it out to a wider clientele. The pilot phase involved interviews
with the clients and helped the providers understand clients’ needs and
preferences. Their views were reflected as much as possible in the prod-
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and training of staff to adapt the intermediaries’ working methods. The
up-front costs of these innovations and the risk that the scale of uptake
will be too low are among the barriers that have slowed progress here.
Though all these schemes have the air of modernity about them, they
also require a degree of activism by the pioneers in attempting the ini-
tial innovations—which may not have been remunerated quickly in
many cases.
A long-neglected area: International remittances
Despite considerable recent interest in international remittances gener-
ally and efforts to define best practices (Isern, Deshpande, and van Doorn
2005; CPSS and World Bank 2006), the study of international remittances
to Africa remains in its infancy (Pearce and Seymour 2005; Sander and
Maimbo 2003, 2004). The identified flow of remittances into Africa
(through formal channels) jumped from US$1.2 billion in 1994 to
US$4.3 billion in 2004 and may have reached US$8 billion in 2005. Three
countries—Nigeria, Sudan, and Uganda—account for three-fourths of
these measured flows (and the top 17 countries—including all with
US$10 million or more—account for more than 97 percent). Even this siz-
able sum is thought to greatly underestimate total flows—perhaps by about
half.25 As shown in table 4.1, several sizable countries regularly receive
inflows in excess of 5 percent of their GDP.26
Data are especially lacking on remittances between developing coun-
tries, which are relatively more prevalent in Africa than elsewhere: a siz-
able data collection effort is needed here (World Bank 2005). Indeed, the
dynamic and complex patterns of migration in Africa, which create the
need for remittances, are themselves not well understood. There has been
a feminization of migration, a diversification of migration destinations, a
transformation of labor flows into commercial migration, and brain drain
from the region. Completing this picture are trafficking in human beings,
the changing map of refugee flows, and the increasing role of regional eco-
nomic organizations in fostering free flows of labor (for a detailed discus-
sion, see Adepoju 2004). Untangling the policy implications for remittance
flows of these multifaceted migration characteristics is methodologically
challenging.
While the prominence of remittances on the continent continues to
grow, the outreach and quality of the financial sector infrastructure for
remittances largely remain weak. Compared with some of the technologi-FINANCE FOR ALL 159
cal solutions discussed above, remittances appear a poor relation but one
that could be transformed. The cost of remittances between industrial and
developing countries appears to be higher to Africa than to other regions
(Hernández-Coss, Egwuagu, and Josefsson 2006). To date, most formal
remittances use long-established, speedy, and reliable—but still rather
costly—services by money transfer operators (MTOs)27 such as Western
Union and its competitors.28
For too long, financial and monetary policies and regulations have cre-
ated barriers to the flow of remittances and their effective investment (box
4.4). Foreign exchange controls, bureaucratic account opening and cash
withdrawal procedures, and limited rural branch networks contribute to
an ongoing preference for informal methods of transferring funds. Wide
gaps between official and parallel market exchange rates have also encour-
aged the use of informal channels, as have other explicit or implicit taxes.
And for migrants forced to migrate illegally, informal methods are often
the only option. 
TABLE 4.1
Remittances: Top Sub-Saharan Recipients
Recipient country US$ million Percentage of GDPa Year of last observation
Lesotho 223.0 29.2 2004
Cape Verde 92.1 15.2 2003
Guinea-Bissau 21.3 6.8 2003
Uganda 306.1 5.8 2004
Sudan 1,401.2 5.7 2004
Senegal 448.2 5.4 2003
Togo 128.3 3.9 2003
Mali 138.9 3.5 2003
Benin 49.5 3.2 2003
Nigeria 2,272.7 2.6 2004
Burkina Faso 43.6 1.9 2001
São Tomé and Príncipe 0.6 1.2 2002
Sierra Leone 24.6 0.9 2004
Ghana 82.3 0.8 2004
Mozambique 2.5 0.6 2004
Ethiopia 133.4 0.5 2004
Niger 11.5 0.5 2003
Sources: World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, except for Lesotho, data from the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development database Handbook of Statistics 2005.
a. Average 2000–02 flows as percentage of 2001 GDP.160 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
BOX 4.4
Improving the Remittances Situation
Overall, Africa’s formal remittance infrastructure’s potential is not being
maximized. The region remains largely cash dominated. In particular, the
proportion of the rural poor who have access to formal banking services, let
alone formal payments systems, remains very low. An improved remit-
tance infrastructure on the continent would make advances in five areas
(CPSS and the World Bank 2006):
• Transparency and consumer protection
• Payment system infrastructure
• Legal and regulatory framework
• Market structure and competition
• Governance and risk management practices
The market for remittance services should be transparent and have ade-
quate consumer protection. Recently, the UK Department for International
Development and the Banking Code Standards Board commissioned a sur-
vey on money transfer products offered to members of the diaspora in the
United Kingdom in order to address this lack of information and transparen-
cy. A number of primary UK remittance destinations were chosen for the
survey, including Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria. Better information on money
transfer services should not only help remitters choose a service that best
meets their needs, but also promote healthy competition between money
transfer providers—competition that reduces the cost and improves the
service for remittance senders (Isern, Deshpande, and van Door 2005;
Pearce and Seymour 2005).
Improvements to payment system infrastructure that have the potential to
increase the efficiency of remittance services should be encouraged. The
choice of remittance method is determined by several factors, including
ease (methods with less paperwork and documentation requirements
were preferred); familiarity (often the remittance method used is the
method used by parents and grandparents or recommended by friends and
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structures, their perceptions of which methods were cheapest tended to
be accurate); speed (of particular importance when the remittance is in-
tended to meet an emergency need); risk tolerance (for theft or other loss-
es; participants claimed to become more risk averse as the size of the re-
mittance increased); and access (how easy it is for the recipient to reach
the delivery point). In South Africa, for example, sending by means of a taxi
driver is cheap, there are no forms to fill in, and the unbanked can access
this means easily. The method is used extensively for both domestic and
cross-border remittances and with equal likelihood by both blue- and white-
collar workers. Participants also believed that the post office had a much
better rural distribution network than the banks and was comparable to the
bank in terms of safety and speed (Truen and others 2005).
Remittance services should be supported by a sound, predictable, nondis-
criminatory, and proportionate legal and regulatory framework in relevant
jurisdictions. Current licensing regulations for money transfer services cen-
ter on foreign exchange trading. For smaller money transfer operators and
informal services, regulations often are opaque and hard to access; compli-
ance may be unaffordable. To be in a better position to review and enhance
the regulatory frameworks used in Africa, we must improve our under-
standing not only of African remittance markets, but also of the business
models that make nonbank transfer services attractive to client segments
elsewhere in the world and of how those models are licensed and regulat-
ed. A facilitative framework in which licensing requirements were adjusted
to reflect actual needs for transparency and for management of foreign ex-
change exposure could greatly enhance the availability and outreach of ba-
sic financial services, including money transfers.
Competitive market conditions, including appropriate access to domestic
payments infrastructures, should be fostered in the remittance industry.
For example, in the absence of a functioning banking system, money trans-
fer companies in Somalia have had an impressive history since the fall of
the government in 1991. The market functions very efficiently, providing
quick and inexpensive services to all parts of Somalia. The remittance flows
through these companies provide subsistence and essential services for
families in Somalia. They also facilitate international trade and domestic
commerce, even in the remote parts of the country, and finance domestic
investment in businesses, community services, construction, and real es-
tate. The principal challenge for government, once it is fully established, will 
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Organization: Who Needs to Do What?
From the examples provided, it is evident that some of the technology-
driven innovations that can help improve financial access in Africa can be
and are being spontaneously implemented by market intermediaries in
some countries. It is likely that more will come from private initiative in
the future (not least through the rollout of what has worked in one coun-
try, including through the activities of banks, MFIs, and others that are
active in more than one country). However, given the fragmentation of
national African markets and the small scale of the individual transaction
or relationship, the prospective rate of return on the necessary fixed-cost
investments in financial technology can seem too low to the private
entrepreneur—especially in the generally adverse climate for private
investment in Africa, as discussed in chapter 1. Furthermore, several of
them have collective action issues (the investment not being worth mak-
ing unless several intermediaries do it at the same time). The following dis-
cussion addresses the question of how this logjam can be broken, whether
BOX 4.4 (continued)
be to find a way to take full advantage of the dynamics of this part of the fi-
nancial system for the benefit of the Somali private sector while combating
the reputational risks of an unregulated industry. 
Remittance services should be supported by appropriate governance and
risk management practices. As is the case for the payments industry gen-
erally, the international remittance industry faces legal, financial, opera-
tional, fraud, and reputational risks. In establishing risk control measures,
remittance service providers should conduct risk-level assessments to en-
sure that proposed risk control measures are appropriate to the level of the
risks and the size of the business generally. Therefore, money transfer op-
erations need significant investment in skilled human capital (Isern, Desh-
pande, and van Doorn 2005). New operators need to train staff or hire spe-
cialized staff for customer relations and back-office functions. Information
systems must be capable of managing the volume of anticipated transfers,
ensuring transaction security, possibly interfacing with other transfer oper-
ators, and generating reports to comply with regulations (such as anti-
money-laundering legislation).FINANCE FOR ALL 163
by donors; by governments at local, national, or transnational levels; by
individual banks or associations of private financiers; or by associations of
users (as, for example, with mutual credit insurance).
A major theme running through this discussion is the need for adequate
governance, in particular where the activist agenda is in play. Activists are
not restrained by immediate market pressures; they have chosen to plow
money and effort into endeavors that the market has declined. To be even
reasonably confident that these efforts and resources will not be wasted or
subverted, the sponsoring agency must have good governance. It could be
a private entity with deep pockets, likely combined with a social con-
science; it could be charitable or donor agencies. National or local govern-
ments are not, in present conditions, the most suitable candidates to
sponsor an activist agenda in the financial sector. 
Diversity of Organizational Models in African Microfinance
One of the most striking features of the recent and ongoing expansion of
the microfinance movement in Africa is the proliferation of different types,
in terms of financial technology applied, organizational structure, degree
of formality and regulation, and clientele. The diversity seems wider than
in other regions. Not only that, but the relative importance of different
models—even of formal microfinance—differs widely from country to
country.
As Robinson (2006, 15–16), reviewing available evidence for Africa,
puts it: 
Regardless of their history or institutional form, however, large-scale
financially self-sufficient institutions with responsible ownership,
skilled governance and management, knowledge of the market, and
commitment to microfinance best practices—and a corporate culture
emphasizing training, incentives, transparency, efficiency, and
accountability—are found clustered at one end of this continuum.
The majority of microfinance clients are also clustered at this end. At
the other end are the many microfinance providers that lack most or
all of these crucial elements. The middle ground is home to numer-
ous positive efforts and to multiple obstacles.
Quantifying the relative importance in outreach of different sizes and
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providers is very large. As far as the formal and semiformal sectors are con-
cerned, the most comprehensive database is that prepared by the Consulta-
tive Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) (Christen, Rosenberg, and Jayadeva
2004),29 which has more than 800 African entries, even though networks
of cooperatives and credit unions are assigned only one entry each (as is the
Nigerian community bank system). However, the 44 largest entities (by
number of accounts) account for about 80 percent of the client base across
Africa, fully justifying Robinson’s statement that the “microfinance indus-
try in Africa is becoming dominated by large, mature financial institutions
and federations with wide outreach” (Robinson 2006, 16). Each of these
entities caters for at least 100,000 clients (table 4.2). As with the full list, the
top 44 include a wide range of different types of entities: state-owned banks,
including postal savings banks; privately owned banks; cooperative savings
and credit institutions; and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
TABLE 4.2
Large Financial Intermediaries and Networks in Africa Ranked by Outreach
Number
Country Name of institution Type of accounts
South Africa Post Bank Postal bank 2,100,000
Zimbabwe People’s Own Savings Bank Savings bank 1,695,000
Kenya Kenya Post Office Savings Bank (KPOSB) Postal bank 1,636,000
Ghana Rural and Community Banks Banks 1,200,000
Niger Caisse Nationale d’Epargne Postal bank 1,124,000
Nigeria Community Banks Unit banks 1,000,000
Tanzania Tanzania Postal Bank Postal bank 954,000
Kenya Kenya Union of Savings & Credit  Credit union 
Co-operatives (KUSCCO) or cooperative 952,000
Côte d’Ivoire Caisse d’Epargne et des Cheques 
Postaux (CECP) Postal bank 828,000
Cameroon Caisse d’Epargne Postale Postal bank 700,000
Tanzania National Microfinance Bank Bank 670,000
South Africa Teba Bank Bank 649,000
Madagascar Caisse d’Epargne Postal bank 574,000
Rwanda Banques Populaires Credit union or cooperative 385,000
Benin Fédération des Caisses d’Epargne et 
de Crédit Agricole Mutuel (FECECAM) Credit union or cooperative 378,000
Burkina Faso Caisse Nationale d’Epargne Postal bank 363,000
Benin Caisse Nationale d’Epargne Postal bank 350,000
Côte d’Ivoire Fédération Nationale des Coopératives 
d’Epargne et de Crédit de Côte d’Ivoire 
(FENACOOPEC-CI) Credit union or cooperative 291,000FINANCE FOR ALL 165
In interpreting table 4.2, one must recognize that the number of
accounts is a most imperfect measure of outreach.30 Many accounts, espe-
cially it seems at postal savings banks, are dormant and thus contribute lit-
tle to welfare. (As few as 10 percent of the accounts at Uganda’s postal
savings bank are thought to be active.) Then again, the range of services
available from different types of intermediaries differs widely. 
These points need to be borne in mind when observing that overall
almost half the accounts recorded in the CGAP database for Africa (as aug-
TABLE 4.2 (continued)
Number
Country Name of institution Type of accounts
Botswana Savings Bank Postal bank 287,000
Nigeria Countrywomen’s Association (COWAN) NGO 270,000
Uganda Centenary Rural Development Bank Bank 251,000
Burkina Faso Fédération des Caisses Populaires Credit union or cooperative 248,000
Mauritius Postal Savings Bank Postal bank 245,000
Sudan Savings & Social Development Bank  Savings bank 230,000
Ethiopia Dedebit Credit and Savings Institution Nonbank financial intermediary 221,000
Ethiopia Amhara Credit and Savings Institution Nonbank financial intermediary 216,000
Namibia Postal Savings Bank Postal bank 209,000
Senegal Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole Agricultural bank 205,000
Malawi Savings Bank Postal bank 204,000
Cape Verde Caixa Económica de Cabo Verde Savings bank 200,000
Togo Caisse d’Epargne du Togo Postal bank 200,000
Senegal Caisse Nationale d’Epargne Postal bank 197,000
Gabon Caisse Nationale d’Epargne Postal bank 175,000
Kenya Equity Bank Bank 173,000
Malawi Malawi Rural Finance Company Nonbank financial intermediary 166,000
Niger Mata Masu Dubara CARE NGO 162,000
Nigeria FADU (Farmers’ Development Union) Nonbank financial intermediary 156,000
Ethiopia Credit Unions Credit union or cooperative 150,000
Cameroon Cameroon Cooperative Credit Union 
League (CAMCCUL) Credit union or cooperative 149,000
Tanzania Savings and Credit Cooperatives Credit union or cooperative 137,000
Togo Faîtière des Unités Coop (FUCEC) Credit union or cooperative 133,000
Sudan Agricultural Bank of Sudan Agricultural bank 125,000
Uganda Postbank Uganda Postal bank 122,000
Mali Kafo Jiginew Credit union or cooperative 115,000
Source: Revised by the authors using data from Peachey and Roe 2005 and Christen, Rosenberg, and Jayadeva 2004.
Note:The table includes intermediaries or networks with an outreach objective and with more than 100,000 accounts or customers.
It overstates access to the extent that some accounts are dormant: the proportion of dormant accounts in post offices is often very
high. The Ghana Association of Rural Banks network is still a fairly loose organization. The Nigeria community banks are not
grouped into any formal network. 166 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
mented) are at savings or postal banks. This figure is about the same as
reported for the developing world as a whole. But the breakdown of the
other half is quite different in Africa, where various forms of credit coop-
eratives and NGOs both account for a much higher percentage (20 percent
and 10 percent, respectively) than is found in the rest of the world (figure
4.1). However, these shares vary sharply across Africa. In 11 of the 42
African countries in the database, savings and postal banks report more
than three-fourths of the accounts; nonbank MFIs have more than three-
fourths of the accounts in 16 countries. This finding displays the contrast-
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Looking at loan accounts, one notes that here, too, the relative impor-
tance of cooperatives and NGOs is much higher in Africa (figure 4.1). This
finding raises two questions: Is there something special about the mutual
model in Africa? Could banks play a bigger role?32
Different Forms of Mutuality 
Elements of mutuality33 contribute strongly to an effective credit culture
and to information flows that strengthen credit appraisal and credit disci-
pline. These processes are arguably stronger for relatively small groups and
hence, in practice, for small-scale intermediation. They are especially
advantageous in informal environments and where external enforcement
of credit contracts cannot be ensured. Their strengths thus seem particu-
larly well adapted to environments that are widely experienced in Africa. 
Mutuality in African microfinance is observed both in lending and in
governance of the intermediary. These are not closely correlated. Whereas
some commercial banks and donor-controlled MFIs sometimes use group
lending techniques, many cooperative or mutual savings and credit insti-
tutions in Africa rely on individual loans but collective governance. 
Variations in group lending have been found effective in different envi-
ronments and in relation to different types of clients. Increasingly, the
leading microlenders no longer confine themselves to a single lending
model. As just one example, the international NGO CARE promotes an
eclectic mix of techniques. For urban and periurban areas, small groups of
four to six people are formed.34 Larger “village” groups of 20 or more are
used in rural areas.35 Another model used by CARE for low-capacity
groups, usually women, in remote areas is designed to stimulate and edu-
cate these groups to achieve self-organization, with a savings and credit
association depending entirely on accumulating the group’s own savings
(Allen 2002). MFIs across Africa practice many variants of these tech-
niques, differing in contract design as well as in group size.36
At the other end of the spectrum, other MFIs favor individual-based
loans, seeing them as more flexible and responsive to each borrower’s
evolving needs than group lending, which can proceed only at the pace of
the slowest developer. Procredit/IPC exemplifies this approach. The fact
that it has secured banking licenses in several countries illustrates how
close its model is to traditional banking—even though with a focus on
smaller and lower-income borrowers and therefore with the need to168 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
emphasize cost control. Many mutually owned MFIs also make individual-
responsibility loans—indeed, this is the classic credit union model. 
The distinction being made here is not hard and fast. For instance, in a
credit union, individual borrowers are linked through their participation
in the ownership of the cooperative, albeit in a much weaker way than can
be implied by participation in a group or cross-guaranteed loan. Mutual
guarantee associations blur the distinction even more.
Group or individual lending?
Which model is best? For lending, there is little evidence to suggest that
either group or individual lending clearly dominates (Cull and Giné
2004).37 For instance, reliance by group lenders on peer pressure may not
always work. In agriculture, the group may be faced with a common or at
least covariant risk. Some borrowing farmer groups have colluded to mis-
represent their ability to repay—see Binswanger and van den Brink
(2005), whose proposal for a sophisticated and coherent community-based
structure for coping with the complex risks and incentive problems faced
in rural finance deserves more attention that it has yet received. 
Perhaps the persistence of a multiplicity of models means that different
models work best in different environments. But such a Panglossian conclu-
sion may not be warranted. Survival of the fittest is unlikely to prevail quickly
in the social lending sector, which is often donor aided and in which institu-
tions generally have a management team motivated by social concerns. Per-
sons with the multidimensional management skills required to fill a top
position in an MFI typically have the qualifications to secure a very highly paid
job in the financial service industry in an advanced economy. They stay in
African microfinance because of their social motivation. This complicates the
comparative evaluation of MFI models, because even an inferior model can be
made to work and to survive against the odds if supported by the efforts of able
and highly motivated managers. Furthermore, while a growing number of
MFIs are reporting profits, others are still kept afloat in practice by donor funds
(sometimes in the form of cheap loans and equity, rather than grants).
Although donors will not back a losing model indefinitely (and some exits
unprofitable MFIs have already exited), their behavior can prolong its life.
The success of cooperatives: Mirage or miracle?
A common misconception among nonspecialists is to suppose that mutu-
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age loan size for the cooperatives in the sample of African MFIs studied by
Lafourcade and others (2005) was about US$500, or about 120 percent of
national gross national income (GNI) per capita, well above the average of
US$300 for the sample as a whole.38 Even though this finding suggests that
cooperatives cater to a less poor clientele on average, cooperatives report a
lower return on assets at 0.4 percent, compared with more than 2 percent
for the rest. Social or statutory ceilings on lending interest rates likely con-
tribute: unregulated MFIs have much higher unit costs but more than
recover those costs on financial revenue.39
Bearing in mind that formal savings and credit cooperatives are, in Stu-
art Rutherford’s (1999) colorful phrase, supercharged rotating savings and
credit associations (ROSCAs), it would nonetheless likely be a mistake to
assume that the cooperative form is particularly focused on higher-income
groups. If data on informal ROSCAs were included, the average loan size
for this wider definition of cooperatives would be much lower. 
Despite reliance on mutualist ideas of solidarity and social capital, the
cooperative model is not immune to failure resulting from malfeasance or
insouciance. One problem can be the difficulty of coping with external
funding, compromising the self-reliance on which cooperatives are sup-
posedly built. The failure in 1998 of the largest network of cooperatives in
Benin, FECECAM (Fédération des Caisses d’Epargne et de Crédit Agricole
Mutuel), illustrates this. In that case, among the many lessons learned was
“the realization by the network that rapid growth under the impulse of
lines of credit at the expense of good financial management can jeopardize
an institution’s sustainability” (Ouattara 2003, 11–12). Endemic manage-
ment and portfolio weaknesses have been noted also in East Africa, where
the savings and credit cooperative (SACCO) mutualist model may be los-
ing out to other institutional forms.
Furthermore, the mutualist glue that holds the model together in good
times may dissolve suddenly if there are adverse shocks, with members
deciding not to repay if the institution is seen as likely to be unable to
make future loans. The recent case of mutual guarantee associations
(MGAs) in Madagascar is a case in point.40 The MGAs had been developed
at the instigation of the national ministry of agriculture, livestock, and
fisheries as a way of facilitating the extension of agricultural credit from
the multinational Bank of Africa in parts of Madagascar where no mutual-
ist credit institutions were active. However, the crisis of 2002 brought a
collapse in farm-gate prices and an inability by some to make repayments,170 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
which escalated into a general collapse of credit discipline, with even the
organizing committee members of MGAs refusing to repay (Bennett and
others 2005). Once again, postmortems identified a failure to embed the
solidaristic principles that are presupposed by the mutualist model: for
example, the overstrong role of the ministry in promoting the scheme and
the lack of understanding by the farmer groups of their collective respon-
sibilities. The collapse uncovered other deficiencies: for instance, loan
approval processes that were so cumbersome that the loan was sometimes
made too late to meet the agricultural input need for which it had been
earmarked (such loans tended to be consumed, resulting in repayment dif-
ficulties).
Cooperatives, with their “one person, one vote” governance principle,
are not inherently suited to a setup of disparity in resources among mem-
bers. They may not be well adapted to absorbing external capital funds.
Such drawbacks have contributed to the decision of the larger UK mutual
financial institutions to convert to the joint-stock corporate structure. In
contrast, though, many European mutuals have managed to innovate in
corporate structure to get around these limitations. Already there are exam-
ples of such innovation in Africa, also. For example, Crédit Mutuel in Sene-
gal launched a regional bank, BIMAO (Banque des Institutions Mutualistes
d’Afrique de l’Ouest), that allows it to accept equity (as well as facilitating
the provision of other banking services). What were until recently loose
confederations of locally based savings and credit cooperatives in West
Africa (such as Nyesigiso and Kafo Jiginew in Mali) have, while retaining
mutuality, greatly centralized decision making in the national central offices
of the networks.41 Kenya’s Cooperative Bank, initially established as a
department in the ministry of cooperatives, evolved to become a kind of
apex for Kenyan cooperatives as well as a stand-alone licensed bank.
As the power of the central office of the network grows, so the degree
to which the member cooperatives are—in practice—being governed by
the individual members diminishes. There is an interesting convergence of
governance with the network of some 120 rural and community banks in
Ghana. These commercial banks (with some restrictions on activities and
geographic scope) are not mutual entities, but they formed an association
in 1981 which, in turn, established in 2001 the ARB Apex Bank—now act-
ing as a kind of head office (Andah 2005; Steel and Andah 2003).42, 43 It is
not evident that a cooperative member of one of the large networks in
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sive to the local area in which it operates than is a locally owned rural bank
in Ghana. 
All in all, governments would be unwise to insist on the mutual organi-
zational form, thereby shutting out the potential offered by other MFI
sponsors. Legislative changes under way in the UEMOA have begun to
reflect this view by dropping the presumption that MFIs will have a mutu-
alist governance; hitherto MFIs that are not cooperatives have been able to
apply for only a temporary five-year license (Lolila-Ramin 2005).
Mainstream Banks:Will Their Role Be Direct or as Wholesalers?
Following successes in microfinance by banks in other regions and the
licensing as banks of a handful of African entities focused on SMEs and
lower-income borrowers, some observers have suggested that the future for
microfinance might lie with banks. If this proposition is intended to refer to
the large international banks, it is far from clear that they will have an easy
path to tread. Some of them do not have it as part of their business model.
Others claim to have a retail strategy reaching further down the income
scale and to micro, small, and medium-scale enterprises (MSMEs), but it is
unclear just how far down this scale they can realistically hope to go.44
In this regard, all eyes are on South Africa and the response of the banks
and other leading financial institutions to the expectation that they can
and should do more to achieve an inclusive financial system in that coun-
try.45 It is a good testbed: the major banks are solid and skillful, the broader
economic environment relatively strong. Yet access for the poor remains
limited. Solutions that prove to be effective and financially viable in South
Africa may be adaptable to the rest of the continent, after some of the
setup and experimentation costs are incurred in South Africa. 
Essentially the problem lies in unit costs. Catering for the small transac-
tion costs involved in dealing with the poor can be prohibitively expensive
for large international banks. The salaries they pay to their well-educated
and well-trained staff members, needed because of the sophistication and
complexity of some of their products (and the need for layers of review
and control), make anything that involves personal intervention very
costly. Technology can dramatically reduce per transaction costs, thereby
offering a countervailing force, but putting the technology into effect in a
sparsely populated region can also be prohibitively costly if the volume of
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made by South African banks even for the low-cost Mzansi accounts
(equivalent to more than US$0.50 for an ATM withdrawal and US$0.35
for a PoS withdrawal or purchase) are affordable by lower-middle-income
South Africans but are likely too expensive for the average Mozambican.
To what extent banks can drive their costs further down to achieve greater
outreach is unclear. 
What can be envisaged, however, is a wholesaling function for large
banks—to help get funding, as well as more sophisticated products, into
the market. Already banks are acting as wholesale suppliers of mobilized
resources to MFIs and cooperatives in several countries and, of course,
they are the main conduit to the payments system. There have been some
disappointing failures on the part of specialized lenders financed by
banks—the case of Unibank and Saambou in South Africa is discussed in
Rust (2002)—but some promising cases also.46 The failures have partly
reflected overconfidence on the part of the funds supplier about the infor-
mation and management capacity of the primary lender. A particular diffi-
culty arises in creating such links where the primary lender is donor aided,
has little capital, or has finances so shaky that commercial lenders require
a donor guarantee, which tends to defeat some of the purpose of the exer-
cise. Fortunately, a growing number of solid MFIs do attract commercial
bank lending without guarantees (Isern and Porteous 2005). 
We have already mentioned the need for banks or other internationally
active intermediaries to create the link with international reinsurance or
bond markets needed to make some forms of agriculture-related insurance
work by laying off the catastrophic end of the risk. Other forms of partner-
ships between mainstream banks and microfinance entities can be
envisaged.
More generally, commercial banks could benefit from close links with
MFIs. For example, lacking a formal credit record, small-scale or microen-
trepreneurs whose credit needs have outgrown the group-lending tech-
niques of microfinance are unlikely to be able to access credit from a
commercial bank where they are not known, unless there are some infor-
mation or cofinancing arrangements between MFIs and banks.
Moving a notch down in scale from the large international banks, the
prospects and, indeed, practice of microfinance engagement by local banks
are considerably greater. It depends in part on the banks’ missions and
business models. Such entities as Centenary Rural Development Bank
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and Akiba Bank in Tanzania, Banque Nationale de Développement Agri-
cole (BNDA) in Mali; Malawi Rural Finance Corporation (MFRC) in
Malawi; Afriland Bank, BICEC, and Union Bank in Cameroon; and CNCA
in Senegal have shown in different ways that licensed commercial banks
in Africa can be effective in microfinance on a substantial scale. These are
either microfinance or development specialists focused on a single country,
but others such as the Bank of Africa and Ecobank, both present in multi-
ple jurisdictions, are also increasingly involved in small-scale finance. 
The National Microfinance Bank (NMB) in Tanzania represents a
unique experiment in seeking to build on existing formal structures to
reach a wider market. The NMB was carved out of the government-owned
National Bank of Commerce when it was being recapitalized and priva-
tized to Absa of South Africa. The NMB was established with a wide branch
network—95 branches, of which all but 6 are outside Dar es Salaam—and
an extensive deposit business. It had new systems, developed under man-
agement contract, with a focus on servicing households and MSME clients.
Recently, partly privatized to a consortium led by Rabobank, the bank is
gradually beginning to expand its loan portfolio. 
Another promising model has been put into effect in Benin and Chad by
Financial Bank (a banking group whose international dimension builds on
the longstanding migration links between Chad and the coast)and in Zim-
babwe by Kingdom Bank. It is the creation of a microfinance subsidiary
that might ultimately be spun off into a freestanding unit. The differences
in operating procedures and business culture can make this solution attrac-
tive (Isern and Porteous 2005; Kloeppinger-Todd 2005).
Commercial banks are not the only large, formal sector institutions that
will play a part in increasing access in Africa. Post offices have already been
mentioned. Post offices date back to the early colonial era and now vary
considerably across Africa in the degree to and the success with which they
offer financial services (World Bank and ING Bank forthcoming). The
largest post office—that of Nigeria—does not currently offer financial
services.
Many postal banks have lacked a customer focus, and some have not
been well managed in even more serious ways—a common problem being
lack of control over recording of liabilities in situations where passbooks
are the legal record. Some have been left in an illiquid state by the govern-
ment, with disastrous consequences for their ability to honor even the
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But other African postal services have turned the corner and are display-
ing a promising dynamism. Where they are well managed, they have a con-
siderable natural advantage to exploit their extensive locational network, as
well as their information technology capacity to offer simple financial prod-
ucts (savings, payments) to poor customers. They are often the largest single
provider of financial services in the country—for example, the Nampost in
Namibia claims a 50 percent share of savings customers by number and about
13 percent by value; it has 190 offices across the country. In Benin, the total
value of postal checking (CCP, or compte chèque postal) and postal saving (CNE,
or caisse nationale d’épargne) accounts comes to the equivalent of more than
half of bank deposits. As well as internal payments, often including the giro
system, several offer international payments using the network of Western
Union or other MTOs. Ensuring that they are not blocked from admission to
the national payments system can help reduce the cost of retail payments.
Moving on to offering credit is being considered in a few cases. This is
something that runs up against the political pressures discussed earlier,
and it cannot be encouraged unhesitatingly. Some postal banks have been
spun off from the post office proper, following the successful experience of
a few European countries. However, this experiment has not always been
successful, and it risks both increasing costs and undermining the built-in
advantages that motivate the use of the post office as a financial service
provider to begin with. Some spinoffs—such as that in Kenya, which
serves an estimated 1.6 million savers—have concentrated their activities
on a much smaller set of offices (about 70 in Kenya), without exploiting
the full range of postal outlets (of which there are 900 in Kenya).
Large chains of goods retailers also enjoy some of the same advantages
mentioned for the post office, although they do not typically have quite as
broad a network of offices. Some African retailers have become interested
in diversifying into offering some financial services to a broad clientele.
Depository and payments services will, again, be their first products.
Supermarket chains are beginning to show an interest in acquiring a lim-
ited banking license, which will enable them to offer such services.
Role of Governments: Consistency, Modesty, Regulatory Style
Competition, infrastructure, coordination
As we have discussed, government is often not itself the best-placed entity
to deliver financial services (not least because of credibility and gover-FINANCE FOR ALL 175
nance issues). Although some of the innovative institutions mentioned
elsewhere in this chapter are state owned, these are exceptions that prove
the rule. Nevertheless, in numerous ways, government actions can help
enhance the quality and outreach of services. In addition to policy for pru-
dential regulation, these actions can be grouped under the headings of
promoting competition, providing infrastructure and other public goods,
and coordinating. 
For competition, maximizing the range of reliable providers and avoid-
ing unnecessary cost impositions on suppliers are two central guiding prin-
ciples. To take just one example, when the government needs to make
payments in remote areas, putting that contract up for competitive tender
rather than automatically continuing to use traditional channels can help
build scale for new internal payments technologies and spur innovation.
Numerous dimensions of infrastructure, both hard and soft, that the
financial sector needs will be provided only with government involve-
ment. At the most basic level, political stability and physical security are
fundamental to the ability of the financial system to operate. Many other
infrastructural investments, such as those aimed at improvements in edu-
cation47 and in transport infrastructure, are needed also by dimensions of
economic and social development. Electronic ICT in particular is crucial for
enabling many financial innovations.
The meso-level infrastructures for finance, especially legal and informa-
tional infrastructures (discussed in chapter 3), remain relevant when it
comes to finance for all. Accounting standards and practice, bankruptcy
law, recourse to the courts to recover collateral—these infrastructures will
all make important contributions. A clear and supportive legal basis for
leasing, factoring, and hire-purchase is a particular low-cost reform that
unlocks sizable possibilities. Both this and the creation of effective title reg-
istries and credit registries can be relevant for improving access to small-
scale borrowing. The design and technology of national payments systems
are relevant insofar as they help or hinder the competitive provision of
low-cost retail payment services at the small scale. (For instance, inter-
change fees for card transactions that are set at a uniform per item rate can
preclude their use by poor people.)
One classic type of public service that is very relevant for the effective-
ness of finance is the public provision of small business development—in
particular, agricultural extension.48 These services are not always provided
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delivered by the private sector, even if subsidized by the state. However, it
is clear that there is too little knowledge of basic business methods and, in
particular, of ways of making the most of existing financial services. Perfor-
mance of publicly subsidized business development services is relatively
easy to monitor quickly, so that governments can ensure that they are get-
ting value for money. Such evaluations should be carried out on a regular
basis.49
Helping improve financial literacy is also important in ensuring that the
poor make good use of the expanding opportunities and do not suffer from
bad financial choices, including overborrowing. Financial literacy efforts
can also, perhaps, yield dividends by laying the foundation for efforts to
nurture norms for honoring financial contracts. 
The introduction of new technology in finance has been pioneered by
activist market participants, including NGOs, supported by donor funds
and, in some cases, by government budgetary funds. The innovators have
worked best when sponsored by agencies with strong governance that
helped ensure that they would not be sidetracked from their goals. Policy
makers need to understand these innovations to make sure that they do
not inadvertently block them through regulation or undercut them with
unsustainable and costly subsidies that chill market development without
achieving their goal on any significant scale. Market participants will not
explore such innovation unless the market is contestable. In short, policy
needs to be designed so as to smooth the way for activists. 
Even if governance weaknesses mean that a directly involved activist
agenda in the financial sector cannot be recommended for most African
government agencies, they can act as a broker or facilitator—“knocking
heads together” to ensure that activist efforts by others are pooled or coor-
dinated if this means that they could be more effective. Working with
industry associations, the government can have an important role to play
in overcoming coordination failures that hinder the adoption of shared
market standards and financial market infrastructure, such as the estab-
lishment of credit bureaus or standardized mortgage contracts to facilitate
securitization.
But it is harder for African governments to use policy levers successfully
to exert pressure on private providers that are purely profit seeking and
have no social goals to push outreach and financial access much beyond
the point of profitability. In contrast to the situation in advanced
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intermediaries can be effective and is in practice used to reduce financial
exclusion, most African governments cannot assume that this is a viable or
sensible way to proceed. To the extent that the problem is getting access
percentages up from 10 or 20 percent (in contrast to advanced economies,
where the challenge is to reduce exclusion from 10 or 15 percent), the
tools and the time frames for achieving different goals need to be realistic.
For one thing, given the small size of their markets, African governments
have limited economic leverage on mainstream banks in a competitive
environment. Too many impositions and the banks will downsize or exit
the market.50 As usual, South Africa provides an exception, with the banks
there launching the Msanzi product at least partly to deflect political pres-
sure. Indeed, even if the leverage of other governments remains modest,
the South African case, if it continues to prove successful, now offers a
focal point for moral suasion: if banks can reach out more effectively in
South Africa, why not elsewhere on the continent? 
Regulatory model
In addition to working proactively to create the conditions under which
providers of financial services can work effectively, governments also
strongly influence developments through the model of prudential regula-
tion that they create. A degree of consensus exists about the main ele-
ments of a regulatory model for microfinance (Christen and others 2003),
and African central banks have been at the fore in gaining acceptance for
and putting in place a coherent regulatory framework for microfinance.51
Yet certain important ambiguities remain. The proliferation of small MFIs,
whether cooperative, NGO-sponsored, or coming from other private ini-
tiatives, has created a bottleneck for regulators. In several countries, it has
become clear that many are poorly managed and are struggling financially;
this is undoubtedly also true elsewhere. This situation presents a dilemma
for the regulator. On the one hand, small MFIs can hardly present systemic
risks, especially if they do not take deposits. On the other hand, the rela-
tively small scale of much terrorism financing means that small size does
not preclude the use of an MFI for this purpose. 
One overriding principle therefore seems important in guiding regula-
tory design in regard to MFIs, namely that regulation should not choke off
initiative and outreach, especially in remote areas.52 A sense of proportion
is needed with regard to fears of systemic distress and terrorism financing,
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(AML–CFT) regulations adapted to the scale and functioning of each class
of intermediary, as proposed in Isern, Deshpande, and van Doorn (2005).
Only the largest deposit-taking MFIs need to be actively supervised for
prudential reasons by the banking regulator. In this regard, for most coun-
tries, size should be measured by the number of depositing clients. More
limited arrangements can be envisaged for the rest. Despite their recent
growth and a tendency to concentration in the sector, arguably in no
African country does any MFI have a balance sheet sufficiently large that
its failure would entail contagion that would cause a wider financial sector
meltdown.53 Focusing on institutions with a large number of clients—and
only on those that take deposits—is simply a rational allocation of limited
supervisory resources to protect the interests of a large number of clients
and also thereby protect social stability.
A new style emerging in Africa is to place MFIs that have sufficiently
large capital in a separate regulatory category. The idea is that members of
this class are at a scale with which the banks and the central bank can do
business. They are more closely supervised than the other MFIs but may be
allowed a broader range of activities (perhaps including a wider geographic
spread for their lending and deposit-taking activities, permission to deal in
foreign exchange, or permission to make larger individual loans). The idea
of this additional tier is that these institutions—not having the capital or
expertise to carry out the full range of banking services safely—cannot
safely be allowed the full freedom of a banking license, yet are too big to be
bypassed by prudential regulation.54 Should this trend toward regulatory
emphasis on larger institutions signal the death knell for smaller MFIs? Not
yet. It is possible that, in time, one or two models of MFI will emerge as
dominant. However, for the present, evidence is insufficient to allow one to
conclude that, given the current economic and social environment in
Africa, any one of the models has decisive disadvantages or merits.
To be sure, it is unlikely that an MFI sector that has wide outreach and
is financially sustainable will in the long run be formed of small institu-
tions. As is clear from econometric analyses of MFI sustainability, scale will
prove essential for cost control (Honohan 2004). But the experimental
stage that we observe implies that some potential giants of the future are
now starting small. If we do not yet really know which model will domi-
nate in the end, we cannot know which types of MFI deserve to grow.55
The diversity of models in play at present likely facilitates product and
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the industry is still young, and how essential experimentation will con-
tinue to be in the search for successful and sustainable formulas for African
conditions, it would be unwise to legislate prematurely for uniformity or
to insist from the outset on large scale.
Regulators tend to be hostile to small institutions, and their suspicion is
often justified. No fewer than 250 small MFIs were closed in Cameroon
following the explosive growth of 1996 to 1999, though 85 percent of the
sector remained informal or unregulated. But it was the largest network,
FECECAM, that failed in Benin. So closing small entities is no guarantee of
safety going forward. 
For smaller MFIs, the ambitions of the regulators should be adapted to
their means. Keeping an ear to the ground and visiting MFIs on a spot-
check basis and in response to rumors or suspicions of which they become
aware is as much as the supervisor of the smaller MFIs can hope to do. In
many cases, the deficiencies reflect inadequate basic business and book-
keeping skills: certainly improvements in financial transparency are badly
needed. Identifying capacity-building needs and helping to provide them
are two of the most fruitful functions of the supervisor. 
Networks of cooperatives, credit unions, and rural banks, such as the
Apex Bank of the Ghana Association of Rural Banks, already find it in
their collective interest to employ inspectors who visit member MFIs on a
regular basis to inspect and advise in a collegial manner. The incentive to
do this will remain high as long as MFIs are neither explicitly nor implic-
itly covered by deposit insurance. Arranging that the official supervisor of
the smaller MFIs, working with these networks and apex institutions, can
draw in times of need on the staff resources of the main bank regulator will
help ensure that any emerging crises can be met with adequate skills. Not
all MFIs will be saved by this pragmatic approach, but the benefits in
improved focus and cost saving will outweigh the costs, if any.
This more selectively targeted approach to supervision should be
matched by a refocusing of regulation. Although it may be hard to design
enforceable antimonopoly and consumer protection regulations, these
goals should begin to receive greater attention. As well as raising prices,
the introduction of technological innovations can be blocked by incum-
bents, especially with technologies that involve network effects such as the
payments system. Furthermore, undue mechanical restrictions on the
design and range of products that can be offered by banks and MFIs will
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classification of loans; excessive liquidity requirements; ownership restric-
tions (until recently, no individual private entity could own more than 20
percent of a bank in Uganda); and usury laws and other forms of interest
ceilings can constrain banks and make MFIs reluctant to convert to banks,
thereby limiting the range of services they can offer their clients.
Interest ceilings are particularly problematic. Although financial special-
ists universally agree on the damaging social effects of constraining ceilings
on bank lending rates, the attempt to control rates has a recurrent populist
attraction. Recent draft legislation in Kenya would, for example, have
capped bank lending rates at 400 basis points above treasury bill rates, a
measure that would have excluded a very large fraction of the potential
borrowing market. Nigeria operates a ceiling at a similar level—400 basis
points above the minimum rediscount rate—according to the mandatory
“guide to bank charges” promulgated by the Central Bank of Nigeria
(Charitonenko 2005).57 The ceiling on bank lending rates in the CEMAC
(Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale) zone is
currently 15 percent. Even the relatively high 27 percent usury ceiling for
MFIs (18 percent for banks) in the UEMOA countries represents a con-
straint for MFIs in that region and is much lower than the rates of 50 to 80
percent per year that lenders in South Africa have commonly charged on
small loans. To be sure, removal or relaxation of usury laws can be politi-
cally delicate. The approach adopted by the South African authorities,
allowing registered lenders to charge higher rates (while leaving the usury
ceilings on the books), had the merit of allowing greater transparency of
high-rate lending and potentially preventing predatory lending practices
while opening the door to effective microlending (Helms and Reille 2004). 
Role of Donors: Resources, Innovation, Independence
Where do external donors fit in? First, of course, they can bring technol-
ogy, human, and financial resources. Apart from capacity building and
other institutional strengthening, donors can be sources of innovation and
entrepreneurship. In addition, by exploiting their independence from local
interest groups, they may be able to inject a degree of insulation from
political pressure and serve to a degree as agencies of restraint. As such,
they can venture further down the activist road than it is safe for govern-
ments to go. This is also true of a growing group of external providers of
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loans, guarantees, equity); they are outside the traditional donor group
and may have a more commercial motivation.58,59
Numerous examples of these elements have been cited throughout this
chapter. Another illustration comes from the equity stakes taken by the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and other donors in small banks
and MFIs in Africa. The donors too are affected by scale problems in this
regard, especially where (as with the IFC) investments are intended to be
remunerative. The equity stakes are small in financial value and cannot
easily repay the inevitable minimum administrative costs involved in eval-
uating and monitoring them. It thus becomes important to supplement the
purely financial engagement with an adequate budget for staff costs, while
refining ways of evaluating the contribution of these costs to national
development.
But the donors must be careful. Their scale often makes them like an
elephant in the garden; when they move, locals may be trampled. How
can they assist while maintaining incentives for private financial service
providers to build their own technology and expand their market supply?
How can they ensure that the costs of the assistance are limited to bud-
geted aid amounts? By now some of the most common causes of damag-
ing side effects and of budget overruns are well known to donors and
recipients, with subsidized interest rates topping the list of distortions.
Not all the new ideas in this area are wholly trouble free. For example,
loan guarantee schemes are increasingly popular. It is important that they
do not become just a covert way of providing sizable de facto interest sub-
sidies to projects with what is in reality a high, but unacknowledged,
default risk.60 To the extent that the guarantee will not be called for several
years, even unsuccessful schemes of this type can seem to be well perform-
ing for quite a while. The design of the guarantee can reduce the distor-
tion, for example, if the guarantee applies to the first loss only and is not
open ended.
Less fraught are such enabling interventions as—to draw on the recom-
mendations of Pearce (2003)—brokering links between private sector par-
ticipants, promoting farmers’ associations, offering technical farm
extension advice, and providing basic business development services. By
funding setup costs as opposed to marginal costs, these kinds of interven-
tion can avoid the most damaging distortions. 
Innovative approaches to solving the problem of choosing which sup-
plier should benefit from a proposed subsidy (perhaps having a competi-182 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
tion in which alternative suppliers bid for the subsidy) need to be explored
in finance as in other sectors. Indeed, the role of donors, including inter-
national financial intermediaries, in enhancing the flow of credit to small-
scale borrowers is a delicate issue, given that donor sponsorship often
drove the expansion of failing development finance institutions (DFIs) in
the past. Most are keen not to repeat the errors of the past. Perhaps one
way is to take a more engaged approach to the design and evaluation of
onlending projects, to try to ensure that such projects are not undermined
by favoritism in lending by the sublenders. This calls for increased efforts
in capacity building and, in particular, attention to institutional design. 
Finally, donors need to look at conditions in their own countries,
notably with regard to international remittances. Do regulatory measures
need to be taken to help ensure that the market for sending remittances to
Africa is competitive and provides reliable services at low cost? The Euro-
pean Commission has been successful in driving improved international
retail payments technologies and in ensuring lower consumer prices for
these payments in the context of the European single currency. Could
these ideas be extended to remittances toward Africa?
Notes
1. Porteous (2006a) discusses the failure of MFI interest rates to decline over time.
2. Data from http://www.mixmarket.org show that for the 57 elite African MFIs
that report the relevant data to the MIX database, the average administrative
cost per borrower in 2003 was US$129 (median of US$58). With such high
unit costs, it is hard for MFIs to make small loans without relying on explicit
or implicit subsidies. Nevertheless, there are indications that reliance on subsi-
dies is falling. More MFIs are now reporting profitability, and with funders
shifting to loans and equity, donor grants are not as common (Lafourcade and
others 2005).
3. Here we include registered cooperatives and credit-only nongovernmental
organizations as well as deposit-taking firms. 
4. For financiers and their customers who prefer to deal only in products that
comply with the more strict interpretations of Sharia law, a different set of
innovations is appropriate. Islamic scholars are continuously refining Sharia-
compliant products to achieve overall functionality comparable to that of
interest-based finance and conventional insurance. Though growing, the use
of these products in Africa remains very limited. The Web site of the Harvard
Law School Islamic Finance Project is a valuable resource on this topic:
http://ifp.law.harvard.edu.FINANCE FOR ALL 183
5. For overall discussion of current issues in rural finance, see Kloeppinger-Todd
(2005), Nagarajan and Meyer (2005), and Zeller (2003). At a more technical
level, an authoritative and up-to-date survey of the economics of rural finance
in developing countries, with numerous references to African studies, is in
Conning and Udry (forthcoming).
6. Private merchants have taken on this role because parastatals have withdrawn
in many countries. A late government entrant into this activity was that of
Kenya in 1992, which displaced sugar factories as supplier of inputs on credit
to smallholders in the sugar sector; the results were not sustainable, with
heavy write-offs, and the government retreated after about a decade.
7. Because input loans are generally a small fraction of the value of output sub-
sequently purchased, lenders can find even high default rates tolerable. Note
that the risk of side sales is essentially confined to commodities whose supply
chain does not have a natural constriction point.
8. Boot and Schmeits (2005) argue that (even though it has been diminishing in
importance in advanced countries, except for the very largest deals) relation-
ship banking remains at the heart of the competitive advantage of banks.
9. Not only underperforming economies rely on this type of relationship lending.
Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) and Allen and others (2006) note the impor-
tance of informal credit arrangements of this type in the rapidly growing Chi-
nese and Indian economies. 
10. The more recent wave of World Bank-sponsored investment climate surveys is
also beginning to be analyzed in microeconometric analysis; see Eifert, Gelb, and
Ramachandran (2006) and Moss, Ramachandran, and Shah (2004). Based on
these surveys, Investment Climate Assessment reports have already been com-
pleted for a dozen African countries: Benin, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagas-
car, Mali, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, with
Malawi soon to appear (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ICAs.aspx).
11. The excusable default concept is successfully applied also by one of the world’s
most effective development banks, Thailand’s Bank for Agriculture and Agri-
cultural Cooperatives (Townsend and Yaron 2001); see also Conning and Udry
(forthcoming).
12. Credit networks of this type are widely observed to be confined within ethnic
groups—reflecting an additional coping strategy of lenders in a difficult busi-
ness environment. Ethnically limited credit networks restrict the opportuni-
ties for growth and productivity improvement (Eifert, Gelb, and
Ramachandran 2006); to advocate greater use of relationship lending is in no
way to advocate such limitations.
13. A savings account with a financial intermediary is a way of providing some
insulation to the flow of household consumption in the event of an emer-
gency. Hit by some losses or an urgent spending need (for medicine, funerals,
and the like), a household will not escape the loss in total net present value
terms, but temporary consumption compression can be avoided. If the house-
hold has access to emergency credit, that too will help.184 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
14. International financial markets in insurance, commodity derivatives, and
other products can be directly accessed only by very large entities such as gov-
ernments. For example, during the food crisis of 2005 to 2006, the govern-
ment of Malawi implemented an innovative approach to financial risk
management of the food security response by purchasing a customized over-
the-counter call option, based on South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX)
quotations, to cap the price of maize imports. More challenging is making such
risk management available widely through the economy. 
15. Informal but well-organized insurance arrangements also exist, notably for
funeral costs in Africa; see Dercon and others (2004).
16. The emphasis here on agricultural insurance should not hide the presence of
other types of microinsurance in Africa. Life cover is often bundled with
microcredit. Burial societies, often promoted by funeral companies, are partic-
ularly widespread in southern Africa. A variety of microinsurance schemes
have emerged for health care, often managed on mutualist principles but
often also involving the active participation of health providers, requiring the
sponsorship and support of donors. They are sometimes linked with micro-
finance—indeed, emergency loans have sometimes displaced health micro-
insurance as the preferred response to health risks. See McCord and Osinde
(2003) for East Africa and Louis (2006) for an interesting francophone case
study. A valuable set of case studies, including several from Africa, can be
found at http://www.microinsurancecentre.org. See also Preker, Scheffler,
and Bassett (2006).
17. For example, tracking crop prices allows farmers to time the sale of produce.
Farmers often do not know and therefore cannot get fair market prices. Inter-
net technology can help (for example, the info kiosks piloted by PRIDE-
Kenya’s Drumnet scheme, which could ultimately be expanded to link into
payments or even credit services). 
18. Following Rutherford (2001), it is convenient to distinguish among three dif-
ferent types of eventuality for which savings are made by poor people: first, to
deal with lumpy requirements of predictable life-cycle events (births, deaths,
marriages, school fees, old age, and so on) and to cope with the timing mis-
match between income receipts (for example, seasonal harvest receipts or the
proceeds of the sale of an animal); second, to meet emergencies (sickness,
injury, loss of employment, war, flood, and the like); and third, for opportuni-
ties (starting a business, acquiring assets, or buying radios, televisions, and so
on). Life-cycle events are fairly predictable and liquidity of savings is not a
major concern. By contrast, the need to finance emergencies requires liquid
savings products. Even if households have the discipline to save at home to
meet the diverse needs for lump sums of money at some point, saving at home
is not a reliable mechanism. The money stored at home is susceptible to being
dissipated in less valuable spending that arises in day-to-day household
expenses, demands from relatives, or theft. The problem of losses of savings is
documented for Uganda by Wright and Muteesassira (2001). They found that
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savings; on average they lost 22 percent of the amount they had saved in the
preceding year. A valuable collection of papers on financial saving mecha-
nisms in Africa is in Wright (2003). Note, however, that precautionary savings
in nonfinancial forms are important in Africa, as has been shown by extensive
literature; a recent example is Kazianga and Udry (2005). 
19. Checking accounts and credit cards represent payment technologies that do
entail credit and that may not be as suitable for the poor as savings accounts
and debit cards. 
20. The pronounced inequality of living standards may have contributed here,
because some banks competitively pursued the higher margins attainable from
the upper echelons by offering high service quality and ambience not compat-
ible with a crowded mass-market banking hall. Once such banks acknowledge
the potential profitability of the mass market, though, they may continue to
segment the market by offering exclusive luxurious physical facilities to cus-
tomers with large balances. 
21. Instead of mobile units, Botswana Saving Bank’s electronic passbook for savers
(which reduces fraud and speeds services) uses a low-cost ATM system and
point-of-sale machines placed in selected post offices countrywide. It also
relies on live telecommunications-a satellite system that provides much-
improved geographic coverage throughout that vast and very sparsely popu-
lated country. 
22. Long before the introduction of Mzansi accounts by a wider range of South
African banks in the context of the Financial Sector Charter, Teba Bank had
developed a low-fee, interest-bearing savings account targeted to low-income,
predominantly unbanked and underbanked residents in rural South Africa.
23. The system was designed by a team originally convened by Hewlett-Packard
and including representatives from ACCION International, Biz Credit, FINCA
International, Grameen Technology Center, Freedom from Hunger, Global
eChange, and PRIDE AFRICA (Firpo 2005).
24. South Africa-Wizzit, MTN (Mobile Telephone Networks), and Standard Bank-
and Kenya-Vodafone MPesa-also have cell-phone banking. There are some
differences in functionality (such as the ability to work across different cell-
phone networks) and in pricing and target market (Porteous 2006b). 
25. For instance, there are no recent data for Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, or Kenya, to take just the largest missing countries. 
26. In addition to remitting funds to relatives at home, emigrants may place
deposits on their own account in the banking system of their home country.
Cape Verde’s emigrant deposit scheme is the most remarkable example here,
with such deposits (up until recently subsidized) amounting to 40 percent of
M2 (Karpowicz 2006). 
27. The potential for some steady remittance flows to form the basis for a favor-
able credit rating is largely lost when the funds flow to a cash point, as with
MTOs, in contrast to being sent to a recipient’s bank or MFI account. 
28. One supplier, Ikobo, has expanded its debit card-based remittance technology
to several African countries. This service allows senders to top up remotely a186 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
Visa debit card that has been sent to the recipient, who can immediately with-
draw the money from ATMs in African cities. The service seems to be slightly
cheaper than the MTOs. Top-up call time codes for some African cell-phone
networks can also be purchased in the United Kingdom and other centers (and
communicated by phone to the recipient). (Within Africa, call time can some-
times be transferred between user accounts for a small fee.)
29. The database of the CGAP has been augmented by Peachey and Roe (2005), who
added more savings banks. The data presented in this study also incorporate some
additional refinements, including those suggested by Honohan (2006).
30. The overall household access percentage estimates presented in chapter 2 use
a nonlinear function of account numbers that should help reduce the biases
mentioned here.
31. Interestingly, the aggregate ratio of MFI deposits to loans is much higher (at 72
percent) in Africa than elsewhere. In other words, the net role of external
funds in financing the sector is smaller in Africa. 
32. Robinson (2006, 16) reviews the available evidence on the financial perform-
ance of leading African providers of microfinance: “Whether specialist organ-
izations or multipurpose institutions, these microfinance providers are
generally commercially funded and financially self-sufficient. They tend to
have substantial assets and high loan repayment rates. And except for NGOs,
their savings accounts typically outnumber their outstanding loans.” She also
notes that, by comparison with the very low per capita national income, staff
salaries at African providers are exceptionally high in international compar-
isons, though this is offset by much higher productivity as measured by num-
ber of clients per staff member.
33. The principles of mutuality are sometimes listed as democracy, participation,
solidarity, autonomy, and liability. Case studies of African mutual financial
institutions include Ouattara, Gonzalez-Vega, and Graham (1999). 
34. The traditional small-group approach, entailing forced lending and a highly
regimented repayment schedule, has been criticized for imposing unnecessary
transactions costs. Also, although group members may progress to larger loan
sizes if the whole group repays on time, the model does not cater to varied
evolution of client needs over time. 
35. FINCA and ACCION pioneered the village banking model. Sometimes the
model relies partly on existing village authority structures for its governance.
36. See Basu, Blavy, and Yulek (2004) for a useful overview.
37. A recent statistical examination of the accounts of several hundred MFIs across
the world suggests some interesting regularities (Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt, and
Morduch 2005). Firms that use individual-based loans (in contrast to village-
based lenders and those making group loans) tend to make larger loans. Only
in the case of these individual-based lenders is revenue sensitive to interest
rates. There is a positive relationship between labor cost and profitability but,
again, only for the individual-based lenders, suggesting that they benefit from
spending more on screening and monitoring while group- and village-based
institutions do not. Given that individual-based lenders are able to exploitFINANCE FOR ALL 187
scale economies by making larger loans to their more creditworthy clients, it is
not surprising that their portfolio is weighted toward less poor individuals.
38. Interestingly, the US$300 figure is a higher percentage (89 percent) of per
capita GNI than the average observed in Asia, Latin America, or the Middle
East and North Africa. This partly reflects the lower income levels in Africa.
But some African MFIs make extremely small loans. The average loan size for
ASSOPIL (Association pour la Promotion des Initiatives Locales) in Benin and
for Bessfa RB in Ghana is US$35 and US$37, respectively. That both are prof-
itable and large MFIs is due to their very high productivity—more than 1,000
borrowers per staff member in the case of ASSOPIL.
39. An instructive finding of Lafourcade and others (2005, figure 8) is that oper-
ating expenses represent a much higher proportion of total assets in southern
Africa and the Indian Ocean area than is the case in the rest of Africa. Perhaps
staff costs are disproportionately higher in the former subregions when com-
pared with the average scale of loans. 
40. MGAs (following the postwar continental European model) have begun to
emerge in some African countries (De Gobbi 2003). Sometimes sponsored by
banks, sometimes by business associations, and sometimes with concrete sup-
port from governments, MGAs are a way for groups of SMEs to exploit their
special knowledge of members’ creditworthiness to guarantee members’ bor-
rowings from banks and other financial intermediaries.
41. Other networks of mutuals began with a strong center, as in the case of PAME-
CAS in Senegal, which, as reflected in the old name that gave it its acronym
(Projet d’Appui aux Mutuelles d’Epargne et de Crédit au Sénégal), began as a
donor-sponsored effort. 
42. Among other things, the ARB Apex Bank operates a very effective retail pay-
ments system for the rural banks.
43. Somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be no corresponding apex institution
yet for the 700 Nigerian community banks (Charitonenko 2005).
44. If most mainstream financial intermediaries were to embrace the principles of
sustainable finance, their contribution would be stronger. For a detailed and
inspiring advocacy of this position for Africa, see Wood and de Cleene (2004).
45. In October 2003, responding to actual or anticipated political pressure, South
Africa’s financial institutions adopted the Black Economic Empowerment
Charter, including measures that will make banking services more accessible
to low-income households—notably a simplified deposit account—the Mzansi
account-offering lower charges and no overdraft facilities (unplanned use of
which can prove disastrously costly for the poor). Some of the techniques that
have been adopted to give effect to this charter are beginning to find their way
into other parts of Africa.
46. In an interesting experiment that might seem to clash with its somewhat con-
servative image, Barclays Bank has recently piloted an initiative in Ghana to
make microloans to susu collectors for onlending to the collectors’ clients. The
Ghana Cooperative Susu Collectors Association, the self-regulated apex body
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ried out preliminary screening of those borrowers. The Ghana Microfinance
Institutions Network (GHAMFIN) facilitated capacity building for the susu col-
lectors and a basic financial skills education program targeted to those who
would be the ultimate borrowers. Noting that Ghana’s susu collectors reflect a
£75 million economy (equivalent to almost 2 percent of GDP) “thriving below
the traditional banking radar,” a Barclays news release implies that the pro-
gram could be profitable at scale.
47. Education and investment in human capital are essential if financial technolo-
gies are to be adopted. Codified knowledge, like a credit-scoring or a mort-
gage-lending tool, requires significant levels of complementary human capital
and tacit knowledge, such as ICT literacy, as well as an adequate organiza-
tional and management capacity.
48. A contrasting example illustrating the damaging effects of some well-intended
government policies is the case of free provision of fertilizer by the govern-
ment to selected maize farmers in Zambia, which fatally undermined an oth-
erwise promising market-based fertilizer credit scheme (Ruotsi 2003).
49. Value-for-money calculations require considering not only the likely effective-
ness of proposed spending (taking into account moral hazard and other poten-
tially adverse unintended side effects), but also the opportunity cost (the value
of alternative uses of public funds). 
50. The oft-discussed Indian experiment of the late 1970s and 1980s, when banks
wishing to expand in the cities were obliged to match this growth with an
expansion of their rural branch network (Burgess and Pande 2004), is a case
in point. In few African cities is the prospect of opening an additional urban
branch a sufficiently attractive proposition to induce a banker to open also in
a rural area: such a policy risks backfiring and reducing branches and access
overall.
51. Among the most active have been the central banks of Ethiopia, Gambia,
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and the two CFA unions.
52. An interesting case study of these concerns appears in Chiumya (2006).
53. Even as nationally dominant an institution as FECECAM, with close to half a
million beneficiaries, had deposits amounting to only about 7 percent of bank
deposits in the latest year. This is not to imply that institutions with an MFI
focus are negligible in terms of total liabilities. For instance, the following are
among the top seven intermediaries in their countries, measured by total
deposits: FECECAM (Benin); Faîtière des Unités Coop, or FUCEC (Togo);
Fédération Nationale des Coopératives d’Epargne et de Crédit, or FENA-
COOPEC (Côte d’Ivoire); Crédit Mutuel (Senegal); Kafo Jiginew and Nyesigiso
(Mali); Réseau des Caisses Populaires du Burkina, or RCPB (Burkina Faso);
Cameroon Cooperative Credit Union League, or CAMCCUL, and Union Bank
(Cameroon); and Bank of Africa (Madagascar). Many large MFIs also have
substantial loans from banks.
54. Proposals in South Africa for two new tiers of restricted core and narrow banks
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existing minimum capital requirements for banks were a barrier to new entry
in retail banking for low-income clients. The minimum capital required of the
proposed new categories of bank would be smaller, at R 50 million and R 10
million, respectively, compared with the minimum for a full service bank of R
250 million. Essentially, in addition to providing transactions services, core
banks would be allowed to take deposits and make secured loans; narrow
banks would only take deposits. The helpfulness of such elaborate regulatory
refinements in facilitating viable and socially useful entry would depend on
national circumstances (FinMark Trust 2005).
55. Many African MFI regulators have become uneasy about the proliferation of
small moneylenders masquerading under the name of MFIs but operating in
the traditional manner of informal moneylenders everywhere. As in the past,
the existence of a ready market for the services of these moneylenders reflects
the limitations of formal finance. 
56. Electronic and cell-phone-based innovations in particular raise important reg-
ulatory questions that are well discussed in Porteous (2006b), who stresses the
desirability of regulatory openness to innovation and regulatory certainty to
give innovators the confidence to make the initial investment. With parts of
Africa close to the technological frontier in some aspects of these develop-
ments, this area is likely to be a rapidly evolving one for advanced economy
regulators also.
57. See the Central Bank of Nigeria’s circular dated April 23, 2004, available at
http://www.cenbank.org/out/circulars/bsd/2004/bsd-02-2004.pdf.
58. An important example of the new entrants in this field is the Investment Cli-
mate Facility for Africa (http://www.investmentclimatefacility.org), a joint
endeavor involving several national governments as well as some major multi-
national business groups. Working with the support of the African Union in
the context of the Africa Peer Review Mechanism process set up by the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development, the facility has financial markets as one
of its eight priority areas and is explicitly set up with a view to exploiting this
potential.
59. As far as microfinance is concerned, 11 key principles have been endorsed by
the Group of Eight, all 33 CGAP donor members, and many others: view them
at http://www.cgap.org/portal/site/CGAP/menuitem.64c03ec40a6d295067
808010591010a0. Collectively agreed guidelines for microfinance donors are
set out at http://www.cgap.org/portal/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanage
ment.servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/Documents/donorguidelines.pdf.
60. Some donors (for example, the U.S. Agency for International Development)
have been using business development schemes (for example, one being car-
ried out by Chemonics in Uganda) in coordination with their loan guarantee
program, with the goal of bringing projects to the point where the risks are
both lower and more easily calculated. It will be interesting to see how suc-
cessful this model proves to be.Introduction: The Vision
Appropriate affordable and sustainable financial services
The previous chapters have offered a vision of how financial systems in
African countries could evolve over the years ahead—a financial sector
delivering a more appropriate, affordable, and sustainable package of the
services needed by African economies and societies. This evolution means
more financial intermediaries that are backed by solid and reputable own-
ers, have skilled management, and compete energetically and imagina-
tively for business on the basis of strict attention to cost control and
knowledge of the local market and conditions. It also means an environ-
ment relevant to sound finance—the supporting infrastructures, legal and
informational, for property rights that can support financial contracts. 
Some of the services are needed by modern firms producing at high lev-
els of productivity for an international as well as a domestic market. Only
if the number and size of these firms grow can African economies hope
both to absorb the growing numbers of young people entering the labor
force in the years ahead1 and to generate adequate incomes to lift them
from absolute poverty.
Financial systems will also be needed to provide services at a small scale
to meet the needs of low-income households, microenterprises, and sub-
sistence and smallholder farming securely and at an affordable cost. These
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services (together with specific improvements in other sectors) will con-
tribute to the ability of the poor to ensure that the new generation has the
health and education to participate fully in the opportunities created by
the growing modern sector.2
There is no need to choose between growth and services
The dichotomy between financial services for growth and those for out-
reach was clear enough in the past in terms of which institutions catered
to which market. But increasingly the dividing line has become blurred,
and this trend will continue. One reason is the middle market of small-
and medium-scale enterprises that now function at the margins of the
formal economy and that are often treated by banks as informal and
unbankable entities. These enterprises must increasingly move upscale in
terms of their business practices—including their accounting and their
engagement with the official sphere—eventually graduating into a higher
league of productivity and competitiveness. Another is that increasing
awareness of the profit potential at the bottom of the pyramid will result
in formal intermediaries moving downscale even as microfinance special-
ists grow up with their clients. Thus, as has already begun to happen in
some countries, some microfinance institutions (MFIs) will become banks
and some banks will become market leaders in catering to low-income
groups. Meanwhile, the emergence of strong financial intermediaries
whose goal is to seek out profitable and secure uses for their funds will
offer energetic entrepreneurs a way of securing the finance needed for
their growth without having to seek political patronage or a disadvanta-
geous alliance with incumbents.
Governments are better equipped to enable market functioning than to 
participate in it
Although this vision sees a major role for private activity—reflecting a
view that finance is a sector that is uniquely sensitive to adverse and unin-
tended side effects of misconceived government and political
intervention—government has a major policy role in seeing that this vision
is accomplished. As this report has stressed throughout, the most reward-
ing task for government is not to try to substitute for the market but instead
to enable and encourage market functioning by building the overall envi-
ronment and the specific meso-level infrastructures needed by market par-
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shape of government policies, at least at the technical level, and they, too,
need to consider how to contribute to the achievement of the vision.
From Vision to Policy
The goal of this study has been to present a considered review of the chal-
lenges and opportunities for financial sector policy in African countries. By
now it will be clear that the approach adopted does not lead to a brief
checklist of easily accomplished items to be implemented. Any checklist
can appear both depressingly long and full of hard-to-accomplish
elements.
Indeed, most African countries have, in the past couple of decades, been
reforming fundamental banking and central banking laws, as well as their
counterparts underpinning the insurance and securities markets. Some of
these countries have enacted laws defining and clarifying the operation of
mutual funds, leasing companies, and wholesale payments systems,
among others, so that the relevant intermediaries can do business without
fear that lack of legal certainty will result in unexpected consequences.
Legislation underpinning the modern use of collateral and governing insol-
vency has also been on the agenda, as of course has the whole vexed area
of ownership and rights over the use of land. All these efforts are essential
to improve legal certainty, without which financial contracts become too
risky for all parties. 
Meanwhile, regulatory structures have had to be designed and staffed
with adequately trained professionals, not only for banks but also for
microfinance institutions, whose solvency their clients have little chance
of evaluating. Failing banks have had to be restructured, recapitalized, and
placed under reputable management and ownership. 
All these measures have been necessary and have in most cases only
been partially accomplished. Each step has been partly technical, but most
have also involved tactical and political choices. Should entry be blocked
to give breathing space for incumbents to consolidate? Should entities con-
trolled by nationals be given preference over foreigners in the hope that
they might act in the national interest? Is finance so sensitive that every-
thing must be built to the most complex prevailing standards, or are short-
cuts permissible and desirable? The reasoning of this report does suggest
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Thus, a three-stranded common thread runs through the policy discus-
sion of this report. 
• First, while not neglecting to build for the long term, shortcuts can be
taken that will allow African financial systems to deliver the most essen-
tial services faster, without compromising on stability and efficiency. 
• Second, openness must be maintained to what the outside world can
offer, whether in the form of regional cooperation at the policy level or
the provision of services by foreign institutions. 
• Third, the value of approaching policy with attention to inclusiveness as
a goal must be understood.
Shortcuts
The bedrock of any coherent vision of what an African financial system
should aspire to is certainly defined in large part by what has been achieved
in advanced economies,3 building on solid legal and information founda-
tions. What has been referred to previously as the modernist agenda is
what is needed for the long term. Fleshing out that agenda and helping
make it a reality over time are what external advisers (including the World
Bank) spend most of their time discussing with policy makers. And rightly
so. Many of the elements take a long time to put in place. That is not only
why making a start on them is important but also why seeking the short-
cuts and ensuring that quick-yielding measures receive sufficient priority
are important. 
The suggestion that information infrastructures may yield greater ben-
efits than legal reform in low-income countries with sizable governance
deficits is an example of such a shortcut involving choices and prioritiza-
tion as between different elements of the modernist agenda. 
Another example is in the idea that regulation of securities markets
might be more successful in most African markets if it begins with the
lighter regulatory touch typical of second-board markets in advanced
economies. Likewise, avoidance of the complexities that would be intro-
duced by most variants of the Basel II capital framework for bank regula-
tion is suggested for now. More generally, the desirability of adapting
regulatory structures to local needs and capacities is something that needs
to be acknowledged more than it has been, though it must not, of course,
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duce the carelessness and self-dealing that have caused many intermedi-
ary failures in the past.
Most of the activist agenda can be seen as a shortcut, for which
advanced financial systems have less need (though even these suffer from
market failures requiring correction, as has been mentioned). The promi-
nence of the activist agenda is thus likely to subside over time as structural
weaknesses are progressively corrected. For the moment, though, getting
an effective financial system is a struggle, not something that will happen
of its own accord.
But strengthening governance is crucial where activism is being tried. If
state-owned development finance institutions (and credit guarantee
schemes) have failed for lack of adequate governance in the past, one must
be alert to the danger that social security funds, newly encouraged to con-
tribute to the provision of long-term and risk finance, could slip down the
same path if their good governance is not ensured. 
External Agency
At several points in the discussion, we have argued that external agencies
can make up for what is lacking at home. They can offer improved gover-
nance through their relative independence from national political pres-
sures. They can offer risk pooling and avoid the diseconomies of small
national scale. They can bring technology and help build human capital.
This argument applies to regional organizations, to foreign-owned finan-
cial intermediaries and markets, and to donors. 
Exploring the potential benefits of internationalization, whether regional
or global, should be a requirement for policy design in any aspect of finance
for African countries. Can the sought-for improvement be achieved more
effectively or more cheaply through some form of outsourcing or through
regional cooperation? Foreigndoes not necessarily mean good, even in finance,
and the potential downsides, whether in terms of the sizable coordination
costs involved in regionalization or the excessive macroeconomic volatility
that might be introduced by premature capital account liberalization, must be
carefully calculated. But in many—if not most—cases, the benefits easily out-
weigh the costs, and many objections (such as the fear that locals will not
learn the relevant skills if services are being provided by foreign institutions)
prove on examination to be groundless. Managing populist doubts here is a
challenge for advisers and even more so for national politicians.196 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
Inclusiveness
Though it may not seem so, conventional financial reform is a potentially
radical undertaking, which may be subversive of incumbent interests as it
transforms the economy and society by giving opportunities to all. Who
can doubt that some such transformation is needed in most African
economies today? A society in which all have a clear stake in underwriting
sustained economic growth—both the existing elites, who craft policy, and
the poor, whose horizons can be substantially lifted only by the assurance
of a reasonable share in expanded general prosperity—is the only type of
society that will prosper in the decades ahead. Inclusiveness is therefore
also a criterion against which policy stances must be evaluated. 
Facilitating the extension of microfinance to a wider clientele requires
the action not just of the government in ensuring that innovators are not
hampered by uncalled-for rules but also of sponsors and intermediaries.
The latter must innovate to reduce unit costs and to meet the barriers of
scale and remoteness, but they must also ensure that successful innova-
tions are sustained and scaled up, thereby helping achieve inclusiveness by
avoiding the syndrome of repeated small-scale initiatives that run out of
steam because follow-up is less glamorous than trailblazing. 
Inclusiveness is also generated by ensuring a sufficient population of
competitive service providers. Otherwise incumbents will restrict them-
selves to those customers that are easiest to serve. Instead of protecting
incumbents from new entrants, many—though not all—African policy
makers have wisely been welcoming entry by reputable service providers. 
Where Should Government Begin?—Two Attainable Goals
As every country that has participated in the World Bank–International
Monetary Fund Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP)4 is well
aware, bringing legal and regulatory structures into compliance with best
practice—as defined by international regulatory bodies and expert
opinion—can be a daunting task. Indeed, for many countries, limited
administrative resources mean the task is impossible to accomplish within
a short time frame. The task implies more than just adjusting laws and
more than accomplishing institutional changes (within court systems, reg-
istries, and the like). It can also involve political upheaval because of the
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important directions in which valuable results can often be obtained at rel-
atively low cost—whether political or administrative.
Boost Credit Flows by Strengthening Registries and
Streamlining Court Procedures
Given the frequent coexistence of high liquidity and a credit crunch—with
bankers in some countries actively discouraging deposits, a lowering of
deposit rates, and a widening of spreads—improving the conditions that
will help increase the flow of credit to the middle market could be the top
priority for many African economies. One dimension to the solution is
more innovative use of lending technologies, some of which have been
discussed in chapter 4. But much of that lies in the hands of the interme-
diaries themselves. What can government do? Given the greater freedom
now allowed in the determination of interest rates in many African coun-
tries and the much lower rates of inflation that now prevail, financial
repression and macroeconomic instability may no longer be top of the list
of the barriers to increased bank lending—although this situation could
change and requires continued vigilance by policy makers. Instead, a num-
ber of other needed steps loom larger, several of which have already been
alluded to in chapter 3. Taking these steps will help both stability of the
financial system and development. 
The functioning of registries—of land, of claims on movable assets, of
credit records—needs improvement almost everywhere. In many cases,
this improvement includes enacting supporting legislation. Closely related
are the special pieces of legislation needed to underpin leasing and an
expansion of the mortgage market. These too deserve to be considered
early on. Some African countries have recently embarked on vigorous
efforts along these lines, and an opportunity will soon exist to take stock at
a nuts-and-bolts level of the degree of success here (as in other specific
areas) to learn from such an evaluation about what works best in African
conditions; carrying out such a stock-taking soon is on the World Bank’s
agenda.
Improving court procedures is, of course, more challenging. In particu-
lar, where corruption infects the courts, progress toward effective reform
will be slow. But some simple procedural changes can help. The inefficient
court procedures behind which delinquent borrowers (that could, but will
not, repay) hide can be dismantled—again often requiring legislation and198 MAKING FINANCE WORK FOR AFRICA
more. The quality of court judgments may be improved by training and
perhaps by instituting a special commercial court. 
This task is not trivial. Populist opposition to any pro-creditor reforms is
likely to be stirred up by vested interests, and the reforms are unlikely to
be enacted without vigorous and skilled political championship. Packaging
such reforms with a national strategy for expanding the coverage of micro-
finance could be one way of building consensus around this aspect of the
modernist agenda.5
Establish Independent Supervision
A politically dependent supervisory agency can be worse than useless, not
least by protecting inefficient incumbents from competition. For example,
at present, the laws on banking and central banking in many African coun-
tries do not give the monetary authority or the banking regulator sufficient
operational independence from politicians—and from the banks—to do a
good job. The importance of such independence was not yet evident when
these laws—often modeled ultimately on since-revised laws of the United
Kingdom or France—were enacted.6
Yet too much discretionary power in the hands of the banking regulator
also can be damaging, and independence of the monetary authority pre-
supposes a free press and an informed public opinion. Accountability is a
necessary companion of independence. Accountability, in turn, requires a
clear understanding of the goals of the regulator (as with the monetary
authority). These goals should envisage facilitating entry of solid interme-
diaries, thereby enhancing competition. If systemic crises are to be avoided,
creating the conditions for greater reliance on market discipline as a com-
plement to official supervision is likely to yield the best results. 
If they are to be independent, the banking regulator and the monetary
authority need to have commensurate skills and administrative capacity.
Here is a delicate balance. In the case of the bank regulator, the marginal
benefit of having an additional trained and experienced supervisory staff
can seem small in the years between crises, but the value of having one to
head off an incipient crisis, or to deal with a crisis when it hits, is high. That
is one reason for advocating regional cooperative arrangements in bank
regulation (as discussed above). As for the monetary authority, the central
bank of many African countries seems to be the best-resourced agency,
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seigniorage to cover administrative costs. On the one hand, these resources
are sometimes used to create a center of excellence for guiding a wide
range of financial policy, not just monetary policy. On the other hand,
some of these institutions might have exercised more moderation in their
office-building programs. Other central banks labor under the burden of
having absorbed the cost of a banking or fiscal crisis and no longer enjoy
financial independence, let alone operational or policy independence. 
As for the regulation of nonbank finance, a lighter touch to capital mar-
ket regulation may be appropriate for many African countries. And
although insurance and pensions are increasingly important, the complex-
ity of insurance accounting and the still small size of the insurance market
argue for recognizing that it may not be feasible to staff the insurance reg-
ulator’s office to a level that would ensure a high probability that abuses
will be forestalled; caveat emptor must remain important for this sector.
The design of prudential regulation for microfinance has become quite
a fraught issue in recent years, despite consensus on some principles. The
main problems seem to be the diversity and multiplicity of MFIs and a ten-
dency for newly established regulators to overreach and micromanage.
Two presumptions may be useful to guide policy in most African countries:
(a) non-deposit-taking MFIs do not require prudential regulation and (b)
delegated monitoring to umbrella institutions of networks of mutuals or
cooperatives can help reduce the central burden of supervision to a practi-
cal level. Finally, regulatory design needs to recognize that banks (moving
downmarket) and MFIs (moving upmarket) will increasingly compete in
the middle market. Regulation of the two in markets where they are both
active should be conducive to a healthy competition between them.
Contrasting Initial Conditions
Given the diversity of initial conditions in different African countries, will
one size fit all in policy design? Yes and no: yes, insofar as the goal is rely-
ing heavily on a self-sustaining, market-driven financial system to make
many of the major allocative decisions in the economy; no, in that trans-
planting some specific practices (such as Basel II’s new method for calcu-
lating bank capital) into an environment lacking key prerequisites would
be a mistake—and also in that priorities will be different for Africa and
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Thus, although all African countries face similar issues to a greater or
lesser extent, the relative weight to be attached to different aspects will
depend on local conditions. For instance, just five different country char-
acteristics immediately point to the different priorities that need to inform
the design and timing of policy reforms:7
• Postconflict countries
• Sparsely populated countries
• Small countries
• Oil-rich countries
• Countries with critical mass
Postconflict Countries
The resilience of some financial transactions in states whose governments
have been overwhelmed by conflict has been remarked upon by some as
an illustration of the resilience of the private financial sector and its ability
to deliver some services even without the support of the state.8 But for the
most part, the effective range of the formal financial sector in conflict-
ridden countries typically shrinks to a limited geographic zone, as up-
country branches of banks are abandoned. Most banks indeed collapse
altogether or teeter on the brink of insolvency, their liquidity dependent
on monetary financing of the government’s deficit. The currency notes
deteriorate physically and have to compete with the introduction of a par-
allel or forged currency by insurgent groups. 
Among the priorities for the new government is the reestablishment of
credibility of the currency, supported by a fair, consistent, and transparent
treatment of the problems of preexisting currency notes and by a coherent
and credible macroeconomic and monetary policy framework.9
Reentry of bankers of substance will present several different chal-
lenges. Some of the old bankers will have left for good, but others may
wish to reenter, even though their old banks had failed. Can they be con-
sidered fit and proper? 
The chaos may have created an opportunity for shady transactions to be
routed through what was left of the financial system, and even the percep-
tion that this could be so, will mean that AML–CFT (anti-money-
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to be put in place earlier than otherwise if this proves necessary to reestab-
lish the country’s banking links with international correspondents.
The domestic payments system is likely to require reconstruction from
bottom up. If security is still questionable in up-country locations and no
bank branches exist yet, the government will have difficulty in making
payments, including to its employees. Post offices may not yet be function-
ing, and in their absence no alternative may exist to having the central
bank provide check-cashing facilities on a temporary basis. Eventually,
banks will return to the main outlying towns, especially if they are offered
a realistic fee for cashing government checks. Electronic payments using
mobile-phone technology—which is likely to be one of the first services
reaching a wide geographic coverage—and points of sale in a handful of
stores in the larger towns may prove feasible at a relatively early date. (The
legal texts that would be desirable to place electronic payments on a secure
basis may not be strictly necessary to underpin this system at first but will
be needed in due course.)10
Sparsely Populated Countries
The many sparsely populated countries in Africa display some similarities
to postconflict countries in terms of communications difficulties. Here too,
then, electronic retail payments and mobile telephony offer a great oppor-
tunity. To ensure that these technologies are exploited, policy makers must
avoid lock-in to a particular limited technology (some of the systems now
being rolled out are a lot more capable than others) or to systems that can-
not communicate with each other, to enact the legislation that will make
banks and others that use these systems feel secure in their rights, and to
remove unneeded banking regulations that might impede the adoption of
these technologies.
Many African countries are in the process of introducing highly secure,
speedy, and effective wholesale payments systems. The effort should not
stop there; indeed, improving retail payments effectiveness is a higher pri-
ority for many African countries. 
A distributed architecture of the financial system is likely to be an essen-
tial feature of sparsely populated countries, though this feature depends on
how the population is actually distributed. In some countries, like Chad or
Niger, large parts of the country are almost totally uninhabited, with most
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ters. In time, the network of viable bank branches conceivably could blan-
ket these centers. In Tanzania, by contrast, the population is scattered
across a large number of isolated settlements. The bulk of the population
there will remain as at present—quite far from a bank branch.11 This situ-
ation means that access for a large fraction of the population can be only
through MFIs or some form of agencies. The role of governments in
smoothing the way for such arrangements is not only regulatory. Ingenu-
ity will be needed to ensure that any subsidies they choose to provide—or
the contracts for effecting government payments in rural areas—are
designed in a way that offers a level playing field, so that the most efficient
financial service providers will end up delivering each aspect of the service.
This system may well result in a distributed architecture, with larger insti-
tutions such as banks, MFI-network umbrella organizations, or the post
office taking the contract and subcontracting parts of it to rural agencies,
including MFIs.
Small Countries
Small size presents a somewhat different set of tradeoffs. Here the inability
to exploit economies of scale onshore and the tendency of the few
providers to exploit monopoly power naturally point to sourcing services—
both market and regulatory—offshore. These countries need some way of
overcoming the diseconomies of insufficient scale, including the lack of
competition between different financial service providers. Policy makers
will want to err on the side of increased openness to entry from reputable
foreign financial service providers, even if they are clearly going to rely
heavily on their parent companies abroad for shared technology, manage-
ment, and back-office and even credit-approval services. 
An alliance with a nearby securities exchange, possibly aiming at the
creation of a satellite of the foreign exchange, will also be worth exploring
if the country does not have its own—and even if it does. This arrange-
ment can raise exchange control issues for both countries to the extent
that dealings on the satellite exchange could be used to export funds, but
these issues will become less and less important as reliance on exchange
controls diminishes. 
The smaller the country, the more attractive regional cooperation on
prudential regulation of banks and other intermediaries becomes, and out-
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solution. To an extent, these advantages of outsourcing have long been
recognized by small African countries as different as Guinea-Bissau and
Lesotho. But the potential has not yet been altogether fulfilled.
Oil-Rich Countries
Several African countries have been enjoying a sizable boom in the value
of oil exports. For the smaller countries in this group, the effects on paper
are astonishing. Indeed, Equatorial Guinea may have had the second-
highest per capita gross domestic product in the world in 2005. Yet the rest
of the economy has little enough to show for these gains. To be sure, the
local banks are doing well out of fees charged on international transfers
associated with the oil business, even though most of that business is
financed offshore. Financial sector policy can have a role both in limiting
the Dutch-disease effects of overvaluation that have been seen elsewhere
with oil booms and as a mechanism for channeling some of these resources
into the financing of productive investment—which in turn can help
increase productivity and output in the nonoil sector.
Apart from monetary and exchange rate policy, the issues here are those
of the governance of public funds, such as pension and social security
funds writ large. These, more than banking or stock exchange issues, will
assume priority in the minds of financial sector policy makers. 
Countries with Critical Mass
A few African countries have the scale to consider providing a wider range
of services onshore and putting in place a more comprehensive adminis-
trative and regulatory framework. Policy makers can be more ambitious in
the nature and form of their policy initiatives. Kenya and Nigeria have
joined South Africa in this category now, and the discussion would be also
relevant for some others, increasingly so over time.
The ability of financial sector policy makers in larger economies to strike
a distinctive policy note and hold to it has been most dramatically illus-
trated by the capital adequacy ruling of the Central Bank of Nigeria.12 This
experience shows several features of larger financial systems:
• First, the ability to be innovative and to design policies that are relevant
to national needs without frightening away the major participants. In a
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rather than put up so much capital, but the franchise value of a bank
license—its potential profitability—means that Nigerian banks
complied.
• Second, the value of a domestic stock market, even in a matter that was
primarily for banking. For all the belittling of Africa’s stock markets that
one hears, the Nigerian stock exchange did manage to raise about
US$3 billion toward the recapitalization of the banks. The banks might
have had difficulty in raising such funds if they had to rely on a private
equity market and might have paid a lot more in fees and in informa-
tion discount if they had listed on the Johannesburg or London
exchange. Once again, the limitations of a small exchange are relative. 
• Finally, the role of an active public debate among financial sector spe-
cialists and the policy-aware public. Not only was the policy floated first
for discussion before being finalized, but also it was extensively and
freely debated in the public media. This kind of transparency and con-
sultation in policy formation may not result in as vigorous or informa-
tive a debate in smaller countries, but it is a costless and valuable
approach.
These reflections emphasize how financial sector policy makers can be
more ambitious and comprehensive in their policy formulation. These
steps include efforts to improve competitiveness and to sanction abuses of
market conduct regulation. (In smaller economies, regulators often do not
have an effective way of ensuring that profit-reducing regulations are
really enforced: the prospect of lower profits may merely trigger exit.) 
Thus, larger countries can be the pioneers in upgrading the market con-
duct of financial intermediaries and markets. The formation or reactivation
of consumer and producer consultative groups could help in the design of
such policies. These policies could include not only the market conduct
rules that should underpin a well-functioning stock exchange but also reg-
ulations designed to curb predatory lending and to promote access of
lower-income groups to financial services. Here, recently enacted legisla-
tion and the financial sector charter in South Africa offer an interesting
model. The adaptation and application of such legislation north of the
Limpopo River could begin in the larger economies, and it should have at
least a demonstration effect everywhere.
* * *POLICY CHOICES IN CURRENT CONDITIONS 205
A combination of modernism and activism, each tempered by an aware-
ness of the limitations of the institutional preconditions in most African
countries, will do best in guiding the move toward stronger and more
effective financial systems. These limitations include the stretched admin-
istrative resources of governments and the weakness of governance insti-
tutions, such as institutions of financial oversight. These limitations imply
that highly complex regulatory designs are unlikely to be operated effec-
tively and that hands-on government involvement in credit allocation, or
generally in the ownership of financial intermediaries, is more likely to be
subverted in favor of special interests.
Delivering the infrastructures for the modernization agenda while
ensuring that the door is left open for activists—local or foreign, profit-
seeking or charitable—is the main agenda for government and its agencies.
The agenda is demanding, not only because of its technical complexity and
the need to respond to changes in the international environment, but also
because it lacks the kind of dramatic initiative that helps secure political
support.
Nevertheless, persistence and ingenuity will be repaid given the central
importance, for achieving development goals, of making finance work for
Africa.
Notes
1. According to United Nations projections, the population in age groups 15 to 59
in Sub-Saharan Africa will grow from 401 million in 2005 to 514 million in
2015 and 656 million in 2025. Although the absolute increases continue to
grow, the rate of growth decade by decade has already peaked (at almost 34
percent in the decade ending in 1995). 
2. At present, almost one-third of the more than 80 million children in the 10 to
14 age group in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) work in the
labor force.
3. To argue that modern finance represents a relatively coherent long-term
objective for African financial sector policy makers is not to deny that
advanced financial systems have experienced failure. Most advanced
economies experienced severe banking collapses in the 1980s or 1990s, result-
ing in a new emphasis on capital adequacy. The misleading information pro-
vided to stock exchange participants and other customers by prominent
financial firms in the late 1990s and early 2000s has led to a series of high-pro-
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4. Twenty African countries (plus the Communauté Économique et Monétaire
de l’Afrique Centrale union) have already participated in the FSAP since 2000.
Three countries have already had follow-up assessments. 
5. Although the seemingly high interest rates necessarily charged by microfi-
nance companies risks being a stumbling block here, MFIs need to attend to
their public image as they expand their coverage, or they too could become
unpopular.
6. Anti-money-laundering and combating of financing of terrorism laws and
arrangements are being modernized in many countries under international
pressure to improve financial integrity.
7. A sixth category—offshore centers—applies only to Mauritius, the Seychelles,
and perhaps Cape Verde at present and will not be discussed further here.
8. The case of Somalia is often mentioned, though some other aspects of the
economy were considerably more resilient than the financial sector (see
Mubarak 2003; Nenova and Harford 2004).
9. Addison, Le Billon, and Murshed (2001) and Addison and others (2005) pro-
vide overviews of the issues, with examples from African experiences, includ-
ing those of Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic
of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Rwanda, and Somalia.
10. A valuable literature survey of postconflict microfinance is in Nagarajan and
McNulty (2004).
11. Although there are 200 bank branches in Tanzania, the mean distance (over
all rural households) to the nearest bank branch is 38 kilometers.
12. The policy was announced by Charles Soludo, executive governor of the Cen-
tral Bank of Nigeria, within a month of his appointment in 2004. He described
it as “preliminary thoughts on the major elements of the reforms by the CBN
[Central Bank of Nigeria]” on which comments and suggestions of the com-
mittee of bankers were solicited “before we finalize them.” But the main fea-
tures were maintained, even to extent of the timetable and the banking
consolidation (every bank with a capital of at least the equivalent of about
US$200 million—an exceptionally high figure by international standards). See
http://www.cenbank.org/documents/speeches.asp.Intrafirm credit represents a large fraction of firm financing, especially for
small firms and others with limited access to bank finance. Successful credit
providers in Africa recognize the continuing importance of a relationship
model of credit. Such lenders rely on (a) multidimensional evaluations of
creditworthiness in making the loan or credit sale and (b) flexible enforce-
ment (Fafchamps 2004; see also Biggs and Shah 2006). 
Credit Appraisal
Acquiring information is time consuming and costly. It also presupposes that
the lender is embedded in the local economy. First, the lender needs to know
about the borrower’s ability to deliver high-quality goods and services to the
market. Then the lender needs to know whether the borrower has a good
business reputation and would be reluctant to lose it (see box A.1).1 And last,
the lender needs to know if the borrower’s ethical character and ability to dis-
simulate make it unlikely that the borrower will conceal a capacity to repay.
Modern credit-scoring techniques implicitly include some indicators that
are correlated with those characteristics, even though they are only very indi-
rectly correlated, on the basis of past repayment record, and are not at the
level of detail accumulated by painstaking, face-to-face observation of the
borrower in multiple economic and social interactions. The most important
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source of this kind of information is the history of successful exchanges. Once
trust has been built in this way, it represents a valuable bilateral relationship
that can underpin future lending. Reflecting this trust, surprisingly lengthy
credit relationships predominate in African markets (Fafchamps 2004).
Enforcement
Having made the loan, lenders find that enforcement proves to be deliber-
ately flexible in the business environment prevailing in most African coun-
BOX A.1
Reputation
Reputation is a widely discussed aspect of credit within tightly knit commu-
nities. Scholars of contemporary and historical businesses have explored
the ways in which a poor payment record of one member of even a far-flung
network of merchants can be reported and result in ostracism from the
whole group (Greif 1993). By reporting a default, an aggrieved creditor
spreads the bad reputation of the delinquent; the threat of this happening
amplifies the costs of default and reduces its incidence. 
These reputation networks are generally formed of people with a common
ethnicity—Lebanese and Syrian in many countries of West Africa, Asante in
Ghana, and others. At the same time, it is commonly observed that foreign
firms find it difficult to deal with African firms and find them generally unre-
liable, and several studies find stronger credit channels within rather than
across ethnicities.
This issue has led some people to believe that trust and reputation are in-
herently ethnically based and that they have no likely or beneficial place in
a pluralist financial system. However, it is important to not overstate the
role of ethnicity in underlying effective credit flows in Africa. Indeed, the
role of ethnicity in supporting credit and other business relationships is of-
ten misunderstood. It is not a question of ethnic solidarity. Social networks
in Africa are not coterminous with ethnic groups. Ethnic business networks
are much smaller than the ethnicities—they are historically created sub-
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tries. In the interfirm credit market studied by Fafchamps (2004) and his
collaborators, lenders recognize that many uncertainties (weather or trans-
port difficulties are two of the most common) can affect borrowers’ ability
to repay on time. Nonculpable delays or excusable breaches of contract are
therefore automatically excused. Lenders don’t regard a delay of even a
few weeks to be at all significant. Indeed, in especially uncertain environ-
ments, no specific repayment date may be specified. Even after the due
date, lenders wait for payment. And a delay does not imply a high proba-
bility of nonpayment: typically 80 or 90 percent of delayed interfirm pay-
ments eventually come in. 
Eventually, when there is a prospect of being repaid, the lender will take
some actions. In few African countries does this problem often involve
recourse to courts or lawyers (Fafchamps 2004, table 4.5).2 Instead, when
repayment seems possible, the lender will begin to harass or closely mon-
itor the borrower, often turning up on market day or payday, when the
borrower might be more likely to have liquidity, to see if the ability to
repay has improved. Renegotiation of the loan is also possible at this stage.
Lenders and traders also report other forms of sanction for slow payers.
Borrowers cannot expect to get the best deals or priority deliveries when
certain goods are scarce. The business relationship is thus a form of busi-
ness collateral. Ensuring its maintenance is an incentive for debtors to
repay. This relationship, of course, suggests and requires a degree of
monopoly power for the lender, pointing to the social cost of a credit sys-
tem that is built on such a costly structure of information gathering.
Notes
1. For centuries, some societies and ethnic groups have cultivated a practice of
publicizing and punishing defaults among their members. Some such conven-
tions may partly explain the higher degree of intraethnic group credit observed
in some African countries (Fisman 2003).
2. An exception was found for Zimbabwe when it was studied in the mid-1990s.
The existence of a relatively efficient court system there did encourage greater
use. Interestingly, there were more breaches of contract noted in Zimbabwe,
suggesting that the availability of enforcement through courts encouraged
more adventurous lending, which led to more breaches.Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2001. “The Colonial Ori-
gins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” American Eco-
nomic Review 91 (5): 1369–401. 
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